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Memorandum by the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson)
Korean Security Problems
The problem of Korean security divides itself into three parts, as follows: (1) the maintenance of UN forces in Korea, pursuant to the [Page 973] General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950; (2) the establishment of Korean military forces; and (3) the permanent neutralization of Korea.
The General Assembly resolution provides that UN forces should not remain in any part of Korea “otherwise than so far as necessary” for achieving the objectives of (1) insuring conditions of stability throughout Korea and (2) of taking all constituent acts, including the holding of elections, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea. It should therefore be the task of the UN Commission for Unification to recommend the withdrawal of UN forces when it has determined, after consultation with the Unified Command, that the objectives specified in the resolution have been achieved to the extent that UN forces are no longer required. If, in the meantime, a General Assembly resolution should be passed providing for the maintenance of national armed forces elements for service as United Nations units, the forces in Korea could be considered as such units and would provide the precedent for their employment in other areas by the United Nations.
With regard to the establishment and maintenance of military and internal security forces for the Republic of Korea, the UN Commission for Unification, pursuant to its authority to “represent the UN in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea” should make recommendations to the Unified Commander for the establishment, in agreement with the ROK, of a UN Advisory Military Group in Korea. This group would in fact represent a continuation of KMAG but should be reconstituted to include personnel from UN member states. To effect this, the UN Commission on Unification should resolve that, in order to maintain its independence, Korea should be encouraged to establish a defensive military force under UN auspices and that, upon agreement between the ROK and the Unified Command, a UN Advisory Military Group would be made available to advise and assist the ROK in maintaining a defense force.
The problem of neutralization would apparently require further action by the General Assembly. NSC 81/1,1 paragraph 30, provides that “the U.S. should recommend that the UN Commission should consider the desirability of permanent neutralization of Korea accompanied by political undertakings by the ROK and by other states separately, including the U.S.S.R., to refrain from any aggression. The question of a UN guarantee should be studied but no U.S. commitment on this point should be made at this stage”.
[Page 974]It may be that if a “uniting for peace” resolution, is passed by the General Assembly,2 and if the Republic of Korea is admitted to the United Nations, the obligations thereby assumed might be considered as making unnecessary special international commitments with regard to Korea. It would be unlikely that either Communist China or the U.S.S.R. would participate in political undertakings to guarantee the neutrality of Korea and therefore an attempt to obtain such guarantee from Korea’s neighbors would accomplish little more than a propaganda objective.
Since Mr. Santa Cruz of Chile has raised the question of a UN guarantee it seems that we might indicate our sympathy with a general discussion of this problem by the Interim Committee. However we might take the position that this is a question which will merit careful consideration and must be thought of in connection with other action which may be taken by the UN, such as the “uniting for peace” resolution, and the progress of the Commission’s work in bringing about the unification of Korea.
- Dated September 9, p. 712.↩
- The “Uniting for Peace” resolution was approved by the U.N. General Assembly on November 3 as Resolution 377 (V); for related documentation, see vol. ii, pp. 303 ff.↩