795.00/6–2650: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received June 26—5:55 p. m.]
3113. Personal from Bohlen1 for Kennan. I fully realize that I do not have all the considerations which entered into instruction contained in Department’s 538 of June 25 to Moscow,2 but I am heartily in accord with views contained in Moscow’s 1734, repeated Paris 247,3 expressing doubt as to desirability of making direct approach to Soviet Government in regard to Korean situation. I agree with them that such a direct approach would offer the Soviets a distinct tactical advantage.
- (1)
- They could utilize this approach to confuse the issue and perhaps by holding out some hope of Soviet cooperation in bringing the conflict to a close, et cetera, et cetera. Could easily inhibit or at least introduce a delaying element in any international or US action which might be in contemplation to assist South Koreans, It would not take too much for certain members of the Security Council to seize on any ray of hope from Moscow to try to hold up further UN action.
- (2)
- Perhaps even more important, it would publicly involve the Soviet Union directly in the Korean matter. We all know, of course, that the Kremlin has set in motion and is directing the Korean operation, but as long as it is not so publicly cited, it would be easier for the Soviets privately to restrain the North Koreans if as a result of strong, determined countermeasures the Kremlin considered that the risks were becoming too great.
This would certainly appear to be a very clear case of typical Stalin methods whereby he initiates action not formally and directly involving the Soviet Union which he can and will press to the full if only weakness is encountered while leaving himself a way out without too direct loss of Soviet face if he considers the risks were becoming too great. It is significant to note in support of this contention that the chief Soviet-Communist propaganda line is that the South Koreans are the aggressors seeking on US instigation to provoke a general war while tibe North Koreans are merely repelling attacks on their territory. This is standard cover used by any aggressor, but it also indicates the facesaving way out if the Kremlin for its own reason decides that South Korea is not worth the risk of a major conflict.
This is the clearest case of direct defiance of the United States plus for the first time overt violation of a frontier that has occurred since the end of the war and you may be sure that all Europeans to say nothing of the Asiatics are watching to see what the United States [Page 175] will do. It is a situation requiring the maximum firmness, and even a willingness to take major risks in order to convince the Kremlin that we mean business without, however, forcing them publicly into a position from which there can be no retreat.
It is for these reasons that I completely agree with Moscow’s telegram under reference that what is needed is the strongest and most vigorous countermeasures backed by the US on the spot in order to convince the Kremlin that the most serious risks are directly involved in the North Korean aggression. In submitting the foregoing I realize that there may be overriding reasons from point of view of public opinion or UN attitudes which necessitate an approach to the Soviet Government in this situation in which case I Would certainly agree with Moscow’s suggestion that it would be merely confined to a simple request for cooperation. [Bohlen.]