Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/12–450

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley) to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

top secret

Washington, 4 December 1950.

Subject: Korea

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Department of State position paper entitled “Korea”, prepared for use by the President in his discussions with Prime Minister Attlee, be changed as indicated in the usual manner in the attached revised draft.¹

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

Korea

It is recommended that the President discuss with Mr. Attlee the following course of action with respect to Korea:

1. Inform Mr. Attlee of the military situation confronting United Nations forces and of the plan to assemble them in three beachheads in the Seoul–Inchon, Hamhung and Pusan areas. Inform him that the X Corps will be evacuated from northeast Korea and moved to Japan in any way which proves to be militarily practicable. The precise handling of evacuated Korean forces will require special attention.

2. It would be militarily advantageous in the immediate situation if a cease-fire order could be arranged provided that considerations offered were not so great as to be unacceptable. It might insure full support of the United Nations if it were done on the basis of the 38th Parallel. Before Chinese Communist forces have reached the 38th Parallel in strength, we should try to establish a cease-fire on the basis of the 38th Parallel, with the armies separated by demilitarized zone. The principal purpose of this effort would be to attempt to deny a success to aggression and to consolidate an overwhelming majority of the United Nations behind this attempt. Arrangements for a cease-fire on the basis of the 38th Parallel must not be impose conditions which would jeopardize the safety of United Nations forces nor be conditioned on agreement on other issues, such as Formosa, and the Chinese seat in the UN. During this cease-fire effort the United Nations Eighth Army would retire on the Seoul Inchon area but should not begin any evacuation until the result of the cease-fire effort can be determined.

3. If a cease-fire can should be effected which permits a stabilization of the 38th Parallel, United Nations should proceed with the political, military and economic stabilization of the Republic of Korea while continuing efforts to seek an independent and unified Korea by political means.

4. If the Chinese Communists reject a cease-fire and move major forces south of the 38th Parallel, the United Nations Eighth Army forces will face a forced evacuation of the Korea. Seoul-Inchon and Pusan areas. The consequences of a voluntary acceptance of a successful aggression and of a voluntary abandonment of our Korean allies would be such that any United Nations evacuation must be clearly the result of military necessity only.

5. If the Chinese Communists drive United Nations forces out of South Korea, The United Nations must take immediate action to declare Communist China an aggressor and must mobilize such political and economic measures as are available to bring pressure upon Peiping and to affirm the determination of the United Nations not to accept an aggression. The absence of available forces and the acknowledgment that the major threat posed to the free world comes from the Soviet Union would not permit an effort to impose a military defeat upon Peiping on the mainland of China. This would not exclude, however, Also there is the possibility of some military action which would harass the Chinese pending their acceptance of a United Nations settlement for Korea and would not exclude any including efforts which could be made to stimulate anticommunist resistance within China itself, including such as the exploitation of Nationalist capabilities, imposition of a naval blockade, and disruption of communications by bombing.

In addition to the measures indicated above, the U.S. and U.K. should consult immediately about other steps which might be taken to strengthen non-communist Asia. These steps might include:

(a) Restoration of considerable self-government to Japan, the acceleration of efforts to obtain a Japanese peace settlement, the strengthening of Japanese capacity for self-defense, the greater utilization of productive capacity to strenghten the capabilities of the free world, and the prompt admission of Japan into international organizations. United Kingdom reluctance to move on these points should be discarded in light of the new critical situation.

(b) Appropriate military arrangements between nations in Southeast Asia capable of effective mutual support. Further steps to organize collective security in the Pacific on a regional basis.

(c) Special efforts to convince non-communist Asia of the nature of the threat which confronts it and to urge upon the governments concerned the need for concerted Asian action to resist communist aggression in that area.

(d) Intensification of economic and military assistance to encourage the organization of resistance to communist encroachment.

(e) Intensification of psychological and covert activity against communist regimes and activity in Asia.

1. In the enclosure, the underlined portions are those suggested for insertion by the JCS, while those lined out represent sections of the original Department of State draft recommended for deletion by the JCS.