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86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

431. Emb requested raise immed with Brit at highest feasible level question raised Tehran’s 239,2 242,3 and 248 July 184 and solicit urgent Brit concurrence in recommendations both Middleton and Henderson that US extend immed finan assistance to Qavam gov.

Suggest if Brit show reluctance you pt [point] out this question has been raised with them on several occasions at high level and that US convinced failure to act immed may cause us to lose best chance yet for settlement oil controversy and reversal deterioration situation in Iran. While we naturally wish to be guided in our action by Brit views, Dept believes we shld lose no time in extending support which Qavam clearly needs if he is to remain in power and work out agreement with Brit. (FYI final action on our part may require clearance and action here at highest level.)

Brit may be informed our tentative thinking is to give or lend Qavam at once small amt along lines suggested Tehran’s 248 as interim stopgap measure without rpt without promise any more will be forthcoming. Aid wld clearly be tied to oil controversy and he wld be told it being extended to help him in interim period required for him to ar[Page 270]range negots for settlement with UK in accordance his announced intention.

In view urgency situation, we believe Qavam must have this aid not rpt not later than early next week and therefore earnestly solicit earliest Brit concurrence. (Brit Emb informed.)

Acheson
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888. 10/7–1852. Top Secret; Priority; NIACT. Repeated Priority and NIACT to Tehran. Drafted by Ferguson and approved by Byroade.
  2. Document 84.
  3. Document 85.
  4. In telegram 248 from Tehran, Henderson asked that the United States extend aid that would enable the new Iranian Government to deal with its financial crisis until around September 20. To that end, Henderson suggested allocating to the Iranian Government a lump sum, based on the current deficit, the exchange rate, and Iran’s ability to absorb aid, with the understanding that “possible further aid dependent on progress toward oil settlement.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 888.10/7–1852)