253. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Wisner) to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)1


  • Draft of proposed message to Teheran station

1. Following conversations which the Director has had within the past couple of days with high-ranking State Department officials concerning the Warne situation, the Director requested that a cable be sent to our Teheran station along the following lines. The purpose of the cable is to obtain an answer to the indicated question which will enable us to follow up this matter further with the State Department.

2. The following is the outline of the proposed cable which I should appreciate your getting off as soon as possible:

“In further discussions with high level officials of ODACID concerning the difficulties and complications arising from the (Warne) situation, the opinion has been expressed that it would be most difficult for ODACID to propose to (Warne) that he depart from Iran for a period of time in such a way as to satisfactorily mask the intent of the instruction. In other words no device or pretext has yet been hit upon which would satisfy (Warne) and guarantee against his asking questions which might provide further complications and prove a source of additional embarrassment.

“Accordingly will you please advise whether in light of all present circumstances you still feel it desirable for (Warne) to be absent from [Page 640] the country for a time. For your information it is the present disposition ODACID to pursue this subject further only if you feel that there are compelling reasons dictating the absence.”2

Frank G. Wisner 3
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 80–01701R, Box 3, Folder 8, TPAJAX Vol. II. Top Secret.
  2. In a memorandum to Roosevelt, July 30, Waller recommended that “if you concur, I shall advise Jernegan to take no action to arrange for Mr. Warne to be called away from Iran.” (Ibid.)
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.