357.AD/11–1450: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 14—8:49 p. m.]
825. Re instructions to certain Embassies (TS reference telegram Deptel 2487 to London, received USUN 5:15 p. m., November 14),1 Canadian and Australian delegations upon instructions their Governments approached USUN today for clarification. Riddell (Canada) said note left by Woodward not clear in two respects:
- (a)
- Whether action indicated had already been taken or was contemplated;
- (b)
- If latter were case, was it contemplated action might be taken without further SC action. Woodward being unable to answer these questions, Riddell instructed to get answers from us.
Later in afternoon Sir Keith Officer (Australia) called on Gross requesting comments on message, particularly in light of prior discussions (mytel 806, November 10).2 Sir Keith said he could understand tactical military requirements but was concerned lest action foreshadowed in reference telegram might lead to bombing Manchurian targets. Sir Keith expressed hope “provocative actions” could be avoided at least until Chinese Communist delegation arrived NY and we have further opportunity to ascertain their viewpoint.
[Page 1157]In light of telephone conversation between Gross and Hickerson, Riddell and Sir Keith were told that matter was being handled elsewhere, that Canadian Ambassador in Washington had been fully briefed by Department, and that American Embassy, Canberra was presumably fully briefing Australian Foreign Office.
Subsequent to foregoing calls, Gross phoned Hickerson requesting authority for USUN to inform Jebb, Chauvel and Sunde and such authority was given.
We think it pertinent to raise question whether broader consultations here might be useful. As Department is aware, many delegations here are genuinely concerned lest military actions be taken unilaterally which may precipitate or provoke expansion of hostilities. Our experience has shown that many of these delegations are more easily led than driven and that (always subject to prudent requirements military security) it will better assure mobilization of UN sentiment behind any military action thought necessary by Unified Command if there is opportunity, within limits of security and of military urgency, to have at least selective consultations. This, we are confident, will better assure accomplishment of tactical considerations outlined in TS Deptel No. 498, November 13.
Some specific questions certain to arise here are:
- (1)
- Will consultations be held prior to military action in or over Manchuria other than type described reference telegram?
- (2)
- Does US as co-sponsor of draft resolution tabled November 10 in SC, intend to request amendment of paragraph related to “inviolate” Sino-Korean frontier or does US interpret this paragraph and paragraph which immediately follows it as authorizing action beyond aerial hot pursuit?