53. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- DADPC–CNEA Weekly Meeting, 7 November 1951
PARTICIPANTS
- [name not declassified]
- [name not declassified]
- [name not declassified]
1. [name not declassified] asked [name not declassified] if he had seen the policy paper on Iran that had been returned for reworking.2 [name not declassified] answered that he had not seen it but that he knew of it. He said that the Senior Staff of NSC wanted it redone and that Mr. Dulles, who is a member of that staff, had suggested that the [less than 1 line not declassified] and Roosevelt be given the job. The two main faults with the paper are that it does not really come to grip with the problems in Iran and it fails to consider our relationships with the British.
[name not declassified] went on to say that the over-all Iranian situation is getting worse. Mossadeq is still here and talking about negotiating but at the moment no actual negotiations are taking place. [name not declassified] asked if the change in British government would have any effect on negotiations and [name not declassified] said he doubted it strongly. [name not declassified] said that they were going to have another conference this afternoon (7 Nov. 1951) to look at OPC strategy in the situation.
[Omitted here is a conversation unrelated to Iran.]
4. [name not declassified] asked if there had been any contact with British SIS on any of these problems. [name not declassified] said that SIS had been contacted only on stay-behind activities in the Near East. [Page 151] [name not declassified] asked what would happen should the situation further deteriorate, perhaps a coup that would put the Tudeh party in the government. [name not declassified] said that for all intents and purposes that would become a stay-behind situation and there would be British-U.S. co-operation. We would probably support a rump government of the Shah. U.S. is fairly well committed to give military support to the British if it becomes necessary. [name not declassified] asked about the possibility of writing off the country if we could insure getting the oil. [name not declassified] replied that oil was not the issue. If we lose Iran, it is very likely that one by one the other Near East countries would collapse in turn.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO–IMS Files, Job 80–01795R, Box 7, Folder 2, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) History 03Nov51–13Nov51. Top Secret.↩
- Not found. At a meeting with the Deputy Assistant Director of Policy Coordination held on November 21, [name not declassified] “noted that an awkward situation had developed out of the new NSC policy paper on Iran. When the original paper was sent back for reworking Mr. Dulles suggested that the [less than 1 line not declassified] Roosevelt and [name not declassified] collaborate on the job. [name not declassified] however, has gone ahead and written the paper without consulting with Mr. Roosevelt. It is an extremely poor paper. [name not declassified] simultaneously submitted it to Mr. Roosevelt and the Board. For all intents and purposes Mr. Roosevelt is committed to it although he had nothing to do with its drafting. [name not declassified] noted that NEA is saying nothing. There is a strong possibility that the Policy Planning Staff will kill it before it gets to the Senior Staff.” (Memorandum for Record, November 29; ibid.)↩