795.00/12–550: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State
niact
[Received December 5—11:03 a. m.]
3164. French public and governmental views on the Korean situation and US policy in Far East largely parallel those of British [Page 1388] opinion as set forth in London’s 3241 to Department December 3,1 and Pleven’s affirmation of “identity of views” with Attlee is generally accepted and welcomed here. As a matter of fact, Pleven’s and Schuman’s trip to London seems to have temporarily silenced those few voices who had criticized government for not acting independently enough, and fair amount of unity in foreign affairs, as exemplified by recent confidence vote in the Assembly, may be registered as one favorable factor in present situation here.
Recent events have at the same time inevitably caused a certain flurry of speculation about French neutralism, notably by foreign observers, and no doubt neutralist tendencies have received some impulse from existing fears that situation may be drifting toward general war. Sharp distinction must in our view be drawn, however, between neutralists, who are a very small coterie of intellectuals and whose attitude has in recent past become increasingly anti-American, and sentiment of large majority of Frenchmen who during present crisis show no inclination to dissociate themselves from France’s western allies.
What is increasingly encountered here is feeling that there is difference between US and Western European approaches toward the Far Eastern situation and that France, together with Britain, must exercise moderating influence on US to avoid major war in Far East which would detract from US capacity to help create situation of strength in Europe. Peculiarly enough, what the French fear at this point is precisely the thing they welcomed last June, the spontaneous reaction of US public opinion to a challenge, and quick and decisive response to such a challenge by the US Government. Nearly all the polemics against Mac Arthur (most recently when he started his last offensive, and increasingly as the offensive developed into retreat) and against the President (for allegedly toying with idea of using atom bomb) spring from feeling that US must be brought around to more cautious attitude, rather than from feeling that France should in any way dissociate itself from the US.
Fact that no French troops are engaged in Korea may account for the different French psychological reaction to the Chinese aggression compared to that which was apparently caused in the US. As a matter of fact, although news of the Chinese counter-offensive was received with dismay and consternation, this was to some extent coupled with an I-told-you-so-attitude. In any event, developments with respect to Communist China’s reception in the UN are largely looked upon from point of view of whether compromise solution is rendered more [Page 1389] or less difficult. Certainly a compromise solution is what French public opinion hopes for, relief and hope in newspapers yesterday created by alleged Chinese proposal for settlement (on basis restoration 38th parallel, admission to UN and jettisoning of Formosa) is significant in this connection.
In spite of these feelings, the recent statements of Pleven and Schuman about complete French unity with the west, and firm adherence to the UN and principle of collective security, can be taken at face value, and France can in our view be counted upon to continue to make her contribution to build up of strength and unity in Europe and defense of this interest in Indochina. But the facts must be recognized that in the Far East France’s war is Indochina and not Korea; that US policy on Formosa has never captured the French imagination; that the French were perhaps only prevented from recognizing Mao by the fact that Mao recognized Ho Chi-minh; and that Schuman is on record as having favored restoration of the status quo ante bellum in Korea (Embtel 1182, September 72). Consequently for French opinion a compromise involving, say, return to the 38th parallel and admission of Communist China to the UN, would be comparatively palatable.
What we are witnessing under present circumstances is emergence into the open of certain latent feelings about the US: feelings that due to geographic and psychological factors the US might decide more lightly about war and peace; that the US Government may be impelled into military commitments which are not in its own interests and a fortiori not in those of its European allies; that the US has in the past not sufficiently listened to real or imaginary counsels of moderation from its allies; and that France, together with Britain, must now play the role that it has from time to time successfully coveted in the past, namely the role of moderator and intelligent, detached advisor to its mighty and much-needed friend. All these feelings of course spring from the basic fact, which cannot be emphasized too often, that under present circumstances and given its geographic position, France feels naked in the face of possible Russian aggression in Europe and fears more than anything else a Soviet military occupation, even if it were to be of short duration.
Department pass Moscow. Repeated information London priority 775, Moscow priority 112.