Office of the Historian

795.00/6–2550: Telegram

The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority
Tokyo, June 25, 1950 [—9 p. m.]1
[Received June 25—10:35 a. m.]

619. For Acheson and Rusk from Dulles and Allison. It is possible that South Koreans may themselves contain and repulse attack and, if so, this is best way.2 If, however, it appears they cannot do so then we believe that US force should be used even though this risks Russian counter moves. To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war. We suggest that Security Council might call for action on behalf of the organization under Article 106 by the five powers or such of them as are willing to respond. [Dulles and Allison.]

Sebald
  1. The time of transmission is supplied from a subsequent statement of Mr. Allison on events in Tokyo following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea (Korean Conflict).↩

  2. In the same statement, Mr. Allison indicated that at 6 p. m. (Tokyo time) on June 25 Messrs. Dulles, Sebald, and Allison had met with General MacArthur at which time the latter expressed his beliefs that: (a) the attack was not an all-out effort, (b) the Soviets were not necessarily behind the attack, and (c) the Republic of Korea would gain victory (ibid.). See also Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, p. 129.

    For Mr. Dulles’ views, see his notes on Korea under date of June 29, p. 237.

    ↩