795.00/12–350: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
flash
[Received December 3—3:51 a. m.]
C–50332. Ref JCS 97772.1 The X Corps is being withdrawn into the Hamhung area as rapidly as possible. The situation within the Eighth Army becomes increasingly critical. General Walker reports, and I agree with his estimate, that he cannot hold the Pyongyang area and under enemy pressure, when exerted, will unquestionably be forced to withdraw to the Seoul area. There is no practicability, nor would any benefit accrue thereby, to attempt to unite the forces of the Eighth Army and the X Corps. Both forces are completely outnumbered and their junction would, therefore, not only not produce added strength, but actually jeopardize the free flow of movement that arises from the two separate logistical lines of naval supply and maneuver.
As I previously reported, the development of a defense line across the waist of Korea is not feasible because of the numerical weakness of our forces as considered in connection with the distances involved; by the necessity of supplying the two parts of the line from ports within each area; and by the division of the area into two compartments by the rugged mountainous terrain running north and south. Such a line is one of approximately 120 air miles with a road distance of approximately 150 miles. If the entire United States Force of seven divisions at my disposal were placed along this defensive line it would mean that a division would be forced to protect a front of approximately 20 miles against greatly superior numbers of an enemy whose greatest strength is a potential for night infiltration through rugged terrain. Such a line with no depth would have little strength, and as a defensive concept would invite penetration with resultant envelopment and piecemeal destruction. Such a concept against the relatively weaker North Korean Forces would have been practicable, but against the full forces of the Chinese Army is impossible.
I do not believe that full comprehension exists of the basic changes which have been wrought by the undisguised entrance of the Chinese Army into the combat. Already Chinese troops to the estimated strength of approximately 26 divisions are in line of battle with an additional minimum of 200,000 to the enemy rear and now in process of being committed to action. In addition to this, remnants of the North Korean Army are being reorganized in the rear and there stands, [Page 1321] of course, behind all this the entire military potential of Communist China.
The terrain is of a nature to diminish the effectiveness of our air support in channelizing and interrupting the enemy supply system; it serves to aid the enemy in his dispersion tactics. This, together with the present limitation of international boundary, reduces enormously the normal benefit that would accrue to our superior air force.
With the enemy concentration inland, the Navy potential is greatly diminished in effectiveness; amphibious maneuver is no longer feasible and effective use of naval gunfire support is limited.
The potentials, therefore, of our combined strength are greatly reduced and the comparison more and more becomes one of relative combat effectiveness of ground forces.
It is clearly evident, therefore, that unless ground reinforcements of the greatest magnitude are promptly supplied, this Command will be either forced into successive withdrawals with diminished powers of resistance after each such move, or will be forced to take up beachhead bastion positions which, while insuring a degree of prolonged resistance, would afford little hope of anything beyond defense.
This small command actually under present conditions is facing the entire Chinese nation in an undeclared war and unless some positive and immediate action is taken, hope for success cannot be justified and steady attrition leading to final destruction can reasonably be contemplated.
Although the command up to the present time has exhibited good morale and marked efficiency, it has been in almost unending combat for five months and is mentally fatigued and physically battered. The combat effectiveness of the Republic of Korea Forces now at our disposal is negligible; for police and constabulary uses they would have some effectiveness. The other foreign army contingents, whatever their combat efficiency may be, are in such small strength as to exercise little influence. Each United States division at my disposal other than the First Marine Division is now approximately 5,000 men understrength and at no time have they achieved their full authorized numerical complement. The Chinese troops are fresh, completely organized, splendidly trained and equipped and apparently in peak condition for actual operations.
The general evaluation of the situation here must be viewed on the basis of an entirely new war against an entirely new power of great military strength and under entirely new conditions.
The directives under which I am operating based upon the North Korean Forces as an enemy are completely outmoded by events. The fact must be clearly understood that our relatively small force now [Page 1322] faces the full offensive power of the Chinese Communist nation augmented by extensive supply of Soviet materiel. The strategic concept suitable for operations against the North Korean Army which was so successful is not susceptible to continued application against such power. This calls for political decisions and strategic plans in implementation thereof, adequate fully to meet the realities involved. In this, time is of the essence as every hour sees the enemy power increase and ours decline.