PPS Fixes, Lot 64 D 563
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning
Staff (Nitze) to the Secretary of State
1
top secret
[Washington,] March 13, 1951.
Mr. Secretary:
Draft Policy Statement for Submission to the NSC: Policy of the United States Toward the Reduction of
Tensions and the Limitation of Armaments
1. This paper has not been addressed to the phasing or tactics of
presentation of the ideas contained, it having been our purpose to see
whether a comprehensive program for relaxing tensions which we could accept
could be developed.
2. Any program for a comprehensive approach to the negotiation of a general
relaxation of tensions involves certain great dangers:
- a.
- That portions of the comprehensive proposal will be taken out of
context and be exploited as independent statements of U.S.
position;
- b.
- That in the course of the necessarily long process of negotiation
and implementation required, there will be a halt in the Western
defense effort.
Both of these difficulties require the most careful consideration of the
manner of presentation and of securing assurances of the Congress and of our
allies that there would be no slackening of effort until the process is
completed. A successful outcome would depend upon a concurrent increase in
our present effort to build strength.
3. It is doubtful whether the position of the West is at present sufficiently
strong to induce acceptance by the U.S.S.R. of the program set forth in the
paper. We must, therefore, try to maximize the
[Page 456]
advantage to the West if proposals along these lines
are advanced and are rejected by the U.S.S.R.
4. In advancing the comprehensive program described in the paper, the initial
proposal at a CFM would be stated in broad
terms. In order to guard against the dangers mentioned in 3 above, the
details would be given only after it was discovered that the U.S.S.R. was
willing to undertake negotiations on a comprehensive program and then only
as progress was made in the negotiations.
5. Annex A to the paper, which deals with specific proposals for the
settlement of problems in Europe and the Far East, is merely a rough draft.
In its present form it is being handled as a matter of the highest security
in the various bureaus and offices of the Department concerned.
6. It is our view that the proposed Annex C, dealing with a census and
verification of armed forces and armaments, should be prepared by the
Defense Establishment, working closely with the A.E.C. and Mr. Arneson’s
office.2
[Attachment]
Draft Statement Prepared in the Policy Planning
Staff3
top secret
[Washington,] March 10, 1951.
Draft Policy Statement for Submission to the
NSC
Policy of the United States Toward
the
Reduction of Tensions and the Limitation of Armaments
conclusions
1. The position of the United States Government has been and is support
for the reduction and limitation of armaments. The President reaffirmed
this position as recently as October 24, 1950, in his address to the
General Assembly of the United Nations. The purpose of the Government in
taking this position has also been made clear: it is that international
peace and security based on freedom and justice and social and economic
progress would be powerfully advanced by the reduction and limitation of
armaments. The Government should maintain this purpose and position.
2. The high existing level of armaments is both a symptom of the conflict
between the fundamental purpose of the United States and the Kremlin
design as described in NSC 684 and also an
independent
[Page 457]
cause of the
present acute state of international tensions. There are, however, other
important problems which are at once symptoms of the basic conflict and
independent causes of tension. These include, in Europe, the failure to
complete the Austrian treaty,5 the failure to unify
Germany and to restore Germany to independent status by a treaty of
peace, the excessive size of Soviet forces outside Soviet boundaries in
Europe, the failure to observe the satellite treaties, and the various
problems associated with the Iron Curtain. In Asia, these include the
aggression against the Republic of Korea,6 the failure to conclude a Japanese peace treaty, the
problem of Formosa,7 the
rebellion in Indochina,8 and, in general, the aggressive
attitudes and conduct of the Chinese Communist regime. These problems
are all interrelated, and the terms of an acceptable settlement on any
one of them must be considered in light of progress or lack of progress
on the others. For example, action on Germany which might be acceptable
in the context of a general relaxation of tensions in Europe might,
taken alone, be positively dangerous to our interests.
3. International tensions have become so acute and so widespread that it
seems unlikely that important progress can be made on any major issue
except in the context of a comprehensive approach to the general
reduction of tensions. At the same time, the mutual confidence which
would be required to accomplish a general relaxation of tensions in a
short period of time is lacking. It therefore seems necessary, if we are
to maximize the possibility of agreement with the Soviet Union and to
halt the deterioration of the international situation, to propose a
comprehensive but gradual reduction of tensions to be carried out in
such a way that the West and the Soviet Union will each be able for two
or three years or more (a) to gain confidence in
the other’s intentions by observing its performance or (b) to call off the process of reducing tensions
if either side reaches the conclusion that the other is not performing
in good faith.
4. Furthermore, such an approach also offers the best chance for the West
to achieve a political success and the least risk of a political
reverse. We must expect that the Kremlin will advance proposals,
including a disarmament proposal, designed for maximum favorable impact
on European and world opinion. We must expect, in other words, proposals
with a superficial plausibility, equity, and simplicity. If the West
reacts defensively to such proposals, advancing painstakingly the
various sound reasons why they are not acceptable, the Kremlin may
achieve an important political victory. The best chance
[Page 458]
for a political success by the West is to
advance—first, if possible—our own comprehensive program for the
reduction of tensions, to focus attention and discussion on it, and to
reject, where necessary, specific Soviet proposals by stating that the
solution of specific problems must be considered within the context of
such a general adjustment of outstanding problems.
5. A proposal for the reduction and limitation of armaments is an
essential part of any comprehensive program for the reduction of
tensions. This proposal should relate to all armed forces and armaments,
for it has become clear that a reduction in certain types of weapons
without a reduction in other forces and weapons would be dangerous to
our security. In addition, progress in the reduction of armaments should
be related to progress on other outstanding issues as indicated in
paragraph 2 above. In other words, we will rely for the improvement of
our security not on progress in the armaments field alone but on
progress on many other problems as well. In this way action in the
armaments field which, taken alone, would not provide a sufficient
increase in our security to justify it, can be acceptable in conjunction
with action on other problems. We can accept, in other words, a gradual
approach on a broad front in place of a complete and perfect solution on
a single front.
6. A gradual approach on a broad front to the reduction of tensions
should include the following concurrent elements:
- (a)
- Sufficient concrete agreement and progress on other problems
in Europe and the Far East to indicate a willingness on the part
of the U.S.S.R. to work toward a reduction of tensions.
- (b)
- General agreement among the major powers on the broad outlines
of a program pursuant to which a phased reduction and limitation
of armed forces and armaments could be accomplished with
continuous observation and inspection of each party’s adherence
to the specific agreements arrived at.
- (c)
- Agreement among the major powers on an immediate and
continuing census and verification of armed forces and
armaments, including para-military and police forces and atomic
weapons, as a first step to secure the information on which a
specific program for reduction and limitation could be worked
out and to demonstrate the practicability of adequate inspection
and verification.
recommendations
7. That the foregoing be approved as the general position of the United
States Government.
8. That the Secretary of State be authorized to take a position in the
proposed meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in conformity with
the above.
9. That negotiations in the Council of Foreign Ministers with respect to
6(a), (b), and (c) above, the Secretary of State be guided by the
positions outlined in the attached Annexes A, B, and C, respectively,
[Page 459]
subject to such
modifications and amendments as may be agreed between the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Annex A
1. It is necessary to approach the problem of relaxing tensions on a
broad front and to undertake negotiations on proposals for the solution
of existing problems in Europe and the Far East and proposals for a
census and verification and the reduction and limitation of armed forces
and armaments. Not until such negotiations are substantially completed,
would any of the major agreements arrived at become operative.
2. At the possible meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers,
negotiations could be undertaken among the Four Powers to determine what
negotiating progress can be made on agreement with respect to a census
and verification, and reduction and limitation of armed forces and
armaments and on proposals for the solution of existing European
problems. If such progress is sufficiently great to make it appear
possible that agreement can be reached, then the negotiations should be
widened to include representatives of the Peiping regime for the purpose
of negotiation for Peiping’s acceptance of agreements for a census and
verification and reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments
as well as proposals for the settlement of other existing problems in
the Far East.
3. In the context of such negotiations as those described above, we could
advance the following proposals:
A. Europe
1. Austria
a. The completion of a peace treaty.
b. Withdrawal of occupation troops from
Austria.
c. Withdrawal of Soviet forces on the lines of
communication through Hungary and Rumania.
2. Germany
a. Free elections and the creation of a unified
Germany.
b. Reduction of occupation forces to agreed
limits.
c. The completion of a peace treaty, which would
provide for limiting German rearmament to one-half that which would be
permitted a country under the criteria included in the agreement for the
reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments, together with
inspection to assure compliance.
d. Withdrawal of all occupation forces from
Germany.
3. Soviet European Satellites
a. Revision of the treaties of peace with
Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria to provide for limiting their
militarization to one-half that
[Page 460]
which would be permitted a country under the criteria included in the
agreement for the reduction and limitation of armed forces and
armaments, together with inspection to assure compliance.
b. Enforcement of the human rights provisions of
the Satellite peace treaties.
4. Withdrawal of Alien Forces.
An agreement for the withdrawal of all alien forces from European
countries after completion of the foregoing actions and the coming into
operation of the agreement for the reduction and limitation of armed
forces and armaments.
B. Far East
1. Korea
a. The termination of hostilities in Korea.
b. Free elections and the unification of
Korea.
c. Withdrawal of all alien forces.
2. Japan
a. Completion of a peace treaty, which would
provide for limiting Japanese rearmament to one-half that which would be
permitted a country under the criteria included in the agreement for the
reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments, together with
inspection to assure compliance.
b. Withdrawal of all alien forces upon the coming
into operation of the agreement for the reduction and limitation of
armed forces and armaments.
3. Indochina
a. Cessation of all Chinese assistance to Viet
Minh forces.
b. To insure that such assistance ceases,
observation and inspection in China in accordance with the system of
observation and inspection included in the agreements for census and
verification and reduction and limitation of armed forces and
armaments.
4. Formosa
a. Upon the completion of the above actions and
the coming into operation of the agreement for the reduction and
limitation of armed forces and armaments, the demobilization of
Nationalist forces in Formosa.
b. Political amnesty for members of the
Nationalist forces and government and permission for them to remain on
Formosa or return to the mainland and continue there without
molestation.
5. Recognition of Peiping Regime
a. Upon completion of negotiations with the
Peiping Regime on agreements for a census and verification and reduction
and limitation of armed forces and armaments and on solutions of the
foregoing problems in the Far East and upon the coming into operation of
such agreements, diplomatic recognition through the exchange of
ambassadors and admission of the Peiping Regime to the United
Nations.
[Page 461]
Annex B
1. The U.S. Government has consistently advocated and continues to
advocate international agreement on the reduction and limitation of
armed forces and of armaments subject to proper safeguards.
2. On October 24 the President suggested that the United Nations Atomic
Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments be
merged.
3. The progress of work in the United Nations could be greatly
accelerated if there were agreement among the powers represented on the
Council of Foreign Ministers on the broad outlines of a workable
program.
4. Such a program requires concurrent progress in the reduction of
tensions other than the level of armaments.
5. Such a program should cover all weapons and armed forces. In order to
simplify the problem of definition and minimize the danger of
circumvention, all police, internal security and paramilitary forces;
should be included in the definition of armed forces.
6. Such a program should eventually include all nations; however,
agreement among the powers having substantial forces may be an adequate
starting point.
7. A workable program should involve five major elements:
-
a.
- Agreement as to the purposes of the program.
-
c.
- Agreement as to the general criteria to cover the size and
composition of permitted forces.
-
c.
- The submission by each country of national programs designed
to conform to the purposes and to be within the criteria and the
negotiation of revisions of such programs so that mutual
agreement as to their conformity is arrived at.
-
d.
- The putting in effect of an adequate system of inspection and
verification.
-
e.
- The phased implementation of the agreed programs.
8. The U.S. believes that the purposes of such a program should be
approximately as follows:
-
a.
- to bring about, as one part of a general program for relaxing
international tensions, for increasing the security of nations,
and for decreasing the danger of war, a reduction and limitation
of the armed forces and armaments of the parties;
-
b.
- to initiate such measures as may be required to ensure that
each party will have notice of a violation of this agreement by
any other party;
-
c.
- to create as soon as possible by these and other means
relations between the parties which will permit the broadening
of the agreement to include other nations with the objectives of
eventually securing the adherence of all nations to a system for
the reduction and limitation of armaments and of transferring
the responsibility for supervision of the system to the United
Nations;
-
d.
- to reduce as soon as possible the burden of armed forces and
armaments and to encourage by this and other means increasing
progress toward the realization of the purposes of the Charter
of the United Nations.
9. The criteria which would govern the reduction and limitation of
armaments by the parties should be along the following lines:
A. Conventional armed forces and armaments.
- (1)
- Armed forces including paramilitary, internal security, and
police forces, shall be limited to a percentage of the
population (for instance, one percent), with an absolute ceiling
(for instance, one million persons).
- (2)
- The proportion of gross national product used for military
purposes shall be limited (for instance, to five
percent).
- (3)
- Certain weapons (for instance, tanks, aircraft, and
submarines) shall be limited in number and characteristics. (The
limitation might vary between the parties in accordance with the
requirements peculiar to their defensive position.)
B. Unconventional armaments.
- (1)
- Stocks, production, and use of biological and chemical weapons
shall be prohibited.
- (2)
- Atomic energy activities shall be dealt with in accordance
with the U.N. plan or with some other plan which is equally or
more satisfactory.
C. Inspection. A plan for observation and inspection shall be worked out
which would ensure notice of violation.
- (1)
- With respect to atomic energy, the requirements of such a plan
will depend on the answers to the questions stated in paragraph
10 below.
- (2)
- With respect to biological and chemical weapons, it may not be
possible to develop a plan which will ensure notice of violation
but provision should be made for such observation and inspection
as is practicable.
10. It must be expected that the Soviet Union will be unwilling to accept
the U.N. plan, and that it probably will reiterate its previous
proposals. In this contingency, the question arises whether, if
satisfactory progress appeared to be possible on other issues, including
the reduction and limitation of conventional armed forces and armaments,
the U.S. should itself propose that the four powers consider the problem
of developing an alternative to the U.N. plan. Before any such proposal
could be made, the U.S. would have to be satisfied that some alternative
plan was a practical possibility and that this alternative would be
preferable, in the context of a general adjustment of problems with the
Soviet Union, to a continuation of international relations along their
present course. The two main possibilities to be considered are:
[Page 463]
- (1)
- Would it be possible to permit atomic energy activities for
peaceful purposes, to prohibit stocks of fissionable materials
except as authorized for peaceful purposes, and to devise an
inspection system which would give us confidence that Soviet
preparations for war would be detected? How would this judgment
be affected if provision were made for the maintenance of agreed
stocks of fissionable materials? Would it be possible to develop
a variant of the U.N. plan which would not involve international
ownership but would provide for participation in operation on a
reciprocal basis and would it be possible by such participation
to guard against prohibited activities?
- (2)
- Would it be possible to prohibit atomic energy activities and
some or all facilities and to devise an inspection system which
would give us confidence that Soviet preparations for war would
be detected?
