107. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1
Regarding (B), we were both of opinion that at present it did not (rpt not) seem likely any alternatives to Mosadeq could be brought into power except perhaps by military coup d’état; that we knew of no (rpt no) outstanding military leaders with ability who had strength, standing or intelligence necessary for assuring success of coup d’état, and for governing Iran in case such coup d’état shld be successful; that army officers who seemed to be best fitted for leadership in effecting coup d’état were General Zahedi and General Hedjazi; that these two Generals differed to extent in their political views since Zahedi sympathized with moderates of National Front whereas Hedjazi would probably be primarily interested in setting up strong government which would strengthen hand of Shah and exterminate Communists (US impression of Zahedi is that he has rather weak character—British impression seems somewhat more favorable).
Regarding (C) coup d’état, to be successful, would have to be carried out and executed entirely by Iranian military in name of Shah without knowledge of Shah since Shah would probably not (rpt not) have stamina to see it through and might at certain stage weaken and denounce leaders; it would probably be necessary for at least commander of army division stationed in Tehran to be fellow conspirator and probably at some point commander of Shah’s bodyguard; it is believed that if army could gain complete control of Tehran and conspirators, in name of Shah, could appoint new chief of staff, most of provinces, except possibly Khuzistan, would recognize new government. Qashqai tribes might cause difficulty. (Such information as has come to us causes us believe trouble from Qashqais might be greater than British seem to think.)
Regarding (D) both Middleton and I agreed that neither British nor American Governments should undertake to encourage or support [Page 306]coup d’état and that our two Embassies should not (rpt not) become involved in any way.
We should also bear in mind that successful coup d’état almost certain result in Tudeh gaining control of national movement. Military dictatorship might therefore encounter increasing difficulties in controlling country and in carrying out constructive program.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.13/7–3152. Top Secret; Security Information; NIACT. Repeated to London. Received at 11:55 a.m. Printed with redactions in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 427–428 (Document 192).↩
- Document 103.↩
- Reference is to telegram 480 from Tehran, printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 425–426 (Document 191).↩