Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/11–450

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

secret

[Washington,] November 4, 1950.

Subject: Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea: Estimate of Objectives.

The Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be viewed against the background of the earlier warning from Peiping that China would intervene in the event that UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel. The intervention was, that is, a calculated move for which preparations were made well in advance, and did not arise accidentally or through processes over which the Chinese Communists had no control. The Chinese Communists were well informed respecting UN objectives, and UN strength and capabilities, in Korea. They were thus in a good position to lay their plans accordingly, providing good margin for error, to the end that they might attain their ends—which are presumed to have been determined in consultation with the USSR side, possibly in the August conference at Peiping which has so frequently been reported upon.¹ It remains to determine the Chinese Communist objectives in their intervention.

I. Hypothetical Alternatives:

1. Protection of Chinese interest in Yalu power.

2. Establishment of a limited cordon sanitaire bordering on Manchuria and USSR.

3. Restoration of the status quo ante June 25 in North Korea.

4. Expulsion of UN forces from the entire Korean peninsula.

5. Creation of an excuse for involvement of Japan.

6. Offering of a springboard for World War III.

II. Discussion:

1. There has been no reference in Chinese Communist propaganda to the Yalu power-plant factor. The power installation, if important, is nevertheless not the only source of power for Manchurian industry. There are both hydro-electric and thermal plants which are probably adequate, in the main, for the supply of all Manchuria’s needs, even though certain difficulties would undoubtedly be encountered in the first instance. The original Chinese threat of intervention had no reference to the Yalu River installation, the Chinese have at this juncture made no démarche respecting that installation, and the scale of their present intervention indicates clearly more than a desire to protect a local area.

2. The establishment of a limited cordon sanitaire does not appear envisaged in their propaganda approach to the Chinese people demanding support for the North Koreans and resistance to an alleged threat of aggression against China. The establishment of such a limited belt would militarily be difficult and, in the light of the North Korean refusal to surrender, from the political point of view does not appear approximate to the Communist minimum political objective.

3. The restoration of the status quo ante June 25 would perhaps have met the requirements implicit in Chou en-lai’s earlier démarche to the Indian Ambassador—satisfaction of which would, however, have left Korea still in a divided and basically unstable state. It is doubtful whether the restoration of North Korean authority south as far as the 38th Parallel would now meet the present joint designs of the Chinese Communists and the Moscow strategists, particularly in view of the circumstance that the North Koreans nominally still maintain their original objective of establishing their authority throughout the entire Korean peninsula. It must be considered, nevertheless, as a minimum objective as determined by both political and military factors.

4. The expulsion of United Nations forces from the entire Korean peninsula could hardly be regarded as other than a desirable objective by the North Koreans, the Chinese Communists and by Moscow. The Chinese Communist forces now available in Manchuria number, according to SCAP, no less than forty-four divisions—with possibly more. No firm information is available regarding the number of Soviet troops in Manchuria (as distinct from the Dairen–Port Arthur area). Today’s telecon refers to the presence of three Chinese Communist divisions identified as being in contact with the Eighth Army. Presumably the Communist strategists would contemplate expulsion of UN forces from Korea if it were considered within their capability to do so, by reason of the important benefit which would thus derive to the Communist camp in terms of both political and military factors. For them, time would be a less valuable commodity than for us. The mere tying down of UN forces might be considered a valid objective.

5. Both the Soviet and Chinese sides have already put on record the allegation that the United States is employing Japanese forces in the fighting in Korea. The Sino-Soviet Alliance of February 14 provides that one signatory shall go to war in support of the other if the second be involved in conflict with either Japan or a nation connected with Japan. Certain defense measures being undertaken in Manchuria would indicate a possible belief that Chinese action in Korea will bring a UN military reaction into China. It must be considered possible that, in the event UN military actions were carried over the Manchurian boundary, this would be taken as an excuse for invoking the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Alliance with the charge that the Japanese had been involved in the fighting in Korea and/or that a nation connected with Japan was involved in an intrusion into Chinese territory. If this development were in fact taken as the occasion for citing the treaty in question, a prompt Soviet attack on Japan could logically be expected. In that event, although the hostilities might nominally be limited in the first instance to the Japan area, the USSR indubitably could be expected to be in a posture of readiness to accept, if need be, the challenges of World War III.

It is appropriate to deduce that Moscow, in its estimate of world political currents will have judged that the UN will refuse to cross the boundaries of Korea into Manchuria. But they will not have neglected the possibility; nor should we neglect the possibility that they plan to expand the area of conflict—whatever the excuse.

6. The Chinese Communist drive into Korea was not accompanied by a like surprise move by the Soviet Union against the United States in a new Pearl Harbor, and it is therefore to be assumed in the first instance that the present move is designed to constitute at most and worst an intermediary stage which will lead to the outbreak of World War III. This assumption that the Moscow aim in the present move is limited in immediate scope is supported by the circumstance that there seems to be some effort to disguise the intervention, if only nominally. One suggested route for arriving at the particular point of World War III’s outbreak would be, as indicated above, by way of involvement in Japan; another would obviously be by springing one or more of a series of moves elsewhere in the world, while the United States had its major available forces pinned down in Korea, until the conflagration had reached the explosion point. Germany is an obvious focus of political moves, and Moscow’s démarche vis-à-vis the American, British and French Ambassadors on November 3 may have some not-distant relationship to events in Korea. World War III might be reached, in short, by either a fairly direct or somewhat round-about route with Korea as its starting point.

III. Tentative Conclusions:

On the basis of the above brief delineation of the alternatives—all of which must be taken in view—it is concluded:

1. The Chinese Communists interest is not limited to the Yalu power installation and/or other border factors, and the establishment of a limited cordon sanitaire therefore would be without major political or economic significance and is, therefore, probably less than the minimum objective.

2. The minimum Chinese Communist objective must be considered to be either the restoration of the statics quo ante June 25 in North Korea or the expulsion of UN forces from the entire Korean peninsula.

3. It is not safe to assume, even so, that Peiping and Moscow together have not made plans which envision the possibility that, in given circumstances, the area of hostilities shall be extended first to Manchuria, second perhaps to Japan or alternatively to Western Europe, with the result in either case to be the outbreak of World War III, soon or late.

IV. Recommendations:

1. That the united UN front be maintained at all costs, with the UN military and political responsibilities in Korea to be distributed more equally than at present among the concerned member nations.

2. That the essence of the standing directive to General MacArthur be maintained at least until the military situation is further clarified, that is, that the UN forces continue action against the enemy in Korea (but in Korea only) for so long as it appears possible to achieve UN objectives: if a sound drubbing could be administered to Chinese Communist forces, with the war localized within Korea, this could only have a salutary effect in Asia.

3. That the factors favoring continued UN and US involvement in Korea, however, be weighed against any other factors determined to be operating against US and UN interests in other possible theatres of conflict throughout the world, to the end that such involvement shall not be carried past a point where it would result in our being exposed to vital blows elsewhere.

1. See telegram 945 from Hong Kong, received at 2:35 p. m. on October 31, p. 1019.