Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/11–2450

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs (Jackson)

top secret

[Washington,] November 24, 1950—4:15 p. m.

Participants:	Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
	Mr. Dean Rusk
	Mr. Wayne G. Jackson

The Ambassador called at Mr. Rusk’s request. Mr. Rusk delivered to the Ambassador, on behalf of the Secretary, a message in answer to one received from Mr. Bevin which related to the hitters desire to give the British House of Commons certain assurances with regard to the conduct of military operations in Korea.¹ A copy of the Secretary’s message to the British Ambassador is attached.

Mr. Rusk also delivered to Ambassador Franks a copy of a personal message from the Secretary to Mr. Bevin relating to the proposal for a demilitarized zone in Korea. This message is being sent by cable to the United States Embassy in London with instructions to deliver it to Mr. Bevin, the copy being given to Ambassador Franks for his information. (The message is contained, in the Department’s Top Secret cable 2752 of November 24.²) Mr. Rusk added that the UN Commander was anxious to take full advantage of favorable terrain in determining where troops will be halted.

Mr. Rusk stated that we had some intelligence, the reliability of which was unknown, that Chinese communists were cancelling all contracts which called for delivery of goods from Hong Kong later than November 30. This might imply some threat to Hong Kong. He assumed that the British had the same intelligence but would see that it was passed to them. Ambassador Franks said that he did not know of any such intelligence.

Mr. Rusk referred to the fact that the Soviets had published the memorandum regarding the Japanese peace treaty which had been circulated to the members of the FEC.³ This might have been done for strictly propaganda purposes if the Russians did not think negotiations on a peace treaty would lead anywhere. Hence, they might wish to seize the propaganda initiative. A more serious speculation was that the Russians might use it to tie in with their claims that Japanese forces were being used in Korea and might relate it to invoking the Sino-Russian treaty. It seemed useful to trying to figure out why the Russians had acted as they did.

Ambassador Franks said that the British Charge in Peiping had seen the Deputy Foreign Minister who had listened with great attention to the British message (disclaiming any intention to invade Chinese soil or injure Chinese interests). The Deputy Foreign Minister had asked for the promptest possible delivery of the Chinese text of the British message.

Mr. Rusk said that he had been asked whether the timing of the UN offensive in Korea had had any relation to the arrival of the Chinese communist delegation in New York. He had answered that it had not.

[Annex]

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Franks)

secret

[Washington, November 24, 1950]

My Dear Mr. Ambassador: I refer to our conversation of Wednesday⁴ about certain aspects of our Korean policy.

Please assure Mr. Bevin that the objectives of the United Nations Commander in the field are no more and no less than the stated objectives of the United Nations as expressed in its resolutions and that the United States directives to the United Nations Commander have as their purpose nothing more than the attainment of declared United Nations objectives. This assurance is hardly necessary in view of the statement of the President last week on the same subject. The reason why these directives are not made public is that, as Mr. Bevin properly suggests, it would not be in the interest of our common cause to reveal operational military directives during the course of the campaign.

I see no reason why Mr. Bevin cannot assure the House of Commons in terms of the three points contained in paragraph 5 of the message from him which you discussed with me on Wednesday.

I should be most happy to exchange with Mr. Bevin assurances that we shall both, in so far as we are able, seek to concert our policy and our action with respect to Korea and to maintain full and close consultation for that purpose.

For the reasons mentioned by Mr. Bevin, it is not possible for the Security Council to issue detailed military instructions to General MacArthur.

There would be some difficulty in our undertaking a formal commitment not to proceed with our United Nations responsibilities in Korea without the express agreement of individual members of the Security Council in cases where one or another of them may fear that action will be taken which would be beyond the United Nations mandate. The problem may be more theoretical than practical in view of our strong determination to act closely with our friends in accordance with United Nations policy, but a governmental commitment could not be offered on the basis of such a broadly defined concept and without some consideration of the circumstances attending the issue if it should arise.

That it is most unlikely to arise is shown by the great restraint which the United Nations Command has shown during recent weeks under grave provocation and considerable danger, by the constant consultation which this government has carried on with other interested governments, including His Majesty’s Government, and by the concerting of views which has been achieved.

[

Dean Acheson

]

1. Mr. Bevin’s message was thus summarized in telegram 2776, November 27, to London:

   “Brit Amb Nov 23 showed Rusk message from Bevin noting Brit public opinion growing restive and all sides Commons anxious lest MacArthur commit UN forces Korea of which UK troops a part, to large scale hostilities with Chi. Bevin, while conceding MacArthur must be given discretion within broad limits conduct campaign on lines he thinks best and that in view mil requirements and with Russians back in SC there can be no question of SC issuing detailed instructions or of MacArthur’s being required seek such instructions from SC through reps US, stated that in debate on fon affairs next week he must be careful not leave impression reason why instructions not made public is either because they give MacArthur more latitude than a strict fulfillment of UN res wld justify or that ‘quite simply we have no knowledge their contents’. Bevin accordingly asked Amb urgently explain to Secy importance his being able assure House (1) objective MacArthur no more and no less than objectives UN, (2) proper consultation taking place, and (3) MacArthur through US is in fact as well as name agent UN. Re (2), Bevin asked Amb press US to agree consult confidentially at least those member states of SC who providing forces Korea on any contemplated action going beyond MacArthur’s mandate and agree not issue instructions to MacArthur to proceed with such action unless those states consulted express agreement.” (795.00/11–2750)

2. Transmitted at 8 p. m. on November 24, p. 1228.
3. The text of the memorandum is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1950, p. 881. For documentation on the Japanese peace treaty, see vol. vi, pp. 1109 ff.
4. November 23.