2. With the present trend I feel that Iran may be lost to the West in the
coming 12 months and believe that it is urgent to plan and carry out the
steps which might change the trend and protect this vital position in
the Middle East.
Attachment
CIA’S ROLE IN IRAN
Summary
1. Currently CIA operations are
severely restricted in Iran owing primarily to the hampering effect
of increased distrust of the West, including the US. The Iranians, alleging that US aid has been wholly inadequate,
remain unconvinced of the genuineness of US interest in Iran.
2. Under existing circumstances, and in the absence of a series of
major overt US efforts in the
political, economic, and military fields, CIA can do little more than intensify its
psychological-political warfare with the object of trying to prevent
a bad situation from growing worse. To this end, CIA is:
a. Providing increased subsidization for selected Iranian
newspapers.
b. Extending guidance and money to Iranian elements opposed to
ultra-nationalism and terrorism.
c. Investigating the feasibility of establishing new, pro-Western
political parties.
d. Taking steps to discredit and if possible disrupt forces hostile
to US security interests.
e. Exploring the possibility of establishing [less
than 1 line not declassified] a radio station for
clandestine broadcasts which would reach at least certain parts of
Iran.
f. Gearing its collection machinery to provide intelligence needed
for these activities.
3. Obviously in the present situation these efforts alone cannot be
relied upon to prevent the possible collapse of the regime.
Accordingly CIA is endeavoring to
organize indigenous resistance groups against the possibility that a
hostile government may be installed in Tehran.
4. If the US should establish a
policy of all-out aid to Iran, which would produce a more friendly
and cooperative atmosphere, CIA
operations could be expanded to include:
[Page 48]
a. A general overhauling of the Iranian intelligence and security
services.
b. Greater influence upon the Iranian press.
c. The possible establishment of a clandestine radio station in
Iran.
d. Greatly intensified political warfare.
e. Accelerated organization, with better prospects of success, of
resistance groups and escape and evasion nets for operations in the
event of Soviet occupation.
This expanded scale of CIA
operations would not be possible of accomplishment covertly without
the pretext and cover which only a greatly increased overt program
would provide.
CIA’S ROLE IN IRAN
1. In view of the seriousness of the Iranian situation, CIA is striving to do what it can to
help reduce the possibility of the country’s falling into Soviet
hands and to foster the establishment of an enduring pro-Western
alignment. Existing conditions are such, however, as to make all
CIA operations exceptionally
difficult and uncertain of outcome. Of the various circumscribing
factors, the most serious is a mounting distrust of the West,
including the US, which makes it
almost impossible to send additional covert agents into the country,
restricts the movements and effectiveness of those already there,
severely limits the number of Iranians willing to cooperate with the
US in clandestine operations,
and makes the people in general unreceptive, if not downright
hostile, to US overtures. US policy has not succeeded in
demonstrating to the Iranians that the US is genuinely interested in their country or in
convincing them that their salvation lies in firm alignment with the
West, and not in rapprochement with the USSR nor in an untenable course of neutrality.
2. It is believed that the conditions noted above will obtain so long
as US assistance to Iran is
maintained at the present rate or at a rate which is not
substantially more vigorous than at present. It is questionable
whether the program provided for in NSC 1073 even if fully and
speedily executed would suffice to reverse the unfavorable trend.
Under these circumstances, CIA can
do little more than intensify its psychological-political warfare
campaign in an effort to prevent or retard further deterioration of
the Iranian situation. Specifically, CIA is currently augmenting the following existing
programs in Iran:
a. Providing for increased subsidization of newspapers, for the
preclusive buying of newsprint or printing facilities, and (if
circumstances warrant) for the establishment of new newspapers.
These meas
[Page 49]
ures are designed
to combat the tendency of influential sections of the Iranian press
to encourage and support the chauvinism and religious fanaticism
which have a paralyzing effect on the Iranian Government.
b. Extending guidance and financial support to individuals, groups,
and parties hostile to the ultra-nationalists, fanatical terrorists,
and pro-Soviet groups.
c. Investigating the feasibility of establishing new political
parties, which might include a progressive religious party, a
moderate “socialist” party to draw liberals away from the Tudeh
Party, and a party with vigorous, pro-Western representation in the
Parliament.
d. Taking positive steps to discredit and if possible disrupt forces
inimical to US security interests by
subversion and by directing black propaganda against the leading
chauvinists, fanatics, and Communists.
e. Exploring the possibility of establishing [less
than 1 line not declassified] a radio station for
clandestine broadcasts in Azerbaijani. These broadcasts (countering
those of the Soviet “Free Azerbaijan” station) could be beamed to
certain parts of Iran but not so effectively as if the station were
located in Iran, which is hardly possible under present
conditions.
f. Gearing its collection machinery to provide increased intelligence
needed in connection with these various activities. “Soft” targets
relatively easy to penetrate for information purposes include [1½ lines not declassified] (especially the
following of Mulla Kashani), [1½ lines not
declassified]. “Hard” targets requiring long-range
operations to penetrate include the Tudeh Party, [1½ lines not declassified].
g. [1 paragraph (3½ lines) not
declassified]
3. For the reasons outlined in Paragraph 2 above, these efforts
obviously cannot be relied upon to prevent the possible collapse of
the present regime. CIA has
accordingly begun to identify and establish contact with the tribal,
military, and civil leaders who would effectively support a
resistance program in the event that a hostile government is
installed in Iran. Once agreements are reached with these leaders,
CIA will determine the material
aid which they would require and will commence to acquire and
stockpile material at appropriate points.
4. If the US should decide to follow
a policy of all-out aid to Iran, both overt and covert, the prospect
of preserving Iran during the cold war period could be immeasurably
improved. Greater cover would be available, and the atmosphere might
be cleared for augmenting and expanding CIA operations, which could be more effective in
support of a program directed positively toward promoting stability
and active cooperation with the West instead of toward the negative
objective of trying to prevent a bad situation from growing worse.
Emphasis would be placed on rehabilitating Iran and building up
immunity to Soviet
[Page 50]
and
Soviet-inspired subversion, and plans could be more effectively laid
for operations to be carried out if Soviet troops should invade and
occupy Iran.
5. Under a US program of all-out aid,
CIA operations could include
the following:
a. A general overhauling of the Iranian intelligence and security
services. The program would include material aid; training of key
officers in modern techniques; and insistence (at least to some
degree) that CIA guidance in such
matters be followed. The objective would be to create an efficient
organization with which CIA could
work and which would be extremely useful in helping to prevent
hostile penetration of key government offices and in running
operations against the Tudeh Party, Soviet installations, and the
USSR itself.
b. Greater influence upon the Iranian press. Subsidization would be
increased as needed; hostile publications could be forced out of
business; and the direction of certain influential papers would, in
effect, be completely taken over.
c. If possible, the establishment of a clandestine broadcasting
station in Iran. The station, purporting to be inside the USSR, would transmit black propaganda
designed to discredit the USSR and
Soviet Communism and aimed particularly at the Azerbaijani and other
waverers. This station could be a powerful instrument in
strengthening Iran against hostile penetration from without and
within.
d. Greatly intensified covert political activity in support of
desirable and against undesirable individuals and groups. If need
be, the government itself or key officials therein could be
subsidized to promote US security
interests. The subsidization of politicians and political parties
has long been a common practice in Iran, and effective steps would
be taken to encourage defection in the Tudeh Party and to create
vigorous new groups which would actively support US interests.
e. Increased efforts, with better prospects of success, to organize
resistance groups to function in the event of Soviet invasion and
occupation. This program would include more substantial efforts to
prepare tribal groups and segments of the army to carry out
guerrilla activities against Soviet units and installations. It
might even prove feasible to bolster the Shah’s avowed intention of
withdrawing to the mountains and setting up a government there.
f. [1 paragraph (6 lines) not
declassified]
