Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/12–250

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, and by Mr. William J. Sheppard, Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat

top secret

[Washington,] December 2, 1950—10:30 a.m.

Participants:	Secretary
	Senator Austin
	Ambassador Gross
	Mr. Jessup
	Mr. Matthews
	Mr. Rusk
	Mr. Nitze
	Mr. Battle
	Mr. Sheppard
	Mr. Hickerson

Mr. Acheson opened the meeting with the request that Mr. Trueheart of the R Area¹ give a briefing on the current situation in Korea.

After this briefing had taken place, the Secretary said that we had given careful consideration to the developments in Korea and had been in close touch with the Military Establishment. He mentioned that the Military were extremely pessimistic about the present situation and said that it was uncertain just what the decision would be so far as establishing a line on which we could hold. He said that we were looking at possible political courses in the light of the extremely grave military situation. He said that our objectives in regard to Korea in the UN were as follows:

1. To increase the security of our troops that are fighting there.

2. To localize the conflict; that is, avoid becoming involved in a more general war.

3. To end the Korean situation quickly on a statisfactory UN basis and disengage US troops as rapidly as possible.

4. To maintain a solid front among our allies and, if possible, retain the support of a majority of the UN.

In order to further these objectives we would take the following line in the UN:

1. That the intervention of the Chinese Communists has raised the gravest danger to the peace of the world.

2. If it continues, this intervention will cause a chain of developments which will bring unparalleled destruction to large areas of the world;

3. That the entire purpose of the UN Charter would come to naught if this is not stopped;

4. That the first point is to stop the fighting in Korea immediately;

5. That the UN should call upon the Chinese Communists to halt their attack and when they have done so the UN forces will cease any further hostilities against them;

6. That we believe the alleged reasons for the Chinese Communists’ intervention to be completely without foundation.

7. That the UN cannot be the place for settling disputes, which is one of its primary functions, while the fighting is still going on.

The Secretary said that he was aware that the Chinese Communists might be unwilling to agree to a cease fire or might state conditions, such as withdrawing to the 38th Parallel, etc. Senator Austin replied that one of the conditions might be the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet from Formosa.

The Senator said that many proposals were made to him. He mentioned that a Chinese, unknown to him, had stopped him in the corridors and suggested that Korea be made a dominion of the Peiping Government. Senator Austin said that he had no idea who this was, but he may have been a member of the delegation. He replied that this was absolutely impossible and the conversation ended there.

The Senator said his correspondence had been very large and was divided between those who went out all the way and recommended use of the atomic bomb and the opposite line of those who wanted to withdraw from Korea entirely. He mentioned a letter from Mrs. Bolton,² which was turned over to Mr. Hickerson for action.

Ambassador Gross said that he thought the question at the outset is how to establish contact with the Chinese Communists, where to get in touch with them, and who should serve as intermediary. He said Sir Benegal Rau was the most obvious intermediary and that, while he was often unreliable, he may be the best available. Mr. Gross mentioned numerous conversations recently with people at the UN and said the general feeling was that we should exploit the Rau approach to General Wu. He said that he had not encouraged this but had told Rau that when they had something they wanted to discuss we would, of course, be happy to consult with them.

Mr. Gross said that the attitude of many of our allies hinged on the question of what we are doing in an effort to work things out, and he felt that we must consider this and the possible use of an intermediary.

Mr. Gross referred to his conversation with Mr. Rau after Rau had seen Wu. He said that Rau had said he could not disclose all that took place. Mr. Gross said that Rau had told Jebb the same thing and that Jebb thought that some offer might have been made by Wu. Mr. Gross did not get that impression at all from his conversation with Rau.

Mr. Gross said that Rau had expressed to him the Indian position that India felt that the recently vetoed resolution was inadequate and inappropriate to the present situation and that India would want the resolution changed to include other methods of dealing with the problem. He did not state specifically what these methods might be, but said that they were along the lines of the amendments which the Indians had suggested informally when the resolution came up before.³

Mr. Jessup said that if we decided to proceed through an intermediary we could visualize our views being presented through Sir Benegal Rau to General Wu through Mao to Moscow. The point he wished to make was that it might be better to make a more direct approach to Moscow in the beginning, perhaps having someone talk to Mr. Malik. Mr. Jessup elaborated on this by saying that the use of intermediaries is a very slow process and a more direct approach would save time. Mr. Gross said that we would not even need an intermediary with Mr. Malik because conversations between the United States Delegation and Malik are rather routine.

The Secretary said that we might decide that we should use all avenues, maybe even taking it into the Political Committee at the proper time.

Mr. Gross reverted to the discussions between Sir Benegal Rau and General Wu and suggested that in this connection the Department ask Ambassador Henderson to request the Indian Government to authorize Sir Benegal to talk with us freely and not to hold back any significant information in connection with the Rau–Wu discussions. Mr. Matthews suggested that perhaps a better approach would be to ask Ambassador Henderson to talk to Mr. Bajpai to see what information he could obtain which is not now available to us. Ambassador Gross inquired whether we had written off a direct approach to the Peiping Government through some government represented there. Mr. Matthews noted that we had tried this earlier and had not been successful.

Senator Austin inquired at this point whether we had a draft paper which we wanted him to introduce in the General Assembly. The Secretary replied that we were still considering whether it would not be better to have conversations without putting any specific position in writing. If we didn’t have the conversations first, we might later have to water-down whatever position we had introduced, and we had wanted to consult with Senator Austin and Ambassador Gross first. In this connection the Secretary noted that the whole atmosphere of our approach should be very calm and without vilification.

At this point the Secretary again referred to the line we would take in the United Nations in furthering our objectives. The Secretary indicated that he thought this approach would appeal to our allies in that it was a sober, responsible position which clearly indicated that this Government does not wish to provoke a larger conflict.

In connection with the method of approach, Mr. Nitze raised the question as to whether it wouldn’t be better to proceed secretly with negotiations while at the same time maintaining a public attitude of firmness. The Secretary replied that we should consider this but at the same time should keep in mind that a more open approach allowed us to bring the maximum pressure on Mao.

Mr. Gross said there was no question but that Formosa and the seating problem would be bound to come up.

The Secretary stated that in this whole matter we must keep ourselves in position to do whatever we need to do to secure our troops and our course of action should not forfeit our flexibility in this respect.

Mr. Gross said that another course of action might be to use a subcommission of the Security Council. They could meet quickly and as their first recommendation suggest that there be a cease fire order. Prior to such an approach, specific suggestions could be made to Mr. Malik to determine his attitude.

Senator Austin said that he had spent so much time at the UN that he felt that he fairly well reflected their viewpoint; that he and his staff had worked strenuously getting the delegations in line behind the resolution which was vetoed in the Security Council; and that as a result they had a certain amount of momentum underway with the other delegations. This momentum, he indicated, rests considerably on an attitude of firmness toward representatives of the USSR and of Mao. The Senator indicated that this momentum would need to be maintained and that he would find it difficult to return to New York and immediately start talking about some kind of an armistice. Mr. Gross said that it was his feeling that the momentum of the present resolution would not be inconsistent with further negotiations and that the negotiations would fit in with the line which we had been taking in New York.

Senator Austin suggested that we go ahead and let Sir Benegal make his amendments in the General Assembly along the lines which he is now thinking and in this manner neither side in the conflict would need to bear the onus of an initiative for stopping the fighting.

In conclusion, Mr. Acheson suggested that departmental staff work today with Senator Austin and Mr. Gross to produce a memorandum by evening for the President and Secretary Marshall which would outline a course of political action which might be followed in the event that the military situation requires it.⁴

1. William C. Trueheart, Intelligence Staff Officer, Department of State.
2. Representative Frances P. Bolton, Republican, of Ohio. The letter is not printed.
3. See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Noyes, November 21, p. 1208.
4. The text of this memorandum was incorporated in telegram Gadel 153 to New York, transmitted at 7 p. m. on Decembers, p. 1307.