Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

330/11–1750

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

top secret

[Washington,] November 17, 1950.

Subject: Probable Consequences of Carrying UN Hostilities into Manchuria

Ref.: CIA Memorandum November 9, 1950 for NSC

CA finds itself unable to accept the opinion expressed in the final paragraph of the reference memorandum that “action by U.N. forces to attack troop concentrations or air fields north of the Yalu River, or to pursue enemy aircraft into Chinese territory would not increase the already substantial risk that the situation may degenerate into a general war involving Russia”, that such action would “probably materially increase the extent of Chinese Communist reaction in Korea proper [only]¹”.

CA’s reasoning is as follows:

As set forth in the JIIC report of November 9,² there was information indicating that a northward troop movement from the south and east China areas had been under way for the past month, and that it was apparently accelerated in late October, and that “almost all recent information points to a heavy and accelerated build-up of Chinese Communist strength in northeast China”. The reference report noted that “Open Communist acceptance of responsibility for the fate of North Korea has also become apparent in statements from Moscow and Eastern Europe in the past few days. …The contrast of these statements with Communist Party efforts only a few weeks ago to play down the question of intervention in Korea is striking. … the unreserved nature of the propaganda implies an intent to turn the tide in Korea through an unofficial war by the Chinese Communists.” The report admitted that “it still cannot be determined conclusively whether the objective of the Chinese Communists is to tie down U.N. forces in Korea for an indefinite period or whether they are making preparations for an offensive to attempt to drive the U.N. forces out of Korea.” It observed further that “The scale of the Chinese military build-up in Northeast China, however, is indicative of a growing military capability beyond any apparent defensive needs, and the increasing belligerency of Chinese propaganda also indicates the beginnings of a campaign to prepare their people for continuing if not augmented support of the North Korean Communists. The risk of war which the Chinese have assumed further raises the question of what commitment the U.S.S.R. may have made to China and at what point the U.S.S.R. would come to her aid, particularly if air attacks on Chinese territory should be made.”

The last quoted item from the reference JIIC report has been made the subject of recent comment coming from the Netherlands Foreign Office which has transmitted the estimate of their Peiping office that Manchuria may constitute a trap for UN forces. This same subject is taken “under consideration in Mr. Emmerson’s memorandum of November 6³ on Soviet and Chinese Communist intentions in Korea where, pointing to the circumstance that the Chinese Communists have braved the risk of UN bombing of Chinese cities by reason of their intervention, he said that the taking of the risk could mean as one hypothesis that “the Moscow–Peiping axis actually desires us to launch an attack on China which would bring into play the Sino-Soviet treaty, permit involvement of the USSR against Japan and eventuate in World War III”.

The military commentator Hanson W. Baldwin, writing under Hong Kong dateline of November 15 (New York Times, November 16), while reporting the Hong Kong consensus of opinion that the Chinese Communist objective in Korea was limited to forcing us to fight a war of attrition there indefinitely, commented that “indications are strong that both the Chinese Communists and the Russians are preparing for any eventuality in Manchuria or the Korean area. The most important of these indications is the concentration of military forces now occurring in that area.” Taking note of some of the recent Chinese Communist troops dispositions, he concluded that the enemy troops now concentrating in Manchuria were “a very powerful force potentially—by the sheer weight of numbers. How the Kremlin and Peiping intend to employ these hordes will determine the future fate of the world.”

Hanson Baldwin’s estimate of the gravity of the situation gets support currently from many quarters both in United States and friendly capitals. In general line with that estimate is the quoted comment of Lt. Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer who, in an address yesterday at San Francisco, stated inter alia that “Recently catastrophic events in the Far East suggest strongly that the Communist leaders have elected to use military force … (and) we are on the brink of, if not already involved in, World War III … (and) face subjugation or even annihilation by the Communists.”^*

In sum, one is bound to conclude from the scale of the military movements undertaken by the Chinese Communists, from the defense preparations they are making at home, and from the violence of their propaganda that they are preparing for major events. How those major events are to be touched off still remains unknown to us. The possibility that the carrying of UN military operations into Manchuria would have been used as a springboard by the Communist side has already been suggested. The JIIC report under mention noted in passing that the USSR has in recent weeks made specific reference to the Sino-Soviet mutual defense treaty. Both the Chinese and Soviet propagandists have put on record their allegation that the United State has used Japanese troops in fighting in Korea.⁴ The New York Times today reports a new Soviet allegation carried by Pravda that Japanese troops are participating extensively in the Korean war, and that a secret military agreement was under negotiation between General MacArthur and the Japanese Government providing for a 30-year occupation of Japan by U.S. forces of three divisions strength, with a tripling of the Japanese reserve police corps now numbering 75,000.

CA reiterates the belief previously expressed (CA Memorandum, November 10, 1950, “Action Respecting Korean-Manchurian Frontier”) that the carrying of UN military operations into Manchuria would be attended by a strong possibility that there would be set off a violent political-military reaction which would be detrimental to the UN and U.S. political and military positions alike. CA believes that the relatively minor military advantage which might be immediately obtained by “hot pursuit” of hostile planes across the frontier would be far outweighed by the increased risk—already seemingly grave—of a general war.

1. Brackets appear in the source text.
2. Not printed.
3. Not printed.
4. New York Times, Nov. 17, 1950. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. The Soviet representative on the Far Eastern Commission had made this allegation at the November 2nd meeting of that body and then released his statement to the press. At the November 16 meeting of the FEC, the U.S. representative (Hamilton) took note of the denials which had been made by the Departments of State and Defense as well as by General MacArthur. For the text of a similar statement made by Mr. Hamilton on November 30, see the Department of State Bulletin, December 11, 1950, p. 936.