Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

700.00/4–2651

Memorandum for the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)

top secret

Washington, April 26, 1951.

Subject: Review of the Current World Situation and Ability of the Force Being Maintained to Meet United States Commitments

References: A. NSC 20/4¹
B. NSC 68 Series²
C. NSC Action No. 393–b³

At the request of the Secretary of Defense the attached copies of two memoranda with enclosures by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject are circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council.

Pending the scheduling of this item on the agenda of an early Council meeting, it is being referred to the Senior NSC Staff⁴ for the preparation of appropriate recommendations for Council action with respect thereto.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Annex 1]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

top secret

Washington, 15 January 1951.

Subject: Review of the Current World Situation and Ability of the Forces Being Maintained to Meet United States Commitments.

1. In accordance with the directive contained in a memorandum by the Secretary of Defense dated 16 August 1950,⁵ the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward herewith their review of the current world situation and ability of the forces being maintained to meet United States commitments.

2. As a result of their review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff now recommend that the United States:

a. Continue to accelerate the build-up of the tangible military power of the United States and its allies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will make further recommendations for increases and for changes in the composition of United States armed forces in accordance with the situation as it develops;

b. Build up even more rapidly and more resolutely the intangible resources favorable to our objectives which live in the minds and hearts of men both within and without the iron curtain;

c. Fully implement the course of action set forth in subparagraph 21/ of NSC 20/4 which states:

“Keep the U.S. public fully informed and cognizant of the threats to our national security so that it will be prepared to support the measures which we must accordingly adopt.”

To this end special emphasis should be given to keeping the American people fully and clearly informed, as appropriate, regarding United States policies with respect to the conflict with the Kremlin, the reasons therefore, and the actions being taken by the United States and its allies to implement such a policy;

d. Intensify information and intelligence measures behind the iron curtain so that those who are opposed to Kremlin-dominated communism may have hopes for the future as well as an opportunity to communicate with the outside free world;

e. Develop a coordinated and integrated propaganda crusade^* against Kremlin-dominated communism everywhere. For this purpose the free world needs an inspiring or animating principle which will pervade every thought, feeling or action of people in the free world as well as of those behind the iron curtain who are opposed to Kremlin-dominated communism;

f. Develop and rapidly implement a large-scale program of psychological warfare, including special operations; and

g. Develop an integrated and coordinated over-all United States economic, political, psychological, including special operations, and military national program, including a plan for operations by the United States and its allies against Kremlin-dominated communism and its aggression tactics, designed to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, to force the USSR to the defensive, and ultimately to reduce to impotence the threat of Kremlin-dominated communism. This plan should include affirmative measures of economic, clandestine, subversive, and psychological character to foment and support unrest and revolution in selected strategic satellite countries and Russian political divisions. The objective would be the establishment of friendly regimes not under Kremlin domination. Such action is essential to engage the Russian attention, keep the Kremlin off balance, and force an increased expenditure of Soviet resources in counteraction. In other words, it would be the current Soviet cold-war technique used against the Soviets, and must be carried out aggressively with full acceptance of the risk of war.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

[Subannex]

Study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret

[Washington, January 15, 1951.]

Review of the Current World Situation and Ability of the Forces Being Maintained To Meet United States Commitments

Introduction

1. This Study consists of four sections, as follows:

a. A Review of the Current World Situation from the Strategic Viewpoint.

b. A Review of the Ability of the Forces Being Maintained To Meet United States Commitments;

c. Conclusions; and

d. Further action suggested for the United States.

section i: a review of the current world situation from the strategic viewpoint

General

2. The United States faces today one of the greatest dangers in its history. The Korean war could be the first phase of a global war between the United States and the USSE. No areas of agreement which might lessen or end this global struggle are apparent except those based on appeasement of the Soviets.

3. For the past two years the United States has followed a policy of containment, by measures short of the actual employment of United States armed forces with respect to the aggressive expansionist activities directed by the Kremlin. In Korea for the first time the United States was faced with the stark alternative either of abandoning, at least in part, its policy of containment or of employing its armed forces, together with those of likeminded nations, to resist armed aggression.

4. In view of the relative weakness of the military forces in being of the Western Powers, the only course of action, which at this time is open to the free world in deterring the Soviets from actions that, involve the risk of global war or for thwarting the Soviet piecemeal aggression is to continue, pending build-up, the tactic of containment but more vigorously implemented and including the use of armed forces as appropriate and available. The present world situation is fraught with danger but it can be satisfactorily resolved if faced with resolution and with action.

5. In order to implement the above tactic, the four following equally important actions are essential:

a. A coordinated and integrated crusade^† against Kremlin-dominated communism everywhere;

b. A rapid, resolute build-up of the tangible military power of the United States and its allies;

c. An even more rapid and more resolute build-up of the intangible resources favorable to our objectives which live in the minds and hearts of men both within and without the iron curtain; and

d. A large-scale program of psychological warfare, including special operations, integrated with the foregoing national actions and rapidly implemented.

6. Presently available intelligence does not indicate clearly the national strength and degree of preparedness of the USSR for a protracted global war. The majority of the people of the Soviet Union are imbued with a high degree of patriotism and loyalty to their land, and they would fight in its defense. The degree of their military readiness for global war is not fully known; however, indications are that the USSR is a nation in advanced stages of preparation for war. The possibility, however, exists that the Kremlin is not entirely satisfied as yet with its military readiness for a protracted global war. What is known of Soviet military strength in being is sufficient to focus attention on the relatively great strength of the USSR as compared with that of the Western Powers, and of Soviet capability to initiate without warning at least armed action with limited objectives.

7. The ultimate objective of the Soviet rulers is the establishment of a communist world controlled by them or their successors. Their immediate objectives, all consistent with the over-all objective, are as follows:^‡

a. To maintain the control of the Kremlin over the peoples of the Soviet Union;

b. To strengthen the economic and military position and defend the territory of the Soviet Union;

c. To consolidate the control over the European and Asian satellites (including Communist China);

d. To make secure the strategic approaches to the Soviet Union and to prevent the establishment, in Europe and Asia, of forces capable of threatening the Soviet position;

e. To eliminate United States influence in Europe and Asia;

f. To establish Soviet domination over Europe and Asia; and

g. To weaken and disintegrate the non-Soviet world generally especially to undermine the power and the influence of the United States.

8. The Soviet rulers can achieve and are achieving the first three of their immediate objectives (subparagraphs 7a, b, and c above) without risk of involvement in armed conflict with the United States.

9. The remaining immediate objectives (subparagraphs 7d, e, f, and g above) are improbable of achievement without resort to armed force. Present intelligence estimates indicate that, in order to attain their remaining immediate objectives, as well as their over-all objective, the Soviet rulers have resolved to pursue aggressively their worldwide attack on the power position of the United States and its allies, regardless of the possibility that global war may result, although they may estimate that the Western Allies would seek to avoid such a development.^§ In fact, the possibility cannot be disregarded that the USSR may already have decided to precipitate global war in circumstances most advantageous to itself through the development of general war in Asia.^§

The Soviet Union and European Satellite States

10. In incorporating the peoples and territories of the European satellite states into the Soviet bloc, the Soviet leaders have had to contend with such basic deeply rooted human traditions as religion, social institutions, independent attitude and conservative instincts of the peasants, as well as the traditional fear and mistrust of Russians. Notwithstanding, the USSR has, for the past five years, been steadily tightening and solidifying its control over the European satellite states. At the same time the USSR has been strengthening its own armed forces, as well as those of its satellites, including both East Germany and Soviet occupied Austria.

11. With respect to Germany, the Soviets apparently realized much earlier than did the West that Germany is the key to the future of Europe. Accordingly, the Soviets now dominate East Germany and have created a large quasi-military East German police force. The visible military might and power of the USSR are affecting adversely the Western orientation of West Germany.

12. The defenses of continental Western Europe are at present wholly inadequate. The economic and military assistance which the United States has provided the free nations of Western Europe and the few collective defense measures which have been agreed upon and implemented by the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have not materially strengthened the military posture of Western Europe. Even the flagrant aggression in Korea does not appear to have caused the leaders of Western Europe to take the actions which common prudence, from the viewpoint of the United States, dictates they should take for their own security. However, a Supreme Commander for the integrated defense forces for Western Europe has now been appointed and certain defense measures for the defense of Western Europe have been taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These actions may indicate the beginning of a change in the attitude of the leaders of Western Europe.

13. France is the key to continental Western European policy.⁶ France is still afraid of antagonizing the USSR by strong policies and at the same time is afraid of a resurgent militaristic Germany. While France is fearful of her weak position, her leaders are unwilling to face up to the harsh and dangerous realities of the situation. As a result, France has not only failed to take effective measures for the strengthening of her own military defenses but has also made it difficult for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to take all of the actions which are imperative for an effective collective defense of Western Europe. If France continues to vacillate and does not rapidly build up her military strength in being, the United States may be forced to review its strategic policy toward continental Europe.

14. The United Kingdom is unwilling to become involved in the complex problem of a European federation because of its position in the British Commonwealth and because of lack of confidence in the French. The United Kingdom has indicated, however, that it is willing to increase its military strength in being and to follow a bold anticommunist policy in Europe in spite of a strong Labor Party left wing.

15. It appears likely that the West Germans may not create defense forces under the terms of the agreement at Brussels by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The German attitude in this matter appears to be largely and compellingly on the obvious disparity in the military strengths in being of the East and the West [sic]. If the West Germans were convinced that the Western Powers could establish their defenses on the Oder or east thereof the West Germans probably would create defense forces on almost any terms. A Germany oriented toward or dominated by the USSR increases enormously the chances of victory for the East in the event of general war.

16. A coalition of Western Powers to fight communism in Europe would be greatly strengthened by the inclusion of Spain.⁷ Exclusion of Spain’s resources and facilities could have seriously adverse consequences in a war between the West and the East. Measures should, therefore, be immediately initiated by the United States to make Spain one of our military allies.

17. It is evident that under present circumstances the USSR has no intention of agreeing to a Treaty of Peace for Austria.⁸

Far East

18. In Korea the United Nations forces, composed for the most part of United States forces, are fighting a war against overwhelming oriental manpower. Soviet equipment and other assistance have greatly strengthened the Chinese Red armies. The Chinese Communist troops in Korea have demonstrated that they will fight for a cause. Further, they are better soldiers than the Nationalist troops the United States trained during World War II.

19. The minimal purpose of the Chinese Communists in Korea is to render the United Nations position untenable. It is the apparent intent of the Chinese Communists to seek the complete destruction of the United Nations forces in Korea or their expulsion from the peninsula.

20. One inexorable fact in the Korean war is that the present Chinese strategy both in Korea and elsewhere in Asia has been carefully charted by Soviet and Red Chinese leaders in collaboration.

21. The attitude of the Chinese Communist regime and the defensive preparations in China show that Communist Chinese intervention in Korea was undertaken with appreciation of the risk of general war between the United States and Communist China and perhaps in expectation of such a development. It is highly improbable, therefore, that the Chinese Communists would have accepted this risk without assurances of effective Soviet support.

22. United Nations efforts to date have failed, both militarily and diplomatically, to settle the Korean conflict. On the contrary, the conflict now involves large Chinese Communist forces which may possess the capability of ultimately forcing an evacuation by United Nations forces, although the United Nations has not officially branded Chinese Communist intervention as aggression. If the United Nations continues to vacillate, or if it fails to solve the problem, the United States may soon be required to re-examine its own position and to seek a solution acceptable to the United States in the light of its own security and its own global commitments.

23. Soviet propaganda and official declarations and demands indicate communist efforts designed to reduce, and ultimately eliminate, United States control over Japan. The reported presence in eastern Siberia of militarized formations of former Japanese prisoners of war, the stripping of United States garrison forces in Japan for the war in Korea, and the complete lack of indigenous external defensive forces in Japan lend weight to the statement that efforts to eliminate United States control over Japan might be an imminent possibility.

24. In Indochina, the immediate objective of Ho Chi Minh,⁹ who is being supplied with arms, equipment, and advisers by the Chinese Communists, is to overrun the whole rich rice area of the Red River delta including the key French cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. The balance of power now existing between the French Union forces and the Viet Minh is most precarious and could easily be upset by even limited Chinese intervention under the cloak of “volunteer” aid. Even without the intervention of Chinese Communist “volunteers”, there is grave doubt that the French will be able to hold the Hanoi-Haiphong area even until the arrival of reinforcements in men and material.

25. The possibility exists that the Chinese Communists may intervene in Indochina either with “volunteers”, as they have in Korea, or openly. The Chinese Communists have sufficient forces available for either type of operation.

26. The French have taken a number of actions in Indochina for the purpose of retrieving the deteriorating situation. These include:

a. A guarantee of sovereignty within the French Union for the three states forming Indochina;

b. Establishment of indigenous armies; and

c. Appointment of General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, an outstanding French military figure, to both political and military leadership of Indochina.

It is possible, however, that these actions come too late to save the present situation.

27. The long-range objective of the communists in Indochina, as in all other parts of the world, is clear and immutable—the conquest of the world by communism.

28. If Indochina falls to the communists, it can be expected that the weak Thai and Burmese Governments would, in turn, fall to Communist domination.

29. The communist movement in the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia, although apparently not now seriously threatening the overthrow of the noncommunist governments, is undermining their stability, constitutes a drain on the economy of these states, and forms focal points for dissidents of all shades of political color.

30. The dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has not been solved.¹⁰ It is important to the free world that this dispute be settled.

31. Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, has had idealistic views on world affairs. These may become more realistic in view of the Chinese Communists intervention in Korea and invasion of Tibet. To what extent these developments will alter the orientation of Nehru and of India toward or away from the West is unpredictable.¹¹

Mediterranean and Middle East

32. The Western Powers are experiencing increased difficulty in their efforts to consolidate defenses in the Middle East.

33. As a result of Soviet propaganda and pressure the Government of Iran has taken steps which indicate that it is seeking to appease, or at least to find a rapprochement with, the USSR. These steps include:

a. Conclusion of the Soviet-Iranian trade agreement;

b. Willingness on the part of the Iranian Government to negotiate the matter of the Soviet debt.

c. The expressed Soviet willingness to settle boundary disputes through the negotiations of a joint commission;

d. The imposition by the Iranian Government of drastic restrictions on travel and contact of Iranians with foreigners; and

e. The government order banning the use of rebroadcast facilities extended to the Voice or America, which has been strongly critical of the USSR.

Unless this trend toward the USSR is reversed Iran may become associated with the Soviet bloc.

34. It can be expected that the USSR will pursue conciliatory tactics in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.¹² These Western oriented nations are on the exposed southern flank of the USSR’s industrial heartland and their incorporation into the Soviet bloc, or at least their denial to the Western Powers, would be greatly to the advantage of the USSR in the event of a global war. Measures should be taken to guard against this eventuality, especially with respect to Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

35. The premier of Iraq has declared that Britain’s treaty of alliance with Iraq is obsolete and that British air bases in that country should be abandoned.

36. The armed truce continues between the Arab states and Israel. Prospects are slight for an early peaceful settlement of their dispute.

37. The dispute between the United Kingdom and Egypt,¹³ because of Egyptian demands for the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone and the ending of British influence in the Sudan, has caused a serious strain in relations between the two countries. There are indications, however, that this dispute may be reaching a solution.

38. Yugoslavia, while turning more and more to the West through necessity, cannot be considered more than a fair-weather friend. Rapprochement with the USSR, while improbable under present circumstances, cannot be discounted as a long-range matter.

39. Turkey in particular holds steadfast to its Western orientation. Turkey and Greece are conducting informal discussions of their common defense problems. Further, these two nations have been invited by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to coordinate their plans with those of this organization. Yugoslavia and Greece have exchanged Ministers. All these arrangements should improve the prospects for united opposition to potential Soviet aggression in Southeast Europe.

40. The main reasons for the fear and unrest in the Middle East are intraregional tensions and the continuing disparity between the military power of the West and that of the Soviet bloc. As a result, except in the case of Greece and Turkey, the governments of the countries of the Middle East are attempting a policy of “neutralism” while at the same time utilizing the threat of neutrality as a bargaining point to gain concessions from the West. The latest reports suggest, however, that the increased Soviet menace is forcing these governments to take a more realistic view of the situation and to become more willing to solve their differences with the Western nations in a friendly manner.

The Western Hemisphere

41. The influence of the United States over friendly nations may have waned because of what appears to them to be the military weakness of the United States and because of fear of the USSR. In the final analysis, the people of the United States must recognize that in a war for our very existence—which a war between the United States and the USSR would be—we may find ourselves with but few but effective allies. In fact, the United States may be forced to accept the Western Hemisphere as its final citadel.

42. The President of the United States has declared a national emergency¹⁴ and thus has initiated a mobilization of the physical resources of the United States. The United States is also increasing its military and economic assistance to its allies in order that they may mobilize rapidly. If mobilization of physical resources is to attain maximum effectiveness, however, there should also be a simultaneous mobilization of nonphysical assets—the minds and hearts of the people of the United States and of its allies. The basic menace to the United States and its allies from within is as great as the menace from without. Accordingly, the mobilization of the nonphysical assets, the minds and hearts of men of the free world, is as important as the mobilization of the physical resources. In order to achieve this total power—and in a major war with the USSR total power will be essential—all national assets, physical and nonphysical, must be mobilized.

43. The United States has proposed an emergency meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the twenty-one American republics.¹⁵ It is essential that the United States retain the support of our Latin-American allies and prevent the Soviets from disrupting the unity and peace now existing in the Western Hemisphere.

44. The Latin Americans and the Orientals, with the exception of the Japanese, have not been considered to be promising military material. The war in Korea has proved that both the Koreans and the Chinese make good soldiers when properly trained, equipped, and led, when fighting for an ideal. Consideration must be given by the West to more effective utilization of Latin-American manpower in the present conflict between the free world and the Kremlin. Both Brazil and Mexico furnished troops for World War II. During the Korean war, however, although the United States received the moral support of the Latin-American nations, very little practical help has been provided. Either we or they have failed to dramatize the situation and impress upon the people of Latin America the fact that their security is as surely jeopardized as that of the United States, of Europe, or of Asia.

45. The United States will from the outset be an active combatant in any future global war. Heretofore this nation has had allies to hold the enemy at bay until mobilization of American military potential could be accomplished. The best defense of the United States still remains in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and in the islands off the coast of Asia in the Western Pacific. In most of these areas the noncommunist armed forces are not sufficient material reinforcement. The United States, however, does not now possess military forces which could be used for reinforcements, nor will the Western World ever possess sufficient strength to hold all of these farflung outposts until and unless the armed forces of the indigenous nations themselves are materially increased. Accordingly, the United States, in deploying its armed forces to such outpost areas, should weigh the risks to the Western Hemisphere which would be involved in possible overextension. From the military viewpoint appropriate military strength must be maintained in the United States in order to defend the western arsenal of democracy.

46. There are many people in the United States who do not understand fully:

a. Why United States armed forces are fighting in Korea;

b. Why the other friendly members of the United Nations have not provided larger forces for the war in Korea; and

c. Why our allies have thus far done so little to increase their military strengths in view of the Soviet threat.

47. In accordance with approved National Security Council Policy (NSC 20/4) and in order to have the wholehearted support of the American people, the United States should keep the American people fully and clearly informed regarding:

a. What the national policy is;

b. The reasons for that United States policy; and

c. The actions being taken by us and our allies and the full scope of the actions which the United States expects them to take.

section ii: a review of the ability of the forces being maintained to meet united states commitments

48. The following summarizes the major United States policies for which military support is, or may be, required:

a. Maintenance of the territorial integrity and security of the United States, its territories, possessions, leased areas, and trust territories administered by it; maintenance of the security of the Republic of the Philippines;¹⁶

b. Maintenance of the territorial integrity and the sovereignty or political independence of the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty;

c. Maintenance of the territorial integrity and the sovereignty or political independence of the other American states;

d. Participation in and full support of the United Nations Organization;

e. Enforcement, in collaboration with allies of the United States, of the terms imposed upon the defeated enemy states of World War II;

f. Military assistance to other free nations, the security of which is of critical importance to the United States, if they are to present effective resistance to communist aggression; and

g. Maintenance of the United States in the best possible relative position with respect to potential enemy powers in order to deter war or to take effective military action.

49. With reference to subparagraph 48g above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in their memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated 13 April 1950:¹⁷

“The fact remains, however, that never before in peacetime has the United States been directly subjected to such strong and relentlessly insidious opposition as today. Such a peace as the United States is experiencing is not a peace; it is, in fact, a war in which its survival is at stake. The present conflict can change to armed warfare whenever it suits the purposes and ends of the USSR. In this war of survival, capitulation to the Soviet Union is a course of action the United States cannot accept; rather, it must fight to preserve its integrity. Unless the United States is strong enough to win the war as now being waged, it will almost inevitably be forced into an armed conflict. In either case, increased United States strength is mandatory. In view of the current world situation, it is vital that the military strength of the United States be brought into balance with both the requirements for the present conflict and a possible fullout war.”

50. Since the date of the memorandum to the Secretary of Defense referred to in the preceding paragraph (13 April 1950), the Soviet leaders have incited and abetted their North Korean and Chinese Communist satellites in committing acts of overt aggression against the United States in Korea. The possibility exists that the USSR may already have decided to precipitate global war in the course of a general war in Asia.

51. The United States has deployed to the Far East the major portion of its active Army and Marine Corps combat and service units, practically all of its expanded Pacific Fleet, and a large proportion of its available Air Force. In view of the current world situation, it is evident that the military strength of the United States is inadequate even for the present undeclared war in Korea. This strength is in no wise in balance with the additional requirements for an undeclared war in Europe or elsewhere in Asia. Further, present United States military strength is wholly inadequate for opposing the USSR in a full-out war.

52. Until recently, the potential strength of the United States as well as the publicized aspects of our atomic energy program have been accepted by the people as reasonably adequate to meet the requirements of the world situation. The strength of our military forces in being has been properly subject to the budgetary limitations of a national peacetime economy. With the declaration by the President of a national emergency, the United States is now in a position further to accelerate the build-up of its military strength. Steps have been taken toward bringing into being the military forces of the United States and its allies which would lead toward a level of strength more nearly in balance with the requirements for the present hostilities, the cold war generally, and for a possible full-out war. Whether or not these actions may be too late to deter war depends on the Kremlin’s assessment of its desire and readiness for war.

section iii: conclusions

53. The Conclusions of “Review of Current World Situation and Ability of Forces to Meet Commitments,” approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 13 April 1950, are still considered sound regardless of the worsened world situation. For purpose of ready reference, these conclusions are quoted below:

• “a. The United States and the USSR are now, to all intents and purposes, engaged in war—except for armed conflict;
• “b. The armed forces of the USSR are unnecessarily large for defensive purposes alone. The excessive Soviet military establishment, together with its force deployments, constitute a coercive force immediately available for offensive operations;
• “c. The United States military strength required to maintain United States integrity and to meet our national commitments must be measured against the current world situation including the increasingly greater Soviet military capability and the Soviet objective of eventual world domination;
• “d. In order to deter war, United States forces in being, together with those of their probable allies, must be strong enough to discourage the Soviets from aggression in any part of the world vital to the security of the United States. In the event war is precipitated, those forces in being must be sufficient to avert disaster pending the mobilization of the allied war potential. Taken together, this is the primary task of the U.S. armed forces; and
• “e. The armed forces being maintained by the United States are not strong enough to accomplish effectively that primary task.”

54. In their memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, dated 6 December 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated the forces they consider necessary and practicable under the present world situation in order to reduce the risks which would otherwise have to be taken.¹⁸ 55. In view of the above considerations, it is recommended that the United States:

a. Continue to accelerate the build-up of the tangible military power of the United States and its allies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will make further recommendations for increases and for changes in the composition of United States armed forces in accordance with the situation as it develops;

b. Build up even more rapidly and more resolutely the intangible resources favorable to our objectives which live in the minds and hearts of men both within and without the iron curtain;

c. Fully implement the course of action set forth in subparagraph 21 f of NSC 20/4 which states:

“Keep the U.S. public fully informed and cognizant of the threats to our national security so that it will be prepared to support the measures which we must accordingly adopt.”

To this end special emphasis should be given to keeping the American people fully and clearly informed, as appropriate, regarding United States policies with respect to the conflict with the Kremlin, the reasons therefor, and the actions being taken by the United States and its allies to implement such a policy;

d. Intensify information and intelligence measures behind the iron curtain so that those who are opposed to Kremlin-dominated communism may have hopes for the future as well as an opportunity to communicate with the outside free world;

e. Develop a coordinated and integrated propaganda crusade^|| against Kremlin-dominated communism everywhere. For this purpose the free world needs an inspiring or animating principle which will pervade every thought, feeling, or action of people in the free world as well as of those behind the iron curtain who are opposed to Kremlin-dominated communism;

f. Develop and rapidly implement a large-scale program of psychological warfare, including special operations, comparable in scope to the Manhattan District project of World War II; and

g. Develop an integrated and coordinated over-all United States economic, political, psychological, including special operations, and military national doctrine, including a plan for operations by the United States and its allies against Kremlin-dominated communism and its aggression tactics, designed to wrest the initative from the Soviet Union, to force the USSR to the defensive, and ultimately to reduce to impotence the threat of Kremlin-dominated communism. This plan should include affirmative measures of economic, clandestine, subversive, and psychological character to foment and support unrest and revolution in selected strategic satellite countries and Russian political divisions. The objective would be the establishment of friendly regimes not under Kremlin domination. Such action is essential to engage the Russian attention, keep the Kremlin off balance, and force an increased expenditure of Soviet resources in counteraction. In other words, it would be the current Soviet cold-war technique used against the Soviets, and must be carried out aggressively with full acceptance of the risk of war.^¶

[Annex 2]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

top secret

Washington, 13 April 1951.

Subject: Review of the Current World Situation and Ability of the Forces Being Maintained to Meet United States Commitments.

1. In accordance with the directive contained in a memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, dated 16 August 1950,¹⁹ the Joint Chiefs of Staff have again reviewed the current world situation and the ability of the forces being maintained to meet United States commitments. They consider that their review of these matters submitted to you by a memorandum dated 15 January 1951, together with its conclusions and recommendations, remains valid as of this date.

2. All of the new developments and trends which are included in the enclosed Supplementary Study generally emphasize the validity of the conclusions and recommendations of the Study submitted on 15 January 1951.

3. In connection with the current situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the following conclusions in the Supplementary Study reflect particularly the events of the past three months:

a. In general, the solidarity among the nations of the Western World has lessened. Concurrently, there has also been a decrease in the will and determination of the American people and our allies to support current military operations and necessary mobilization programs.

b. Current United States mobilization programs, if not reduced below the levels outlined to you in our memorandum, dated 5 January 1951, subject, “Statement of Service Programs for FY 1951 and FY 1952,”¹⁹ should be generally satisfactory, from a military viewpoint, to meet the demands of a “cold war” but will not be adequate to meet these demands together with the requirements for the continuation of the Korean war.

c. From the military point of view, regional international arrangements for international security should only be entered into when they will directly enhance the security interests of the United States. In this connection, it is considered that admission of Turkey and Greece to NATO should be proposed now.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now additionally recommend that action be taken on an urgent basis to:

a. Increase the will and determination of the American people as well as our allies to support current military operations.

b. Achieve a broad base of popular support for the United States mobilization program through an appropriate governmental information program.

c. Increase the will and determination of our allies to achieve through national efforts, at the earliest possible date, a substantially increased degree of mobilization readiness. Such a degree of mobilization readiness should be reached as will permit meeting the requirements of the NATO Medium Term Defense Plan at a date as soon as possible after 1 July 1952.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

[Subannex]

Study Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret

[Washington, April 13, 1951.]

Supplementary Study on the 15 January 1951 Review of the Current World Situation and Ability of the Forces Being Maintained To Meet United States Commitments

Introduction

1. The study of the subject dated 15 January 1951, together with its conclusions and recommendations, remains valid as of this date. Certain new developments and trends have become apparent in the world situation which in turn emphasize the soundness of the previous conclusions and recommendations. This paper only concerns itself with that new matter. Its format is designed so that each section is supplemental to the corresponding section of the study of 15 January 1951.

section i: a review of the current world situation from the strategic viewpoint

General

2. The Soviet rulers have now made apparent the following immediate objectives in support of their general objectives:

a. To prevent or delay the rearmament of the Western World;

b. Specifically, to prevent the rearmament of Western Germany and Japan; and

c. To prevent the United Nations from achieving their objectives in Korea.

3. Current intelligence does not indicate whether or not the USSR has decided to precipitate general war in the near future; neither are there indications that they are abandoning any of their objectives. The Soviet rulers are intensifying their efforts to foment disunity among and within the nations of the non-communist world. These efforts have met with some success.

The Soviet Union and European Satellite States

4. There are indications of increased resistance to Soviet control on the part of the people of Czechoslovakia, Albania, and to a lesser degree the people of Hungary and Poland. The Soviet rulers are taking countermeasures against this resistance.²⁰

Western Europe

5. The USSR has achieved some propaganda benefits from the meeting of the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers now being held in Paris.²¹ The USSR has so far resisted substantive concession to the Western Powers. It has tried to break the tripartite unity of the United States, United Kingdom, and France. Both the United Kingdom and France have shown indications of being hard-pressed. It is important, from the United States military point of view, that this tripartite solidarity be maintained.

6. There is evidence that the British Government is apprehensive of United States global policies and is not whole-heartedly supporting them. The British Government is opposing certain United States policies in the Far East and toward Spain. The British people have evidenced dissatisfaction regarding certain proposals concerning North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command arrangements.

7. The military power of France, as well as that of the other continental NATO nations, has not increased as rapidly as expected. The Pleven Government fell and was replaced by a Cabinet formed by Prime Minister Henri Queuille. A succession of strikes gives further evidence of serious internal weakness. France opposes the United States policy toward Spain. France has been intransigent with respect to the rearmament of Western Germany and to certain details of United States collaboration with the United Kingdom. There is evidence that France regards the United States and the United Kingdom with some distrust.

8. The progress of the rearmament of Western Germany has been slow and in general unsatisfactory.

9. In general, the development of strength in the other NATO nations is unsatisfactory. Efforts to secure agreement for any advance of the target dates for meeting their NATO force requirements for 1954 have thus far been generally unsuccessful. There is little tangible evidence of their will and determination to resist Soviet armed aggression if that should occur. They continue to be reluctant to generate armed forces through their own efforts.

10. Some success in overcoming the weaknesses of the European NATO nations is to be anticipated from the efforts of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

The Far East

11. Unless world tensions in general are relaxed, it is improbable that a politico-military settlement of even the Korean problem in a manner satisfactory to the United States can be achieved. United Nations armed forces must, therefore, continue to operate under the current United States military policy in Korea. United States forces in Korea must pursue their current military course of action there until a political objective for that country appears attainable without jeopardizing United States positions with respect to the USSR, to Formosa, and seating the Chinese communists in the United Nations.

12. Steps have been taken to establish a Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) for Formosa and to increase the flow of Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) material to the Chinese Nationalists. The outcome of the struggle in Indochina is still in doubt although the position of the non-communist forces has improved. A Chinese Communist decision as to direct intervention in Indochina, or as to an attack on Formosa, will, in all probability, be largely dependent upon the degree of Chinese Communist involvement in the Korean war.

13. The United States has made progress without Soviet participation toward the conclusion of satisfactory peace arrangements for Japan. The Japanese Government has shown evidence of willingness to cooperate with the United States for the security of the Japanese islands.

14. The unfavorable over-all situation in the Philippines has not improved.

15. The United States has suggested a pact of alliance with certain Pacific nations. The terms of this pact will, in all probability, include agreements for mutual assistance.

16. In general, the military situation in the Far East has stabilized, hut any improvement during the past three months is nullified by the communist build-up and general intelligence is ominous for the United States.

Mediterranean and Middle East

17. Following the assassination of Razmara, the situation in Iran became fluid.²² Martial law has been declared in some areas. There is danger that the Western World may lose Iran to the USSR. The threat of the nationalization of the oil resources of Iran has created tension between the United Kingdom and the Iranian Government. It is understood that the British are contemplating the use of force if such action would be necessary for them to retain control of their oil concessions in Iran. In such an eventuality the USSR might occupy North Iran under its Treaty of 1921 with that country.

18. The position of the United Kingdom in Iraq has been weakened by Iran acting to nationalize its oil resources. This action by Iran may also affect adversely the United States position in Saudi Arabia and the British position in Egypt.

The Western Hemisphere

Latin America

19. It is increasingly important to the security of the United States that Latin lethargy toward improvement of internal security, defense posture, and capabilities for the common defense of the Western Hemisphere be overcome. Certain Latin-American nations oppose this United States policy because they consider their essential needs to lie in the field of economic development, particularly since they believe that the United States is the only likely target of direct external aggression. In connection with the problem of Western Hemisphere solidarity, it should be noted that shortly before the March 1951 meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Washington,²³ President Peron²⁴ preempted an independent newspaper. Further, he made certain claims as to Argentina’s independent progress in the field of atomic energy. These claims are probably without substantive foundation. Nevertheless, the Peron statement appears to challenge the leadership of the United States in Latin America.

20. There is some doubt as to the degree of support which may be given by the Latin American Republics to the announced United States concept to “strengthen those armed forces and resources best adapted to the collective defense” and of those features of the United States common defense proposals which involve “prevention and suppression of aggression in other parts of the world through the United Nations.”

21. No positive program for the development of Latin-American forces for use outside the Western Hemisphere should be undertaken until such time as the United States is assured that the Latin-American nations have accepted and are capable of performing appropriate tasks directly associated with the defense of the Western Hemisphere.

The United States

22. There is a tacit acceptance by the people of the United States that this country may still be in danger although the enthusiasm which prevailed at the beginning of mobilization has markedly lessened. The general attitude of the American people shows a lack of appreciation of the importance and urgency of our current military operations and current and long-range programs. This trend has become particularly apparent in the course of various hearings before and actions by the 82d Congress on military matters. Further, there appears to be a wide lack of understanding of United States objectives and aims in Korea, in Asia generally, and in Europe.

23. In light of the foregoing, there is real concern as to the possible future support which the military establishment can expect to receive from the American people. Further, if the American people should show tangible evidence of lack of support of our military operations and programs, general recognition of such a feeling would, in all probability, influence the future alignment of possible allies of the United States and affect adversely the United States world position generally.

24. There is urgent necessity to develop among the American people a wholehearted will and determination to support current politico-military operations and current and long-range mobilization programs. This could be accomplished by an appropriate governmental information program. In view of the certainty that the struggle will be long, the chances of survival in the conflict of ideologies will be greatest for the group which best maintains its spiritual, cultural, and material solidarity.

section ii: a review of the ability of the forces being maintained to meet united states commitments

25. Current programs for expansion of the United States military forces were designed to provide both the forces and a mobilization base to initiate implementation of NSC 68. Originally assigned a target date in 1954, these programs are now being implemented with a target date of not later than 1 July 1952. There are indications that current budgetary action will prevent meeting this target date.

26. The goal of our MDAP Programs is presently set for 1954, but should be accelerated as much as possible in order to be more nearly in consonance with our own M–Day and D–Day, 1 July 1952.

27. Present mobilization programs do not constitute “full mobilization”, nor are they so intended. It is understood that these programs were designed to represent a rate of mobilization which, in general, would be as great as the economy of the United States can afford indefinitely under “cold war” conditions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff may find it necessary, however, to make recommendations to accelerate certain of the mobilization programs in order to overtake current expenditures in Korea if our forces continue operations there,^** or in the event that it becomes necessary to take similar action with respect to aggression elsewhere in the world.

28. A United States policy along the lines of collective security is now developing. The United States sponsored the “Uniting for Peace Resolution” of the United Nations;²⁵ has suggested a “Pacific Pact”;²⁶ and is stressing collective action at the March 1951 meeting in Washington of the Organization of American States.

29. In view of the disparity between our military strength and our global responsibilities, it is vital that the United States continue to develop its war potential and that the objectives of the current mobilization programs be met. It would be dangerous to falter in our determination to obtain a satisfactory state of military and industrial preparedness.

section iii: conclusions

30. The conclusions of the basic study dated 15 January 1951 are reaffirmed.

31. The following additional conclusions reflect particularly the events of the past three months:

a. In general the solidarity among the nations of the Western World has lessened. Concurrently, there has also been a decrease in the will and determination of the American people and our allies to support current military operations and necessary mobilization programs;

b. Current United States mobilization programs, if not decreased, should be generally satisfactory to meet the demands of a “cold war” but will not be adequate to meet these demands together with the requirements for the continuation of the Korean war; and

c. From the military point of view, regional international arrangements for international security should only be entered into when they will directly enhance the security interests of the United States. In this connection it is considered that admission of Turkey and Greece to NATO should be proposed now.

section iv: further action suggested for the united states

32. The recommendations in the study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 15 January 1951 are reaffirmed. In addition the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that action be taken on an urgent basis to:

a. Increase the will and determination of the American people as well as our allies to support current military operations;

b. Achieve a broad base of popular support for the United States mobilization program through an appropriate governmental information program; and

c. Increase the will and determination of our allies to achieve through national efforts, at the earliest possible date, a substantially increased degree of mobilization readiness. Such a degree of mobilization readiness should be reached as will permit meeting the requirements of the NATO Medium Term Defense Plan at a date as soon as possible after 1 July 1952.

1. NSC 20/4, “United States Objectives With Respect to the USSR To Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security,” a report dated November 23, 1948, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 2, p. 662.
2. NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” April 14, 1950, and NSC 68/4, December 14, 1950, same title, are printed ibid., 1950, vol. i, pp. 234 and 467, respectively. NSC 68/2, September 30, 1950, same title, is printed in part, ibid., p. 400.
3. See footnote 4, p. 13.
4. The Senior Staff of the National Security Council consisted of Assistant Secretary-level representatives nominated by the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury; the National Security Resources Board; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Office of Defense Mobilization. The Executive Secretary of the NSC served as chairman. The Senior Staff, which met approximately twice a week, constituted the principal staff arm of the Council.
5. Not printed.
6. “Crusade” is used in the sense of a vigorous and aggressive movement for the advancement of an idea or cause. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. Crusade is used in the sense of a vigorous and aggressive movement for the advancement of an idea or cause. (See American College Dictionary–1948 Edition.) [Footnote in the source text.]
8. CIA Report, NIE–3, 15 November 1950; not on file in J.C.S. Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text. For the conclusions of NIE–3, “Soviet Capabilities and Intentions,” see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, p. 414.]
9. CIA Report, NIE–11, 5 December 1950; on file in J.C.S. Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text. NIE–11, “Soviet Intentions in the Current Situation,” is printed as a memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency, ibid., vol. vii, p. 1308.]
10. CIA Report, NIE–11, 5 December 1950; on file in J.C.S. Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text. NIE–11, “Soviet Intentions in the Current Situation,” is printed as a memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency, ibid., vol. vii, p. 1308.]
6. Documentation on United States relations with France is presented in volume iv.
7. Documentation on United States relations with Spain appears in volume iv.
8. Documentation on United States policy with respect to Austria and a Peace Treaty for Austria is presented ibid.
9. President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
10. For documentation on the issue of Kashmir, see vol. vi, Part 2, pp. 1699 ff.
11. For documentation on general relations between the United States and India, see ibid., pp. 2085 ff.
12. Documentation on United States relations with Iraq and Saudi Arabia appears in volume v; with Afghanistan, in volume vi, Part 2.
13. Documentation on United States interest in this dispute and other aspects of U.S. relations with Egypt appears in volume v.
14. See footnote 6, p. 54.
15. For documentation on the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, which convened in Washington on March 26, 1951, see vol. ii, pp. 925 ff.
16. For documentation on United States relations with the Philippines, see vol. vi, Part 2, pp. 1491 ff.
17. Not printed.
18. For text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, p. 475.
19. “Crusade” is used in the sense of a vigorous and aggressive movement for the advancement of an idea or cause. (See American College Dictionary, 1948 Edition.) [Footnote in the source text.]
20. Such measures are necessary if we are to achieve the initiative and win the present conflict without resort to eventual overt war. Further, they are essential in the eventuality of war. [Footnote in the source text.]
19. Not printed.
19. Not printed.
20. Material on resistance to Soviet control is included in documentation on general United States policies and problems in regard to Eastern Europe in volume iv.
21. For documentation on Four-Power Exploratory talks at Paris, March–June 1951, see vol. iii, pp. 1086 ff.
22. Gen. Ali Razmara, Prime Minister of Iran, was assassinated on March 7, 1951. Documentation on United States relations with Iran is presented in volume v.
23. For documentation on the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics held at Washington, March 26–April 7, see vol. ii, pp. 925 ff.
24. Gen. Juan Domingo Perón, President of Argentina. For documentation on United States relations with Argentina, see ibid., pp. 1079 ff.
25. NSC 68/4. [Footnote in the source text.]
25. For documentation on the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 3, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. ii, pp. 303 ff.
26. For documentation on discussions of a Pacific Pact, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 132 ff.