Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563

Paper Prepared by the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Ferguson)¹

top secret

[Washington, February 8, 1951.]

General Considerations With Respect to Allies of the United States

comparative strength

In the last five years the Soviet Union has proceeded as rapidly as it could with the development of its own resources and the expansion of its armed forces. It has also enlarged its empire to include eastern Europe and China.

2. The non-Soviet world still has far greater resources and a far larger military potential than the Soviet empire. Much of the strength of the non-Soviet world, however, lies in Western Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, all of which are experiencing increased Soviet pressure.

3. The Soviet Union is aware of the fact that the resources and potential of the non-Soviet world would probably result in the ultimate defeat of the Soviet Union unless a significant part of such resources and potential can be utilized by the Soviet Union or at least denied to the free world.

4. There would be a critical shift in the ability of the United States to achieve ultimate victory if the Soviet Union succeeded in utilizing or denying to the West all or even a substantial part of the resources and potential outside of the Western Hemisphere.

the critical importance of the next few years

1. Our objective must be to maintain as much strength in the non-Soviet world as we can against the possibility of a conflict with the Soviet Union.

2. We not only need as much assistance as possible from the whole free world in the event of an armed conflict with the U.S.S.R. but we also need to retain in the free world as much strength as possible in order to deter the Soviet Union from aggressive action and to increase the possibility of a change in the Soviet Government.

3. To achieve any of our objectives, certain areas are clearly of more importance than others, and where the importance is of a critical nature to us we shall have to so conduct ourselves and so determine our policy that we assure the commitment of this strength to our purposes.

the relative importance to the united states of various parts of the non-soviet world

1. The Western Hemisphere²

Canada and the American Republics are crucial to the ultimate survival of the United States. In fact, the Western Hemisphere as a whole constitutes our power base. It is necessary both to deny any part of the Western Hemisphere to an enemy and to draw upon the natural resources and manpower of the Hemisphere in any military contest.

2. The United Kingdom³

The necessity of the United Kingdom as an ally is of critical importance. The British Isles provide essential bases for our own air and naval forces and the relations of the U.K. to various parts of the Mediterranean, where we shall certainly have to operate in the event of conflict with the U.S.S.R., have great advantages. Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, the Suez and the Sudan will all play their part in any strategy directed toward the Soviet Union itself and toward Europe and the Middle East. In addition, British military forces will be operating on the ground in the Arab area.

In the Far East, the importance of the Malay Peninsula and parts of the Indonesian Archipelago may be crucial in halting Soviet expansion over the whole of Asia as well as the island chain from the Philippines through the Japanese islands.

In addition, the relationship between the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth is one which has advantages to us which we could not forego.

3. The British Commonwealth

Except for India, the British Commonwealth countries are firmly attached to the western alliance and it is upon them that we would have to rely most heavily should the Soviet Union move into the Middle East and Western Europe before our strength and the strength of the NATO countries was developed to a point at which successful defense was possible. Any division between us and the members of the British Commonwealth, including India, would be a great disadvantage to us in deterring the Soviet Union or in combatting it. In the case of India and Pakistan, it is unlikely that we shall succeed in securing any substantial military assistance for a number of years, but we must try to secure assurance that India will not willingly associate itself with the Soviet Union and that neither its manpower nor its resources shall be at Soviet disposal.

4. Western Europe

The members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, together with Spain, represent the great prize in a contest for power. As a result of the commitments under NATO, these allies, with the exception of Spain, are firmly tied to the western alliance. Such formal commitments, however, would be of little value if the sentiment of neutrality paralyzed their efforts to build from their present weakness to a new strength. The Soviet Union is seeking with every means short of war to deny us the assistance of Western Europe and leave us with only the form. These efforts must be successfully resisted and since we cannot afford to have Western Europe utilized in the power struggle by the U.S.S.R., armed aggression against Western Europe would necessarily result in a global conflict.

5. Germany and Japan⁴

In the last war the strength which Germany and Japan were able to develop brought much of Eurasia, the Pacific and Africa under their domination. The potential strength of these two areas in the hands of the Soviet Union would greatly affect the power balance between the U.S.S.R. and U.S. Our problem with respect to these two former enemies is two-fold, since we must not only deny them to the U.S.S.R. but also we must seek to utilize their potential in our own behalf. Their neutralization would be an invitation to their absorption into the Soviet Union and therefore their orientation toward the West must be accomplished and must carry with it the will to develop their strength for the common purpose of the non-Soviet world rather than their own aggrandizement.

6. Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Iran⁵

This arc on the periphery of the Soviet Union is the shield of the Middle East and, perhaps even more importantly, of Africa. The forces in being in Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey are the most sizable and best trained forces presently in existence on the Eurasian land mass which are available to the non-Soviet world. These forces have probable capacity of holding a bridge to Eurasia in the event the U.S.S.R. occupies Western Europe. The loss of Yugoslavia and Greece would almost surely prevent the development of an adequate defense in Western Europe and the defeat of Turkey would provide access to Africa. The defeat of Iran would permit the flanking of Turkey and would also provide access to Africa.

7. The Arab States and Israel⁶

It is unlikely that sufficient military strength can be developed to deny this area to the Soviet Union in the event of the defeat of Iran, and certainly in the event of the defeat of Iran and Turkey. The petroleum resources of the Middle East are of great importance to Europe and would have great strategic value to us in the event of war with the Soviet Union. Access to Africa through the Arab States makes the area of even more significance.

8. Africa⁷

In the event of war with the U.S.S.R. in the next few years, Africa would be essential as a base of operations. It would give us the possibility of continued air attacks on the U.S.S.R. power base and would provide us with the necessary opportunity for a build-up of strength directed to the re-invasion of Europe. Without Africa, it is doubtful whether the invasion of Eurasia under Soviet control would be possible.

9. Southeast Asia and Indonesia⁸

The conquest or control of Southeast Asia and Indonesia by Soviet dominated forces would provide the Soviet orbit with vital resources and greatly reduce the availability to us of these resources. Such conquest or control would also threaten India, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, and weaken the U.S. position in the whole Pacific area.

10. The United Nations⁹

While our relations with the United Nations are in a sense only the reflection of our relations with the members of the U.N., it is necessary to recognize the very substantial importance to us of collective action and wide international approval. The U.N. is not a substitute for allies, but a means of working with them.

conclusion

The United States will frequently find, as it has in the case of its position with respect to Communist China and the Nationalist Government on Formosa, that it will not always have the automatic support of other areas of the world important to it as allies in the cold war period and essential in the event of actual hostilities. Where differences occur on questions which appear to the U.S. to relate closely to our security, we shall not be able to give up our positions, but we must make every effort to maintain our positions in a way least disruptive to our important allies. Whatever we do must be weighed carefully in this context and the number of disagreements between us and other friendly countries must be held to a minimum if we are to have the rest of the friendly world genuinely with us when we need them most. Since certain of our allies will strongly desire some actions which will be strongly opposed by others of our allies, we shall have to consider our own interest in terms of both our own security and the relative importance of the allies who would be directly affected.

1. The source text is labeled “II Draft.” No evidence that a subsequent draft was prepared has been found.
2. For documentation on United States policy with respect to the defense of the Western Hemisphere, see vol. ii, pp. 985 ff.
3. Documentation on United States relations with the United Kingdom is included in volume iv.
4. For documentation on United States policy with respect to Germany, see vol. iii, pp. 1344 ff. Regarding U.S. policy with regard to Japan and the Japanese Peace Treaty, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.
5. Compilations on United States policy with respect to Greece, Turkey, and Iran are included in volume v.
6. For documentation on the Arab-Israel dispute over the future status of Palestine and on United States relations with various Arab states, see volume v .
7. Documentation on general United States policies with respect to Africa is printed ibid.
8. For documentation on the defense of the East Asian-Pacific area and on U.S. relations with Indonesia, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 1 ff. and 583 ff., respectively.
9. For documentation on United States policy at the United Nations regarding specific area problems, see the appropriate regional volumes. For documentation on general U.S.–U.N. relations, see vol. ii, pp. 1 ff.