795.00/11–2550: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
operational immediate
[Received November 25—6:11 a. m.]
C–69808. Reurmsg W–97287.1 The concern underlying the search for the means to confine the spread of the Korean conflict is fully understood and shared here, but it is believed that the suggested approach would not only fail to achieve the desired result but would be provocative of the very consequences we seek to avert.
In the first place from a military standpoint my personal reconnaisance of the Yalu River line yesterday demonstrated conclusively that it would be utterly impossible for us to stop upon commanding [Page 1232] terrain south of the river as suggested and there be in a position to hold under effective control its lines of approach to North Korea. The terrain ranging from the lowlands in the west to the rugged central and eastern sectors is not adaptable to such a system of defense were we, for any reason, to sacrifice the natural defense features of the river line itself, features to be found in no other natural defense line in all of Korea. Nor would it be either militarily or politically defensible to yield this natural protective barrier safeguarding the territorial integrity of Korea.
Moreover any failure on our part to prosecute the military campaign through to the achievement of its public and oft repeated objective of destroying all enemy forces south of Korea’s northern boundary as essential to the restoration of unity and peace to all of Korea would be fraught with most disastrous consequences. It would be regarded by the Korean people as a betrayal of their sovereign and territorial integrity and of the solemn undertaking the United Nations entered into in their behalf, and by the Chinese and all the other peoples of Asia as weakness reflected from the appeasement of Communist aggression. As pointed out in my message C–68572 of 9 November,2 such action as tribute to international lawlessness and aggression would but encourage further international lawlessness and aggression. Furthermore, the political tension existing between the two countries requires that the international boundary be closed to reduce to a minimum lawless border incidents including bandit raids and smuggling and such action could not be effected if there existed a border zone beyond our immediate control.
Study of the Soviet and Peiping propaganda line discloses little to suggest any major concern over the potentiality of United Nations control of the southern banks of the Yalu River. Even what has been said concerning the hydroelectric facilities in North Korea is for the most part a product of British-American speculation, finding little reflection in any Soviet or Chinese utterances. Indeed, our info on these facilities and the disposition abroad of their power output fails to confirm that dependence upon this source of power is a major factor in the basic causes giving rise to the Chinese aggressive moves in Korea. Thus despite the fact that these hydro-electric facilities at Changjun brought under control of the X Corps had been closed down completely for a full month prior to the arrival of our forces with much of the vital machinery and other equip removed and dispersed and are not yet restored to operation, no suggestion of complaint has emanated from Soviet or Chinese sources over the deprivation of power consequent thereto. In view of these factual considerations one is brought to [Page 1233] the conclusion that the issue of hydro-electric power rests upon the most tenuous of grounds.
The entry of Chinese Communists into the Korean conflict was a risk we knowingly took at the time we committed our forces. Had they entered at the time we were beleaguered behind our Pusan perimeter beachhead, the hazard would have been far more grave than it is now that we hold the initiative and have a much smaller area within which to interdict their hostile moves. Our forces are committed to seize the entire border area, and indeed in the east have already occupied a sector of the Yalu River with no noticeable political or military Soviet or Chinese reaction. We have repeatedly and publicly made it unmistakably clear that we entertain no aggressive designs whatsoever against any part of Chinese or Soviet territory. It is my plan just as soon as we are able to consolidate positions along the Yalu River to replace as far as possible American Forces with those of the Republic of Korea and publicly announce orders effecting:
- (1)
- The return of American Forces to Japan;
- (2)
- The parole of all prisoners of war to their homes;
- (3)
- The leaving of the unification of Korea and the restoration of the civil processes of government to the people, with the advice and assistance of The United Nations authorities.
I believe that the prompt implementation of this plan as soon as our military objectives have been reached will effectively appeal to reason in the Chinese mind. If it will not, then the resulting situation is not one which might be influenced by bringing to a halt our military measures short of present commitments. By resolutely meeting those commitments and accomplishing our military mission as so often publicly delineated lies best—indeed only—hope that Soviet and Chinese aggressive designs may be checked before these countries are committed to a course from which for political reasons they cannot withdraw.