1. It continues to be in the security interest of the United States that
Iran not fall under communist domination, either as a result of invasion
or internal subversion.
For these reasons, the United States should continue its basic policy to
take all feasible steps to assure that Iran does not fall victim to
communist control.
2. Because of United States commitments in other areas, the current
understanding with the United Kingdom that it is responsible for the
initiative in military support of Iran should be continued. The
vulnerability of Iran, particularly the northern part, and the paucity
of the military resources available make it desirable that the United
States and the United Kingdom jointly give early consideration to
measures designed to strengthen the general area in order to give Iran
support in depth.
3. Present conditions in Iran as well as Soviet threats to that country
require that the United States further strengthen its programs in Iran
in support of its basic policy. Accordingly, the United States
should:
4. In the event an Iranian Government, despite the foregoing United
States measures, should take steps leading toward communist control in
Iran and capitulation to the USSR, the
United States should be prepared to undertake special political
operations to reverse the trend and to effect Iranian alignment with the
free world.
5. The United States should now make plans and preparations in
conjunction with the United Kingdom to counter possible communist
subversion in Iran and to increase support of the pro-Western Iranian
Government in the event of either a communist seizure of power in one or
more of the provinces or a communist seizure of the central government.
Such plans and preparations should envisage political and economic
support, including:
(1) Making clear to the world United States preference for a peaceful
settlement and the conditions upon which the United States would, in
concert with other members of the United Nations, accept such a
settlement.
(2) Obtaining agreement of the United Nations authorizing member nations
to take appropriate action in the name of the United Nations to assist
Iran.
Attachment
Study Prepared by the Staff of the National
Security Council
THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO
IRAN
The Problem
1. To assess the position of the United States with respect to Iran,
with particular reference to possible future developments in Iran
affecting United States security interests.
Analysis
Basic United States Position
2. Because of its resources, strategic location, vulnerability to
armed attack and exposure to political subversion, Iran must be
regarded as a continuing objective in the Soviet program of
expansion. If Iran should come under Soviet domination, the
independence of all other countries of the Middle East would be
threatened. Specifically the USSR
could (1) control or limit the availability of a Middle Eastern oil
reservoir upon which the economy of Western Europe depends; (2)
acquire advance bases for subversive activities or actual attack
against a vast contiguous area including Turkey, Iraq, the Arabian
Peninsula (hence the Suez Canal), Afghanistan, and Pakistan; (3)
obtain a base hundreds of miles nearer to potential US–UK
lines of defense in the Middle East than any held at present; (4)
control continental air routes crossing Iran, threaten those
traversing adjacent areas, and menace shipping in the Persian Gulf;
and (5) undermine the will of most Middle Eastern countries to
resist Soviet aggression. In addition to these developments
affecting the Middle East, the loss of another free country to
communist domination at this time would damage the global position
of the United States and other members of the Western community by
weakening the determination of threatened nations everywhere to
resist communism.
3. Loss of Iranian oil production and of the refinery at Abadan would
seriously affect Western economic and military interests,
particularly as regards the level of industrial activity in Western
Europe. The effect of this loss on the volume of petroleum products
available for Western Europe could be overcome in a reasonable
length of time by developing reserves and building refineries
elsewhere, but the financial effects, in the loss of the British
investment and in the increased dollar requirements of Western
Europe, could be overcome only slowly, if at all. The loss of Abadan
would also deprive the West of the principal source of aviation
gasoline and fuel oil in the Eastern Hemisphere, with consequent
effect upon air and naval activity in the region.
[Page 27]
4. The primary objective of our policy toward Iran is to prevent the
domination of that country by the USSR and to strengthen Iran’s association with the free
world. Corollary aims are (1) to encourage relations between Iran
and other countries calculated to elicit United Nations support for
its continued independence; (2) to assist the Iranian Government in
maintaining conditions of internal security, thereby increasing
respect for Iranian sovereignty, strengthening the stability of the
government, avoiding a pretext for overt Soviet intervention, and
making indirect Soviet aggression through internal subversion more
difficult; and (3) to foster social reform and an expanding economy
with the purpose of alleviating discontent and strengthening
allegiance to the central government.
Evaluation of Current Policy
5. Our objective of preventing domination of Iran by the USSR has so far been achieved by
means of political action. Iran, after first following a policy of
procrastination, evasion and compromise when confronted by an
aggressive Soviet attitude, has for the past three years, with
strong United States and United Kingdom encouragement and support,
been able to maintain its independence in the face of persistent
Soviet pressure. The United States has informed Iranian authorities
that it is prepared, so long as the Iranian Government demonstrates
a willingness to stand up for its independence against external
pressure, to support Iran not only by words but also by appropriate
acts. We have told the Iranians that we are not in a position to
make any commitment as to our action if the Soviet Union should take
aggressive measures against Iran, but have pointed out our
obligations under the United Nations Charter. In response to Iranian
inquiries, we have authorized the Embassy in Tehran to say that in
the event of war with the Soviet Union involving both Iran and the
United States, Iran may count on all assistance compatible with
United States resources and commitments in a global conflict. The
Secretary of State informed the Shah on November 18, 1949 that our
interest was not limited to the area of our formal treaty
obligations. The Shah was assured that our interest in Iran would be
great indeed if trouble should come.
6. Past United States efforts to assist Iran internally have included
two military missions now advising the Iranian Army and the
Gendarmérie, support of Iran’s efforts to secure financial aid
through appropriate agencies (such as the World Bank) for
well-justified economic development projects, encouragement and
advice in connection with the Iranian Government’s consideration of
political and economic reforms designed to strengthen popular
loyalty to the central government, and the provision of surplus
light military equipment on credit for internal security and
legitimate defense purposes. Iran has also been included in the
Mutual Defense Assistance Program and is [Page 28] now receiving military aid on a grant basis.
The purpose of this aid is to assist in the maintenance of internal
security, to increase the confidence of the Iranian Government and
people in their ability to defend themselves, to give concrete
evidence of American interest in the security of Iran, and to enable
the Iranian forces, in the event of war, to carry out certain
limited defensive operations in furtherance of over-all strategic
plans of the free world.
7. With the approval of the President and in conjunction with the
Export-Import Bank, the Department of State is initiating a new
program designed to overcome some of the existing weaknesses of the
Iranian governmental and economic structure and provide impetus for
the economic and social development of the country. This program
includes the following elements:
a. An Export-Import Bank loan of $25,000,000
for road building and agricultural improvement. Failure of Iran to
accept this credit would increase our reliance on IBRD credits and United States
Government grants as levers to induce the Iranian Government to put
its economic house in order.
b. The strengthening of the staffs of the
existing American diplomatic and consular posts in Iran and the
opening of a new consulate at Isfahan.
c. A substantially enlarged program of
information and cultural relations in Iran.
d. A military aid program within the
capabilities of the Iranian armed forces to absorb.
e. A technical assistance program using Point
Four funds concentrating on public health, rural extension,
education, etc., at the village level.
f. Seeking the cooperation of the United
Kingdom to enable Iran to utilize its sterling receipts from
petroleum for essential development of the country, including
conversion of such sterling into dollars, as may be required, for
essential imports and servicing of dollar obligations for
development purposes.
8. A major source of economic stagnation and political discontent in
Iran has been the failure of the Iranian Government and the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to reach an agreement on a supplementary
concession agreement. The belief is widespread in Iran that the
company is unfairly exploiting the country by refusing to offer
reasonable and equitable royalties and its entire operation is
resented as a closed corporation exploiting Iranian wealth but
beyond the reach of Iranian custom or law.
9. This has resulted in strong antagonism against the British and,
among the less educated, against all foreigners, and has led many
Ira[Page 29]nians to believe that
the Western powers are not seriously interested in the welfare and
independence of the country but are concerned only with exploiting
its primary resources for their own purposes. The present Iranian
leaders do not associate the United States with the policies of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. They, however, want the United States to
side with them in the dispute and force the Company to meet their
terms. Nationalization, which is currently under discussion in the
Iranian Parliament, is not impossible and if it did occur would
subsequently make it easier for the USSR to influence the distribution of the oil. The
United States should use its utmost influence to persuade the
British to offer, and the Iranian Government to accept, an equitable
concession agreement. Failure to reach such agreement carries with
it such undesirable consequences that no opportunity should be lost
to impart to both governments our sense of urgency in this
matter.
10. Iran has expressed serious dissatisfaction with the limited
nature of the military assistance we are prepared to furnish and
even greater dissatisfaction at our past failure to provide
substantial direct economic assistance. The Iranian Government has
repeatedly stressed the desirability of a closer defense
relationship with the United States, preferably through the
mechanism of a regional defense arrangement for the Near East
similar to the North Atlantic Treaty. Our refusal to commit
ourselves in this respect has been a further source of Iranian
uneasiness and discontent. These factors have occasionally in the
past given rise to a belief in Iran that the United States is not
seriously interested in the welfare and independence of the country
and would abandon it to Russian aggression if matters came to a
showdown. There is a danger that such an attitude will recur unless
the United States continues to take a course designed to convince
the Iranians of its genuine interest in Iranian independence. There
is a belief in influential Iranian quarters that the Iranian
Government in its westward orientation policy has gone too far and
has placed Iran in an extremely vulnerable position vis-à-vis the
Soviet Union without obtaining anything in return to help Iran
protect itself. This attitude combined with recent ostensibly
friendly gestures by the USSR have
started a trend towards Iran’s reversion to its historical policy of
playing one power off against the other and maintaining a precarious
neutrality. The new program of American assistance and guidance
outlined above is designed to counteract this trend in Iranian
thinking. Likewise, the firm policy adopted by the United States in
Korea has helped to convince the Iranians of United States
determination to oppose aggression even though the United States has
no formal security arrangements with the country attacked. Reverses
in Korea, on the other hand, tend to make many Iranians doubtful of
United States ability to render effective assistance, a feeling not
lessened by Iran’s proximity to the Soviet Union.
[Page 30]
Possible Future Developments
11. Although the USSR will continue
to apply strong political and psychological pressures against Iran
in an effort to force the government of that country into
submission, it is considered unlikely that the Soviet Union would be
willing to resort to direct armed intervention by organized USSR military forces at this time.
Nevertheless the possibility of such armed intervention cannot be
entirely ruled out. In the absence of such armed intervention Iran
is probably capable of maintaining successful resistance to Soviet
pressure and could be expected to maintain its alignment with the
free world provided it has confidence in United States and United
Kingdom support and can produce competent political leadership able
to overcome the existing feeling of frustration and hopelessness
among the mass of the people and to implement the planned economic
and social reforms, delay in the execution of which is now seriously
threatening the internal stability of the country. Since these
conditions necessary for the maintenance of Iran’s westward
orientation and resistance to Soviet pressure may not continue to
exist, it is possible that the United States may be faced in the
future with one or more of the following contingencies:
First Contingency: The Iranian Government
adopts a policy of “neutrality” in the “cold war” and seeks a modus
vivendi with the Soviet Union.
12. Continuing deterioration of the situation in Iran has created a
feeling of hopelessness and a public psychology inherently dangerous
from the point of view of Iran’s determination to resist Soviet
pressures. Present Soviet tactics in Iran are designed to convince
the Iranians that they have nothing to fear from the USSR and it seems certain that in
their search for security many Iranians are impressed by the present
“friendly” policy of the Soviets. Unless the United States can
convince them of the real issue at stake, they will insist on a
government in power not unsympathetic to Soviet approaches. Such a
government, fearing overt Soviet action and feeling that it has been
left alone to its fate, might seek some sort of understanding with
the Soviet Union, possibly along the lines of the agreement of 1946.
Such an understanding would permit Soviet economic exploitation,
amnesty to political prisoners, legalization of the Tudeh Party and
its eventual participation in the government, and would open the
door to a gradual taking over of the country by local communist and
Soviet agents.
13. Current United States measures in Iran are designed to prevent
this first contingency. If nevertheless the contingency did occur,
the United States could, in conjunction with the United Kingdom and
with little risk in proportion to the possible gain, take positive
steps, including covert measures, to support pro-Western elements
and effect Iran’s alignment with the free world. The alternative
course of action, [Page 31] that of
accepting without counter-action Iran’s reversion to an attitude of
neutrality, would probably result in eventual loss of Iran with the
consequences noted in paragraph 2 above.
Second Contingency: The overthrow of the
present Iranian Government and the establishment of a pro-Soviet
puppet government by subversive or other means not involving the use
of Soviet military force.
14. The weakness of the Iranian Government and the growing activity
of dissident elements, including the Tudeh Party (despite the fact
that this party is outlawed and has to function underground) make
this event a possibility. Several leading Iranians have expressed
the view that communist overthrow of the government is not only
possible but even probable unless steps are taken to improve the
economic and social condition of the people and increase the
efficiency of the government. The appointment of General Razmara, formerly Chief of Staff
of the Iranian Army, as Prime Minister gave promise of improved
leadership and direction; but up to the time of his assassination on
March 7, 1951, his accomplishments had been singularly few.
15. The assassination of Prime Minister Razmara underlines the basic political instability
of Iran and emphasizes once again the need for strong and vigorous
leadership. It had been hoped at the time of his appointment in June
1950 that Razmara possessed
the qualities and influence needed to give Iran forceful government.
However, he proved unable to make headway against the selfish
interests of the politicians who control the Iranian Parliament and
at the time of his death, he had been obliged to resort to one
compromise after another in order to stay in power.
16. His murder will greatly increase the existing political
instability in Iran at least for a temporary period. The
opportunities available to the communists will thus be enhanced and
it therefore becomes more than ever necessary that there be firm
direction of the government at almost any cost. The only source of
the required type of leadership at the moment appears to be the
Shah. He can only succeed with strong support from the United States
and the United Kingdom. During the next few months the political
situation will be extremely fluid and give rise to many
difficulties.
17. If the second contingency occurred the United States would have
three alternative courses of action:
a. To accept the loss of Iran to the Soviet
orbit. This would require a reversal of basic United States
policy regarding the Mediterranean and Middle East and would mean
acceptance of the consequences summarized in paragraph 2 above.
b. To support, in conjunction with the United
Kingdom, the legitimate government by all means short of
commitment of United States military [Page 32] forces. This course of action would
involve little risk and if successful would produce considerable
gain at little cost. It would leave United States forces uncommitted
in Iran and hence available for other and possibly more urgent
missions. It is understood that the United Kingdom stands ready to
send a small force into Iraq or southern Iran in such an emergency
and this might be sufficient to accomplish our purposes without the
use of United States forces. Use of United Kingdom forces probably
would not have the same degree of provocation as the use of United
States forces; but would give the USSR a pretext to invoke the 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty
of Friendship. On the other hand, should this course prove
ineffective in restoring the legitimate government, the United
States would have to accept loss of all or part of Iran or pass to
the course of action noted in the following subparagraph.
c. To support the legitimate government of Iran by
measures which include, inter alia, the deployment of United
States armed forces (1) as a show of force or (2) in sufficient
strength to restore the legitimate government. A show of
force could be limited to air and naval action, and might be
successful in restoring the legitimate government and preserving
Iran’s alignment with the West. However, United States armed forces
in sufficient strength to restore the legitimate government might
lead to progressively heavier commitments that the United States
could not afford. In any event, United States armed forces in
strength to restore the government will not be available in the
foreseeable future. Commitment of United States forces even in a
show of force might provoke military action by the USSR which could well lead to
hostilities between the United States and the USSR.
Third Contingency: The establishment of
pro-Soviet provincial governments in Iran by subversive or other
means not involving the use of Soviet military force.
18. The provincial administration of Iran is still subject to a high
degree of centralized control from Tehran, and the local communist
leadership in northern Iran was largely broken up when Soviet forces
retired in 1946. Therefore, even though renewed communist activity
has been reported in some parts of the area, it is doubtful that
communist leadership could be re-installed in the provincial
administrations, in the absence of renewed entry of Soviet forces,
unless the central government virtually ceased to function or was
overthrown and replaced by a pro-Soviet puppet regime. Nevertheless,
establishment of pro-Soviet provincial governments is by no means
impossible if confusion and maladministration in the Iranian
Government continue for an indefinite period and if political
leadership is not greatly improved.
19. If this contingency did occur we would be faced with intensified
Soviet subversive activities in the remaining free areas of Iran and
[Page 33] in Near Eastern areas
contiguous thereto and with an increased tendency on the part of
Near Eastern countries to seek strengthened security arrangements
with the Western powers. Should security arrangements considered
satisfactory by them not be forthcoming, the Near Eastern countries
might in time seek a compromise with the USSR.
20. In this contingency the courses of action available to the United
States are virtually the same as those discussed under the second
contingency above, the principal difference being that support of
the Iranian Government at its request would be for the purpose of
enabling it to regain control of revolting provinces rather than of
the central machinery of government. However, the risk of military
involvement with the USSR would be
increased for the United States if United States or United Kingdom
forces, either as token forces or in strength, were deployed near
the northern provinces, although it is entirely possible such
deployment might serve as a deterrent.
Fourth Contingency: An overt invasion of Iran
by the armed forces of the Soviet Union.
21. Information presently available does not indicate that overt
Soviet attack with organized USSR
military forces against Iran is probable at this time, especially
since opportunities still remain for the USSR to gain its objectives in Iran short of overt
attack. However, the possibility of such attack cannot be excluded,
since the USSR has the military
capability of launching an attack without warning and quickly
overrunning Iran. While such an attack would in fact give rise to
the risk of global war, it is possible, even though not probable,
that the USSR, miscalculating the
degree of risk involved, would launch an attack against Iran
designed to attain Soviet objectives in that area without bringing
on global war. It is also possible, but improbable, that the USSR would deliberately assume a risk
of global war by attacking Iran.
22. It seems likely, in view of the repeated references to the 1921
Irano-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in the Soviet protests to Iran in
1948 and 1950 over the presence in Iran of American military
missions and oil drillers, that the Soviets will, if they invade
Iran, invoke Article 6 of this treaty as a justification for their
action. According to the Legal Adviser of the Department of State,
the following conditions must co-exist before the Soviet Union would
be justified in sending troops into Iran:
“a. If any third countries attempt by military
interference to carry out a policy of usurpation in the territory of
Persia or to make the territory of Persia a base for military
operations against Russia.
“b. If at the same time there is a threat of
danger to the frontiers of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet
Republic or those of the Powers allied therewith.
[Page 34]
“c. If the Persian Government, after being
warned by the Russian Soviet Government, finds itself unable to
avert such danger.
“d. If preparations have been made for a
considerable armed attack upon Russia or the Soviet Republics allied
to her by the partisans of the regime which has been overthrown (the
Czarist regime), or by its supporters among those foreign powers
which are in a position to assist the enemies of the Workers and
Peasants Republics, and at the same time to possess themselves by
force or by underhand methods of part of the Persian territory
thereby establishing a base of operations for any attacks—made
either directly or through the counter-revolutionary forces—which
they might contemplate against Russia or the Soviet Republics allied
to her.”
It is also the view of the Department’s legal advisers that if the
USSR made out a case for
co-existence of the above four conditions, and at the same time the
Government of Iran denied their co-existence and/or resisted the
introduction of Soviet troops into Iran, the USSR would not be entitled under the
United Nations Charter to introduce armed forces unilaterally into
Iran on the basis of the treaty. It would be a violation of Charter
obligations for the Soviet Union to take such action against the
will and over the resistance of the Government of Iran. In such
circumstances, the Soviet Government would be bound by the Charter
to seek a peaceful adjustment of differences arising out of the 1921
treaty and, if necessary, to refer the matter to the United Nations
for consideration.
23. In view of the above, the invocation of the treaty need leave no
doubts in the free world as to the rights and wrongs of the matter
and the misuse of its provisions by the Soviets to justify
aggression could be made clear to world opinion. The Soviets can use
the treaty as a pretext to becloud the issue and the United States
should accordingly be on the alert to counter such moves.
24. In the event of overt Soviet attack on Iran, available United
States courses of action would include:
a. Opposing the aggression by political means
short of the commitment of United States armed forces in
Iran. This course would be the less costly and would leave
our forces available for other urgent tasks, including the
contingency of global war. This course, however, would be unlikely
to succeed.
b. Opposing the aggression by all means short of
global war, including deployment of United States and United
Kingdom forces for localized opposition to the Soviet
attack. This course would lead to hostilities between
United States and USSR forces
involving the risk of global war, while the commitment of United
States forces in Iran would reduce United States capabilities for
global war if it developed. However, this course, in so far as it
prevented complete Soviet occupation of Iran, would provide an [Page 35] opportunity for the
operation of political measures designed to stop the aggression
short of global war.
c. Taking action on the assumption that global war
had automatically begun. However, it would be contrary to
United States interests and traditions to regard a localized attack
as the automatic “push-button” initiation of global war.
Conclusions
25. The present situation in Iran requires the continuation of basic
United States policy with respect to the Mediterranean and the
Middle East, including Iran, and the strengthening of measures in
support of that policy, particularly measures designed to prevent
Iran from assuming an attitude of neutrality in the “cold war”.
26. In the event Iran assumes an attitude of neutrality in the “cold
war”, political steps by the United States and United Kingdom to
restore Iranian alignment with the free world would be required.
27. In the event the present Iranian Government is replaced by a
pro-Soviet puppet government through subversive measures not
involving the use of Soviet military forces, United States and
United Kingdom support of the legitimate government would be
required.
28. In the event pro-Soviet provincial governments are established in
certain areas of Iran by subversive means not involving the use of
Soviet military force, United States and United Kingdom support of
the legitimate government, short of deployment of United States
forces is required.
29. Direct Soviet attack on Iran would not automatically initiate
global war, but would in fact so greatly increase the risk of global
war that the United States while taking measures to stop and
localize the aggression would also have to proceed on the assumption
that global war was probably imminent.
