711.5611/11–850
Memorandum by the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Use of the Atomic Bomb in China
If we use the atomic bomb in China it should be done only on the basis of over-riding military considerations. We should presumably have reached a point where the bomb is needed to produce decisive results either unobtainable by conventional warfare or obtainable only through expenditure of vastly greater numbers of men and quantities of materiel.
We should of course defer to a JCS estimate of the military effect of atomic bombing in China. One opinion would seem to be that China offers few suitable A-bomb targets, in view of scattered cities, low degree of industrialization, and immense area. Targets would presumably be 1) cities, 2) industrial complexes, and 3) concentrations of men and materiel in particular tactical situations. Obviously, the political effects, summarized below, would vary in degree according to the target. A repetition of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would produce the most damaging reaction, bombing of purely industrial targets the least. Nevertheless, we must consider that, regardless of the fact that military results achieved by atomic bombardment may be identical [Page 1099] to those attained by conventional weapons, the effect on world opinion will be vastly different. The A-bomb has the status of a peculiar monster conceived by American cunning and its use by us, in whatever situation, would be exploited to our serious detriment.
Therefore, if a decision to use the A-bomb in China should be reached, we should either:
- 1)
- Secure some form of sanction for its use from cooperating members of the UN, or
- 2)
- be prepared to accept the political damage in return for the strategic gain.
The following are foreseen as some of the political effects of a decision to use the atomic bomb in China:
1. The Effect on the United States Moral Position.
In view of the history of our attempts to secure international control of atomic energy and of the special place occupied by the atomic bomb as a weapon of mass destruction, the moral position of the United States would be seriously damaged as a result of use of the bomb, without international sanction, against China. Because of the difference in the moral, political, and psychological position occupied by China as opposed to that of the USSR, in the eyes of the world, the effect of using the A-bomb against China would be quite different from that of its use against the Soviet Union.
2. Effect on the UN of a US Decision to Use the A-Bomb.
Unilateral decision by the United States to use the atomic bomb against China would in all likelihood destroy the unity preserved thus far in the combined UN action in Korea. It is probable that U.S. use of the A-bomb would be deplored and denounced by a considerable number of nations who had up to that time supported the action in Korea. The results might therefore be a disintegration of the concept of UN maintenance of world security and a shattering blow to the future development of the UN in the direction indicated by the Uniting for Peace resolution.
3. Effect on the USSR.
Use of the atomic bomb in China would strengthen Soviet propaganda that the United States is bent on initiating general war. Furthermore, should the Soviet Union be prepared to launch a third World War, atomic bombing of China would encourage Soviet participation in war under conditions by which the U.S. moral position would be irreparably damaged while the Soviets would suffer the minimum condemnation.
[Page 1100]4. The Effect in Asia.
Should the next atomic bomb be dropped on an Asiatic population, it is easy for foresee the revulsion of feeling which would spread throughout Asia. Fears that we reserve atomic weapons exclusively for Japanese and Chinese would be confirmed, our efforts to win the Asiatics to our side would be cancelled and our influence in non-Communist nations of Asia would deteriorate to an almost nonexistent quantity.
5. Use of the A-Bomb Would Commit us Deeper in Asia.
In order to obtain decisive results we should undoubtedly have to engage in atomic warfare on a wide scale. This would involve us deep in Asia and make it difficult, if not impossible, to withdraw in order to fight in another theater of war. On the other hand, should we be unable to achieve decisive results even with atomic bombing of China, the effect upon our world position, particularly as regards Western Europe and countries looking to us for protection against the Soviets, would be disastrous.