795.00/11–2430: Telegram
The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins), to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (MacArthur)
operational immediate
WAR 97287. From CSUSA sgd Collins. Following from JCS: Other members of United Nations indicate growing concern over the possibilities of bringing on a general conflict should a major clash develop with Chinese Communist forces as a result of your forces advancing squarely against the entire boundary between Korea and Manchuria–USSR. This might not only result in loss of support within United Nations and leave US standing alone but would also involve increased risks of a military nature. Proposals in UN may suggest unwelcome restrictions on your advance to the north since some sentiment exists in UN for establishing a demilitarized zone between your [Page 1223] forces and the frontier in the hope of thereby reducing Chinese Communist fear of UN military action against Manchuria and the corresponding sensitivity on the part of the USSR with respect to Vladivostok.
A meeting was held Thursday [Tuesday?]1 with Secretaries of State and Defense, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and other officials to review the situation developing here.
The consensus of political and military opinion was that there should be no change in your mission, but that immediate action should be taken at top governmental level to formulate a course of action which would permit the establishment of a unified Korea and at the same time reduce risk of more general involvement. On the assumption that your coming attack will be successful,2 exploratory discussions were had to discover what military measures, which you might in any event wish to take, might lend themselves to political action which would reduce tension with Peiping and the Soviet Union and maintain a solid UN front. The following represent a search for such measures:
- 1.
- After advancing to or near the Yalu, you might secure the position which you had thus achieved by holding forces on terrain dominating the approaches from the Valley of the Yalu, from its mouth to approximately the position now held by the 17th Infantry. These forces would be principally ROK troops while other UN forces would be grouped in positions of readiness to insure the holding of the established line. This, of course, would be contingent on the cessation of effective enemy resistance.
- 2.
- The above position would be extended to the Japan Sea along a general line approximately east from the 17th Infantry’s position with an outpost at Chongjin, which would be the limit for the present of your advance to the northeast.
- 3.
- It was thought that the above would not seriously affect the accomplishment of your military mission.
- 4.
- UN forces would continue to make every effort to spare all hydro-electric installations in North Korea; destruction of these facilities could result only as incident to resistance from enemy forces.
- 5.
- UNCURK would, at the appropriate time, enter into negotiations with appropriate representatives to insure an equitable distribution of hydro-electric power.
- 6.
- In the event that the Chinese forces did not again attack in force across the Yalu, the conduct of orderly elections in North Korea and the unification of the country could proceed in accordance with UN action.
- 7.
- Ultimate handling of the extremely sensitive Northeast Province would await further UN procedures.
While it is recognized that from the point of view of the Commander in the field this course of action may leave much to be desired, it is felt that there may be other considerations which must be accepted and that the above procedure would not seriously affect the accomplishment of your military mission. At the same time it might well provide an out for the Chinese Communists to withdraw into Manchuria without loss of face and might lessen the concern of the Russians as to the security of Vladivostok. This concern may be at the root of Russian pressure on the Chinese Communists to intervene in Korea.
The above is suggested as a course of action upon which we would appreciate your comments. If it should prove feasible the second question would arise as to whether and how such a course of action might be announced. This would have to be worked out in such a way as not to impede your operations, but in such a way that the Chinese and Russians could not mistake UN intentions. Your views as to timing and source of such an announcement would be appreciated.
Since there are many political and military implications involved in these ideas and since other nations would be involved, no action along these lines is contemplated until full opportunity has been given for further consideration of your views, final decision by the President, and possibly discussion with certain other governments. [CSUSA.]
- See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Jessup of the meeting which took place on Tuesday, November 21, p. 1204. No record of a meeting on Thursday, November 23 (Thanksgiving Day), has been found.↩
-
General MacArthur flew to Korea on November 24 to witness the launching of the U.N. offensive. For the occasion, he issued a communiqué which concluded as follows:
“If successful this [attack] should for all practical purposes end the war, restore peace and unity to Korea, enable the prompt withdrawal of United Nations military forces, and permit the complete assumption by the Korean people and nation of full sovereignty and international equality. It is that for which we fight.” (See Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 774 and Hearings, p. 3491.)
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