Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

700.5 MAP/10–1951

The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee (Cannon)¹

[Washington,] October 19, 1951.

My Dear Mr. Cannon: I wish to express to you and Senator McKellar my grave concern over the 5% cut the Senate has made in the appropriations under the Mutual Security Act of 1951.²

The orginal request for $8.5 billion was determined upon only after careful screening by the Bureau of the Budget. It was considered, and I think rightly so, the smallest amount which was needed to obtain the security goals we seek during the current fiscal year. The cut of over $1 billion made by the authorizing legislation leaves us in a most difficult situation.

We have been reprogramming to reflect this cut and are reviewing the form in which our programs will be administered in an effort to minimize the effect of the cut or, to state it in reverse, in an effort to maximize the effect of the reduced amount of dollars. To make a further cut now of 5% is to endanger our objectives to such an extent that I feel obliged to urge you and your Committee to refuse to take the responsibility of doing so. I ask you earnestly to restore the 5% cut which the Senate has made.

I can add little except emphasis to the points which have been made before your Committees. I do, however, wish to restate two of the more important considerations.

1. The Mutual Security Act has been loosely called the “Foreign Aid Bill”. This is a misnomer. It is truly a United States security measure. The areas to which arms will go are vital to the security of the United States; Europe, Greece, Turkey, Formosa, the Philippines and Indochina are of the highest importance to our defense. If we loose [lose] the manpower, technical skill, manufacturing facilities and raw materials of Europe and her colonies to Soviet domination, we face a grim future in which successful defense of our own borders will be immeasurably more difficult and the cost immeasurably greater than if Europe is able to defend itself. Furthermore, the base for bearing the increased cost will be much narrower because we will lose much of the trade and raw materials on which our prosperity depends. Under those conditions our standard of living would bear no resemblance to that of today. The loss of Greece and Turkey would leave General Eisenhower’s southern flank unguarded, would unbar the land bridge to Africa and would open to the Soviets the rich oil fields of the Middle East and the main road to the Far East with its wealth of raw materials. I need not dwell on the seriousness of enemy domination of Formosa, the Philippines and Indochina. The economic aid under the Mutual Security Act which is not in support of military effort is almost wholly devoted to discouraging communist aggression by imparting to the peoples in underdeveloped areas the know-how to use their own natural resources to rid themselves of hunger and disease—sources of the discontent on which communism feeds. Such aid is by far the most effective weapon we can use against communism in these areas.

2. The Mutual Security Act is truly an economy measure. There is no question but that we obtain more defense effort per $1 of military aid or supporting economic aid than for a corresponding dollar spent on our own armed forces. Europe is the largest recipient of this type of aid. For each unit of military forces in Europe we pay only the cost of a part of its armament. Troop pay, housing, personnel equipment, most of the lighter arms and their ammunition, and some of the heavier arms are provided by our partners. The economic aid we furnish in support of military effort is estimated by ECA to produce on the average at least $3 of military results for each $1 of aid. In no other way can we obtain in Europe or elsewhere anything like the amount of military defense effort which we obtain through the Mutual Security Act.

I can add that the cut already made by the authorizing legislation will put us behind in meeting our schedule for arming General Eisenhower’s troops. Moreover, since the program for Europe was presented to the Congress, two of our principal partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are experiencing unforeseen financial problems—problems which endanger their ability to provide the forces they have agreed to place under General Eisenhower’s command. An important factor in this grave situation is that our ability to aid them has been crippled by the cut already made by the authorizing legislation. A further cut would very much increase the already great danger.

I, therefore, urge upon you and your Committee that the only wise action from the point of view of the security of the United States is to restore the 5% cut which the Senate has made.³

Sincerely yours,

Dean Acheson

1. Drafted by Charles A. Coolidge, Deputy Director, International Security Affairs. An identical letter was sent to Senator Kenneth McKellar, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee.
2. On October 18, the Senate voted 57–13 to approve the decision of the Senate Appropriations Committee to cut 5% from funds for the Mutual Security Program and to add an unrequested $100 million for Spain. The House had previously approved (October 11) the full amount of the program virtually as requested.
3. On October 19, House and Senate conferees agreed to uphold the Senate’s 5% cut in funds for military aid to Europe but to restore all other cuts. The conferees also confirmed the additional funds for Spain voted by the Senate. On October 20, both the House and the Senate approved this compromise by voice vote. H.R. 5684, the Mutual Security Appropriations Bill, provided $7,328,903,976 in new funds and $816,727,306 in re-appropriated funds for the operation of the Mutual Security Program. President Truman signed the measure on October 31 (Public Law 249, 82d Cong.; 65 Stat. 70).