Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/12–350

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

top secret

[Washington,] December 3, 1950—9:30 a. m.

Subject: Meeting at the Pentagon

Participants:	General Marshall
	General Bradley
	Admiral Sherman
	General Haislip1
	General Vandenberg
	General Gruenther2
	General Norstad
	Admiral Davis3
	General Ridgway and other officers
	Mr. Harriman
	Secretary Acheson
	Mr. Matthews
	Mr. Nitze
	Mr. Rusk
	Mr. Jessup

General Ridgway gave the briefing on military developments. This was based on yesterday’s telecon since he said there was nothing really new in today’s telecon. He stressed the adverse terrain and weather conditions. The Tenth Corps capability to withdraw is questionable. The Eighth Army probably can get down to Changdo.

In answer to Mr. Acheson’s question, General Ridgway said he was not sure whether they could get to the Seoul area. The enemy can get down in force in a matter of days. We can hold the three beachheads of Inchon, Hamhung and Pusan for some time if we can get our troops in the beachheads. They could hold until a decision is made on the question of evacuation. He indicated they could reach the Seoul–Inchon area.

General Bradley said it was less clear that the Tenth Corps could get to Hamhung. There are some rail facilities—seven engines and 200 cars which can take the Capital Division and part of the Seventh Division part way. He expressed anxiety about radio reports on our troops strength and movements of the troops. This problem of release of military information to the enemy would have to be re-examined. General MacArthur has authority to impose censorship but he has not done so.

General Ridgway and Admiral Sherman described the necessity for the Marines to regroup at Hagaru before the Division can withdraw. About 1,000 wounded have been evacuated by air.

Secretary Acheson asked whether this information gives the answer to the questions asked at the meeting last night with the President; namely, has the military situation reached a point at which it is necessary for us to get a cease-fire?

General Bradley said if this is possible it would be fine. There is still a question of the price to be paid. Do we get out of Korea and do they? The military situation would improve if we succeed in getting into the beachheads. We do not have much strength in Pusan.

General Ridgway, in answer to General Marshall, who asked about the 2,300 replacements scheduled for December, said they were being expedited but pointed out they were mostly recruits just finished with their fourteen weeks training. Men are being flown out.

General Haislip said that General MacArthur sets the priorities as between men, equipment, etc.

General Bradley raised the question whether if we cannot get a cease-fire in forty-eight hours through the UN must we conclude that we must take action ourselves. Should we take other means, for example, saying to the Chinese Communists that since they refuse a cease-fire we consider we are at war. If we get out of Korea are we to give up the whole of Asia? Against China we could use blockade of the coast, bombing and a good many other things to bother them, though we would probably not use the A-Bomb.

Mr. Jessup asked General Bradley what he anticipated the Chinese Communist reaction would be in regard to attacks on Hong Kong and Indochina. To which General Bradley replied that we could hurt them a great deal by air; he noted their shortage of gas.

Mr. Acheson spoke on the question of the price which might have to be paid for a cease-fire. Do we say in the UN that we must have a cease-fire? Such an offer would either be rejected or it would start talks. As General Marshall had pointed out, we must consider the security of our troops and the effect on the position of the United States in the Far East and the whole world. There is danger of our becoming the greatest appeasers of all time if we abandon the Koreans and they are slaughtered; if there is a Dunkirk and we are forced out it is a disaster but not a disgraceful one. It seemed to him that the Tenth Corps will be forced out but the others would not be just yet. If the UN declares a cease-fire and an approach is made to the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union they will ask terms. It would seem alright to agree to withdraw to the 38th parallel. This would not involve any loss of national unity. This, however, seems too easy and it is doubtful if they would agree. They might say we must leave Korea. We might agree to withdraw the Tenth Corps to Japan but not the Eighth Army. If this were accepted and we can get the Tenth Corps out they might soon start a new attack on the Eighth Army. We are presented with a bitter choice. They may further ask that we withdraw the Seventh Fleet from Formosa and seat them in the UN. We must consider whether these are negotiable propositions. They might further demand that the Japanese Peace Treaty be concluded only by unanimous agreement of five parties, including the Chinese Communists. This would mean driving us out of the Far East.

General Vandenberg said that beginning negotiations on such matters involves the possibility of getting ourselves into a position from which we could not withdraw.

Mr. Acheson agreed that we would probably be drawn into negotiations. We get no support from our friends, except the Philippines, on refusing to withdraw the Seventh Fleet. The other countries agree that Formosa is not ours and have no sympathy with our position. On the other hand, if we can get a solid front among our Allies with our going back to the 38th parallel, this is a position with moral force and maintains cohesiveness among the Allies. The present tendency among other countries is to criticize us rather than the Chinese Communists.

General Vandenberg asked whether we were not getting into a trap; the Chinese Communists will say “No, but …”

Secretary Acheson said we must anticipate that someone will propose a cease-fire, for example, Attlee. The State Department can try to hold other governments on what is decent and right. We must avoid having the whole world think we are wrong. We can get support for not abandoning Japan and support for not abandoning Korea. There would be no support on Formosa or on the question of seating the Chinese Communists.

General Bradley said from a military point of view a cease-fire would be very useful to relieve pressure, etc., but the political price will be too great. If we suggested and the conditions are bad, what do we do then? If we are forced out by military or political action where do we go? If we are to be at war with the Chinese Communists we certainly don’t want to hand them Formosa. He repeated that a ceasefire would be a help to us if the cost is not too great. Time has now run out on that proposition and we must consider it.

Secretary Acheson agreed. Regarding a state of war with the Chinese Communists we must consider carefully any steps against China generally. If a cease-fire is rejected and we have to fight our way out, all military steps against the Chinese should relate to the evacuation of our troops. Anything helping out that is alright. If measures against China do not contribute to that end and are mere retaliation, it would not meet this test. If we get into general war with China and there are grave chances of general war with the Soviet Union soon then we would fight without allies on our side.

General Bradley said we must weigh that against Korea and against the loss of prestige in Asia and Europe. We would lose Indochina and Formosa. The Germans are already saying we have proved that we are weak. Appeasement is gaining in Europe.

Admiral Sherman said there were only two ways to treat with the Chinese. We can say we are a weakened nation and will negotiate. This is not true. We have lost men and will lose more and one can say we have lost a campaign but we are not defeated. He thought we should not ask for a cease-fire. The only sound basis for dealing with the Chinese Communists would say that unless you stop you are at war with the United States. If after that they choose war, we get our troops out as best we can and fight the war. If we don’t take this course others will begin to push us around. If any one can kill that many Americans and not be at war, we are defeated.

Mr. Rusk asked regarding the evacuation of our forces without major destruction, what pressure is on us to pay some price to save that force.

General Bradley said it was a race to get into the beachhead. They probably won’t agree to a cease-fire. It is a question of how long we can hold. It was also a question of how long the American public will stand this without saying we are at war with China.

Secretary Acheson said the great trouble is that we are fighting the wrong nation. We are fighting the second team, whereas the real enemy is the Soviet Union.

General Bradley said that he would not advocate putting men into China but wondered whether we could come home and just forget the matter.

Secretary Acheson said certainly not. He asked what the effect of war with China would be on our ability to fight the Soviet Union which would like to see us tangle with the Chinese. If our resources are devoted there, we cannot build up strength in Europe.

Admiral Sherman urged that we avoid telling the Chinese or the Soviet Union that we will not do anything against them. We must avoid press, radio stories, etc., on what we are doing. We should make no commitment as to anything that we must do.

Secretary Acheson said suppose we are at war with the Chinese Communists we must think what is the effect on our Allies and our relations with the Soviet Union. He thought many of them would quit us and deal with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Harriman said he was not sure of that yet on the basis of his information.

Secretary Acheson thought that the other countries would not be willing to get into war with China in view of the Sino-Soviet Treaty.

General Marshall raised the question of Indochina and the dilemma of the French there and the resulting French attitude.

Secretary Acheson said the French are so weak and shell-shocked they are anxious for a deal which would give an illusion of safety. He asked Mr. Rusk for his views.

Mr. Rusk said the French would try to get a deal with Ho and then withdraw. They would not stay firm except with a solid UN front. The danger is that we might lose both our principles and our troops. The UN did come in in June. They are tied in with us and we with them in the UN. Unless we maintain the integrity of the UN, there is a question if we can maintain the integrity of our foreign policy. There must be no reward for aggression in Korea. We could solidify the UN with us on standing on the 38th parallel. If the Chinese cross the parallel it would solidify our UN support. The UN should be clear as to the Chinese Communist action. We are not actually at war yet and are therefore not committed to defeat Communist China. If the UN declares China an aggressor, the Chinese Communists get no political profit from aggression. The contrary would be true if they are seated as a result of the aggression. We must convince our friends. We cannot sustain here the theory of an absolute priority for Europe if we surrender the Far East. We could try to void China, making it hard for them to solidify their control and thus difficult to move into Southeast Asia. We could step up current action, if it would not involve too much sacrifice of our troops. It is a middle way between appeasement and full war.

General Marshall asked if we would confine the cease-fire to a line at the 38th parallel.

Mr. Rusk said the only thing we should accept by agreement is the 38th parallel and that anything else should be taken only de facto.

General Vandenberg asked whether we would settle the Formosan problem.

Admiral Sherman said we may get some help out of Formosa if there are general hostilities with the Chinese. The UN must stand firm.

General Marshall said that the attitude described in the UN was illogical, amounting almost to bad faith but that one had to recognize that such situations do arise in international relations. He recalled the reactions in the British press at the time of the Battle of the Bulge. We must accept the UN procedure and try to improve it but not expect perfection.

Mr. Harriman said that tactics in the UN must consider our moral position and American opinion. Our policy must be based on holding the US and the British Commonwealth in line. The European attitude depends upon us and our attitude and what we are ready to do. More action hi our defense effort is necessary. Many in Europe are ready to appease but not all of them will take this line unless we lose our leadership.

General Haislip pointed out that we can do nothing to help in Europe since we have only one Division and very few supplies to contribute.

General Bradley thought that Mr. Rusk’s statement was fine. We might gain with the UN by proposing it but there was still the danger that we might get into a position of trading in regard to abandoning all of Korea, Formosa, etc. Again the question was how big a price will we pay. Perhaps we should make the gesture regarding the 38th parallel which might involve some gains but where do we go from there. Should we not say that if we don’t accept this then we will be at war?

Mr. Nitze questioned whether the Soviet Union would want the Chinese Communists to accept it. If not, are we ready to follow the chain of events if the Soviet Union puts in its forces in support of the Chinese. There would be a slight chance of holding our European allies. It is not possible to hold the UK in line for early hostilities with the Soviet Union. He was not much worried about refusing to yield on Formosa and the question of seating the Chinese while we were under attack but there was the question of holding our allies in line. If we carry hostilities against China and the Soviet Union comes in what do we do?

Secretary Acheson asked whether anyone doubted that it would be desirable to have a cease-fire on the 38th parallel if some other country suggested it. (There was no answer to this but no dissent.)

General Bradley asked how much we could afford to lose by abandonment without further action against Communist China. He spoke of the reaction in Congress and among the armed forces. He doubted whether the Chinese would accept the 38th parallel if we crossed it first.

Admiral Davis said the UN proposal ought to be immediate.

Mr. Harriman asked whether anyone doubted the immediate necessity of a higher degree of mobilization.

Admiral Sherman agreed we should accelerate.

General Vandenberg questioned whether the Russians would move in Europe at the same time they might move in Asia. It might be better to get their Air Force involved in Asia. It would be very good from our point of view if we could force them to devote their air to Asia where they are more vulnerable and thus weaken their air force in Europe.

Admiral Sherman said we must not tie up troops in China and we must make no public statement regarding what we plan to do.

General Bradley said there were two questions. The political question was whether we ask for a cease-fire; the military question is when we draw back to the beachheads, do we begin to evacuate our troops or do we fight to a Dunkirk. We can evacuate personnel rapidly from Inchon but not the equipment. We can get out more if we begin at once. The same is true of Pusan but there was a question about Hamhung. An immediate decision must be made on whether we begin to withdraw.

Secretary Acheson asked whether the materiel is vital.

General Bradley said we have nothing else but you cannot say it is “vital”.

Admiral Sherman explained that 60,000 men could be evacuated from Inchon in one day without their equipment but that it would take six days to evacuate one division with its equipment.

Secretary Acheson asked whether we should evacuate the ROK forces.

Mr. Matthews said that we could not leave them there if they wanted to come out.

General Marshall returned to Admiral Sherman’s point about starting from a complete admission of defeat. He pointed to the important psychological elements. On the political side he thought it would be useful if someone would put up the proposal of a cease-fire on the 38th parallel before we get there. Once we are in the beachheads the Chinese Communists can overrun South Korea. The line-up with the British Commonwealth is most important.

Mr. Rusk suggested there was no sense going to Pusan.

Mr. Jessup raised the question whether the ROK forces should be evacuated to Japan.

Mr. Rusk said that the Communists were very active among the Koreans now in Japan and that it might be risky to bring in the Korean Army.

Admiral Sherman raised the question of the rearmament of Japan.

General Bradley asked whether we should begin evacuation of civilian dependents from Berlin and other exposed places. Was there any political or military gain? We have avoided this step hitherto because of its psychological effect. On the other hand can we go to full mobilization and leave them exposed. We need an answer soon on this.

Admiral Sherman thought we should not allow any more dependents to go out to these places now.

General Vandenberg said if there was any political advantage in it we should do it fast.

Mr. Matthews said there was certainly no political advantage.

General Vandenberg said it might show the USSR we meant business.

Mr. Harriman said it would scare Europe very badly.

General Bradley said if the Chinese attack on us in Korea is not war would it be war if they overran our zone in Berlin.

Secretary Acheson said we have already said it would be.

General Bradley recalled that we used to say that an attack on a platoon of United States troops meant war. Would anyone believe it now if we don’t react to the Chinese attack. We might well be overrun by East Germans in Berlin.

Secretary Acheson doubted if the Russians would deflect any of their forces from Europe to China. He thought they might begin making trouble in Berlin and Vienna.

General Vandenberg said that the proposed action against China would not affect our capacity in Europe. All we would need would be the naval blockade and the use of one or two air groups. It would be a long-range job.

Mr. Jessup asked whether it would involve the loss of Hong Kong and Indochina.

Admiral Sherman said the Chinese would take them anyhow.

General Vandenberg stated it would be harder for the Chinese Communists to hold their people under an attack; they would have a great problem with food and transportation, etc.

Mr. Harriman expressed agreement with Admiral Sherman’s previous statement about treating with the Chinese.

General Bradley asked what the effect would be on our friends in going beyond what we are now doing. He repeated the urgent need for deciding the two questions about a cease-fire on the 38th parallel and evacuation of our forces from the beachhead.

Admiral Sherman said we could not give MacArthur an order about evacuation unless censorship had been previously imposed.

General Ridgway said we needed to accelerate now our mobilization. We have an uncommitted capacity for 75,000 more men.

Admiral Sherman thought the President should announce a program of acceleration.

There followed a general discussion on details of calling up more men, the state of readiness of the camps, rebuilding, etc.

General Marshall kept pressing the question whether we need more money to do more than we are doing and General Ridgway and General Gruenther indicated that we did.

Secretary Acheson suggested that the President should take public action, including a declaration of national emergency which was not technically necessary but which would show the country the general attitude the President was taking.

General Vandenberg agreed it was important to make the country realize the situation.

General Bradley suggested that we establish firm beachheads but do it on the principle that we are going to withdraw in an orderly way. We might then get some other country to propose a cease-fire in the UN on the 38th parallel.

Mr. Jessup raised the question of whether we should agree that all non-Korean forces should leave Korea as proposed by General Wu of the Chinese Communist Delegation in his speech.

Admiral Sherman said that he would rather take war with China than this.

Mr. Rusk suggested that any withdrawal would be a phased withdrawal under UN supervision.

General Vandenberg wondered whether the American people would accept it.

General Bradley was worried whether we could do this without striking back at the Chinese Communists.

Secretary Acheson said that if we should start action against the Chinese Communists elsewhere, the military situation is we must get out of Korea and the choice is between being forced out in a Dunkirk with heavy losses or whether we have a negotiated withdrawal or whether we undertake it along with war against the Chinese Communists. We might be at a point at which we would find the UN was not at war with Communist China but at the same time if we are at war with Communist China we want the greatest possible support from others.

General Bradley said he didn’t want war with Communist China. The effect of pulling out or being kicked out without war with Communist China would, however, be very bad. He would not propose any retaliation until after we had completed the evacuation.

General Gruenther asked him whether he would include an ultimatum to the Chinese that if they did not stop fighting we would consider ourselves at war putting a date a few days ahead as General Bradley had previously indicated.

Admiral Sherman said he didn’t think the Chinese had fuel enough for a prolonged air effort.

General Marshall inquired about our anti-aircraft at Inchon. While we have lost a great deal of equipment there is still a great deal of anti-aircraft in the theater.

Secretary Acheson said that if we concluded now for whatever reason, either American opinion or anything else, to continue hostilities against the Chinese Communists we cannot take the course of proposing a cease-fire on any basis. We can’t have a cease-fire and still go on fighting the Chinese unless they violated the cease-fire and renew their attack because in that case we alone would be starting a war in violation of the UN order. If we must go ahead with hostilities against the Chinese we must not take the course of ending the hostilities; we must be forced out of Korea and therefore we must resist a suggestion of a cease-fire. In that case, we would have to try to get condemnation of the Chinese and have them branded as an aggressor.

Mr. Jessup emphasized the point about unilateral defiance of a UN order.

General Marshall agreed.

Mr. Nitze said we would be better off if we had no hostilities with the Chinese if we could do this with honor and then get ready for the Soviet Union.

General Vandenberg stated that with the casualties we have suffered, a cease-fire is unacceptable.

Admiral Sherman distinguished between the Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire and the present proposal in which the UN itself is being pushed around.

Mr. Jessup said that Admiral Sherman’s point was entirely logical but that unfortunately the members of the UN are not looking at the matter so logically.

Mr. Harriman questioned whether a cease-fire proposal would unite the UN.

Mr. Jessup suggested we would have to decide which would be the greater blow to our prestige—to accept a cease-fire or to be driven out of Korea.

General Vandenberg agreed.

Secretary Acheson said that the President must talk with Attlee before a decision is made for war with China. We could go ahead and take the first three steps in the memorandum.⁴ We still have latitude with regard to the kind of resolution to press in the UN.

Mr. Harriman said that any other course would be very dangerous.

Mr. Acheson said that at the meeting last night we had thought we might have to take some other course, but that the reports he had heard this morning looked better with regard to the military position.

General Marshall agreed that it did look slightly better. There is no use in holding the Northeast part of Korea. The military estimate of possibly reaching Inchon was better than it had been last night.

General Bradley said that if our beachheads are not strongly established we need to get out as soon as possible. However, several days are needed for the talks with Attlee and the questions in the UN. He said that they expected to lose Wonsan but hope to hold Hamhung or Hungnam.

Secretary Acheson returned to the question of the desirability of censorship.

Admiral Sherman said it was most desirable but it was difficult. Perhaps the best way was to get the reporters out of the place.

Secretary Acheson recalled that General Sherman’s policy in the Civil War was to tell the correspondents all his plans and then lock them up in jail.

Mr. Rusk stressed the importance of not announcing our plans in regard to evacuation of troops.

Admiral Sherman urged that General MacArthur be ordered to get his troops into the beachheads at once.

General Marshall inquired whether he hadn’t already received such orders and Admiral Sherman indicated that the Joint Chiefs had indicated concurrence in his plans.

General Marshall said it was important that the President should talk with Attlee before final decisions were made.

General Bradley read a draft of an order to General MacArthur along the lines of telling him to hold the beachheads as long as required, pending settlement of the general situation.

General Marshall questioned whether it was necessary to go into so much detail on the situation and future developments. He thought it would be sufficient merely to approve the grouping in the three-base areas. He wondered, however, whether this would bar General MacArthur from any other choice which might seem to him on the ground necessary.

General Bradley said that the Joint Chiefs were merely approving what MacArthur had suggested. He agreed it was dangerous to make any more commitments than necessary.

Admiral Sherman suggested inserting a sentence to the effect that the safety of his forces was paramount.⁵

Secretary Acheson said that from the political point of view the evacuation of the Tenth Corps was alright.

General Marshall noted his concern about the problem of the South Koreans.

General Bradley raised the question of the 160,000 north Korean POW’s we hold.

Mr. Rusk suggested that we might want to exchange them for some of the prisoners which they hold.

General Marshall said this matter must be considered and guidance sent later to General MacArthur.

1. Gen. Wade H. Haislip, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
2. Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, U.S. Army.
3. Vice Adm. Arthur C. Davis, Director of the Joint Staff. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. Reference is to the memorandum in telegram Gadel 153 to New York, December 2, 7 p. m., p. 1307.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted the following message to General MacArthur at 1:41 p. m. on December 3:

   “Your C 50332. We consider that the preservation of your forces is now the primary consideration. Consolidation of forces into beachheads is concurred in.” (Telegram JCS 97917; 795.00/12–350)