795.00/12–250: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
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[Received December 2—11 p. m.]
1381. 1. During conversation with Bajpai this morning, I told him that I regretted that my illness had prevented my having a chat with him for several days. In meantime, there had been number of important developments and events including veto on part of Soviet Union of Six Power resolution and abstinence [sic] of India. He smiled rather weakly and said that India had made certain suggestions for amending resolution; that apparently resolution had to be passed so hurriedly that when it was found that objections were not practicable there had been no time for instructions to be sent to Rau. I said net result was, I feared, international Communists might not be sufficiently convinced that all of free world was completely unanimous in condemning Chinese aggression in Korea.
2. Bajpai said that it seemed to GOI that most important objective at moment was to prevent spread of hostilities. I agreed, pointing out, however, that it was not easy for UN forces to carry on warfare in present circumstances with an enemy which maintained supply base in untouchable area across international frontiers. Since large proportion American army involved US public was not likely to remain quiescent over very long period while such situation existed.
3. Bajpai told me in utmost confidence (and I request that this statement be repeated to no other government and be guarded carefully) that GOI had just turned down suggestion from Pearson of Canada that it join in appeal for immediate cease fire. It feared that [Page 1318] such action on its part would be misunderstood.1 He asked me not to repeat this to my government but I feel I must violate this injunction.
4. Bajpai said he wondered whether it was too late to endeavor to set up a neutral zone around areas in which China has particularly strong strategic and economic interests. I told him I could not comment on suggestion of this kind. It could best be discussed at Washington or Lake Success. I again stressed that US had sent its troops to Korea as component part of UN forces and that all the activities of these troops had been in compliance with decisions taken by UN and that UN had inescapable responsibility for safety these forces. If these forces were in danger, it seemed clear that UN should take forthright and courageous action to minimize such danger.