320/12–250: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

top secret
priority
niact

Gadel 153. Eyes only for Austin and Gross. Set forth below is memo resulting from consultations this afternoon:

Recommended Steps in the UN. (1) Prompt submission to the GA by the six powers of new agenda item entitled “Intervention of the Central Peoples Govt of the Peoples Republic of China in Korea”.

(2) Concurrent submission of explanatory memorandum in such form as to leave open nature of resolution which might be adopted by GA.

(3) Unless military situation requires different course of action, submission in GA of resolution vetoed in SC.

(4) In the event that military necessity requires an immediate cease fire, the following alternative courses shld be considered:

(a)
An approach to the Russians or Chinese Communists or both either directly, or indirectly through an intermediary, with a view to obtaining their agreement to the issuance of an immediate cease fire [Page 1308] and confirmation of that agreement by resolution in the SC or in any other way satisfactory to them.
The approach to the Russians and/or Chinese Communists cld be made directly by the US, by the UK, by the Indian Rep, by the Norwegian Rep, or by some combination of the foregoing. If the approach is made in Peiping the Swedish Ambas cld be used.
(b)
If it is deemed inadvisable to initiate an approach to the Russians or Chinese, either directly or indirectly, there cld be proposed in the GA a resolution calling for an immediate cease fire. This cld be done by introducing a cease fire resolution instead of the vetoed SC resolution and accelerate Assembly procedures so that the whole matter is taken up in plenary session. It is believed that it wld be possible to obtain a vote in this fashion within 24 to 48 hrs after the matter is placed on the Assembly’s agenda.
(c)
A third and slower alternative wld be to proceed in the Assembly by submitting the vetoed SC resolution in the first instance, and arrange for the introduction in the Assembly by amendment of that resolution or otherwise of a cease fire resolution in which we wld acquiesce and which we wld push forward to a prompt vote. It wld also be possible for some other delegation to introduce a cease fire resolution in the Assembly as an interim measure pending consideration of the vetoed resolution.

(5) If an approach to the Soviet and/or Chinese is made and rejected we shld proceed in the GA in such a way as to secure and maintain the maximum support of the free world for such action on the ground as is necessary under the circumstances.

Acheson