Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

IO Files

Minutes of the Twenty-first Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

[Extract] secret

New York, October 16, 1950—9:15 a.m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (50).]

1. Korean Relief and Reconstruction (US/A/2681/Rev 1)¹

Mr. Lubin explained that the paper before the Delegation was a draft resolution for action by the Economic and Social Council, containing a second draft resolution for adoption of the General Assembly, with respect to the establishment of a Korean War Damage and Rehabilitation Agency. The draft resolution had been worked out with the British, French, Brazilians, and Canadians. While it was not yet finally accepted by those delegations, they had given it tentative approval. It was the general trend of thinking within our own Delegation that we should have voluntary contributions to the Korean relief program based upon certain percentages which each country would agree to contribute after consideration of an assessment scale in the Fifth Committee.

Mr. Lubin summarized the provisions of the resolution regarding the establishment of the Korean War Damage Agency and providing for the designation of a United Nations Agent General and his deputy to conduct relief operations in Korea. He pointed out that the proposed Agent General would be assisted by an Advisory Committee which we thought should be composed of the five states making the largest contributions to the relief work in Korea. He noted that the question of funds and procurement of supplies would, under this plan, be handled by the Agent General who would be able to use existing agencies insofar as practicable.

Mr. Lubin raised several questions which the Delegation would have to take into account. The first was whether the Unification Commission should be given more authority in the relief field. He noted that the Australians insisted, for example, that the Commission should be the principal authority, and that the Agent General should be made more directly responsible to it. The second question was whether we should insist that the Agent General be an American or whether we would be willing to take an Asian as Agent General, with a capable American national to serve as his deputy. The third question was whether the Advisory Commission should be composed of the five largest contributors. In this connection he observed that this advisory body had virtually no real authority.

Mr. Dulles inquired where the money for the Korean relief operation was coming from. Mr. Lubin explained that Committee Five would consider this problem after information was available as to the probable cost of the contemplated program. The Committee could then work out an arrangement whereby each country would be requested to give a certain amount. Mr. Dulles observed that the United States would, in fact, be putting up most of the money. For this reason he questioned whether we should hide ourselves behind an Asiatic serving as the Agent General. After all, one of the purposes of the program was to put on a demonstration of what we could do and to make the Asian people realize what a contribution the United States could make to their economic well-being.

Mr. Lubin called attention to another point of view in this connection; that was that if an American were running the relief operation, we would be accused of imperialism in the Far East, and this would be taken as further evidence of the fact that Korea was our special party. He pointed out that we were not permitting others to play a dominant role in the administration of the Unified Command. In order to overcome this feeling the suggestion had been made that it might be preferable for the deputy to be an American. Mr. Dulles recalled that when he was in Korea, the Americans had been extremely well-thought-of and were doing well. He had seen no evidence that American assistance was regarded as American imperialism in Korea. Mr. Lubin agreed with him insofar as Korea was concerned, but considered it certain we would subject ourselves to criticism from other states in Asia.

Senator Lodge thought it was important to choose an American for the top post. Such a choice would be symbolical as regards the United States and the Far East. In the Far East, an American would be regarded as a symbol of the economic help which the Secretary had referred to in his speech. With respect to this country it would help quiet certain feelings in Congress. In his opinion, the question involved in this case was far larger than Korea. It involved the entire Far East and our policy toward that area. What we did in Korea would raise the question of our position throughout the area.

Mr. Lubin observed that the President, in approving the Korean relief program, had reserved for himself the right to decide whether all money should be channeled through the United Nations or whether some should go through ECA. This was contained in a statement which he signed.² Our draft resolution looked toward working under the United Nations, but also through ECA. Senator Lodge observed that if every time the United States engaged in charitable activities, it was going to be accused of imperialism, it would make a great many people in this country terribly sad. He thought we should do things because they were right, and in this connection he referred to the statements coming from the Lucknow Conference.

Mr. Kotschnig³ observed that as a result of the Korean victory won under United Nations auspices, there was a greater desire to carry through the relief program as a United Nations enterprise than might otherwise have been the case. He believed there was a very real chance of getting substantial funds from other countries for Korean relief for this reason. We would not probably have to pick up the entire check. He referred to his conversations with Colonel Katzin, the representative of the Secretary-General in Korea, who had said that whenever an American relief operation was started in a country, it was done on the most expensive basis. Katzin thought, for example, that the ECA operation in Korea was too large. He therefore felt it would be much cheaper to run the relief operation on a United Nations scale. Korea was a viable state, once it was united, and in his opinion $500,000,000 would carry the relief operation for the necessary three years. Mr. Kotschnig observed that our own experts talked in terms of a billion dollar relief program in Korea. Possibly these facts were in favor of a United Nations operation rather than a straight American enterprise as had been suggested.

Mr. Ross did not disagree with Mr. Kotschnig but wished to place a somewhat different emphasis on the situation. He recalled that while the Korean campaign had been conducted under United Nations auspices, the United Nations had been very glad to use the United States as the agent of the United Nations at that time. He would guess the United Nations would be equally glad to continue to use the United States as its agent in the relief operation. In his opinion the question whether the Agent General should be an American had been previously settled when the Delegation had discussed whether the United States should be on the Unification Commission. At that time we had decided against such membership, but it was thought that it would, under these circumstances, be essential to have an American relief commissioner, or failing that, a Canadian. He went on to recall that the Delegation had also discussed whether the principal secretary of the commission should be an American, and there too, we had agreed that if an American were not chosen, we should insist on a qualified Canadian.

Senator Cooper asked whether the problem before the Delegation was whether the relief operation should be done by the United States or the United Nations, or whether it was simply a question of the Agent General’s being an American. Mr. Dulles thought the Delegation was considering only the appointment of the Agent General. He was personally concerned by the extent to which we seemed to be writing ourselves out of the Korean operation. Senator Cooper thought that by making the Korean relief effort one to which all the United Nations members would make contributions, any stigma of imperialism could be removed.

Mr. Kotschnig stated that the only serious candidate for relief administrator in Korea was Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar of India. His candidacy faced us with a real problem since he had great support in the United Nations and the confidence of many of the members. His Indian nationality did create a problem for us. Nevertheless, Mr. Kotschnig thought we would be faced with a very strong move for his appointment. Mr. Allison observed that if an Indian were appointed Agent General, there would be considerable difficulty with members of the government of the Republic of Korea, who had lost all faith in the Indians. He wished to associate himself with what Senator Lodge had said, and that was that we should find the right thing to do in Korea and then go ahead and do it. He thought it important to have an American as the chief relief administrator; a highly qualified Asian could be chosen as his deputy.

In response to a question from Senator Lodge, Mr. Lubin reviewed the composition of the Unification Commission in Korea, the plan for the economic relief operation, and the body which would be set up to administer it. Mr. Lubin went on to say that on the basis of our preliminary preference for an American to be chosen as Agent General, our draft resolution provided for the nomination of a candidate by the Secretary-General, which we thought would make it easier to put up a qualified American. However, he noted that other members might insist that this individual be appointed by the General Assembly in which case we might encounter difficulty.

Mr. McKeever felt that since Americans had been left out of other vital bodies in Korea, it was particularly important that an American head up the relief program. In his view the only way to disprove charges of imperialism was to have Americans in positions which would disprove these charges. The real issue was to find an American who understood Asian problems. He had one other comment. He wished to see the words, “war damage”, removed from the title of the commission. It would be better, he thought, to call it the “Korean Relief and Rehabilitation Agency”. He observed in this connection that Communist propaganda already tagged this country as being responsible for the greater part of the war damage in Korea, and he thought we should not point up the war damage ourselves in choosing the title for this agency.

Mr. Dulles observed that while it was technically true that Korean political decisions would be made by the Commission, nevertheless, local relief people also would make political decisions. There was the question of to whom the relief should go, for example. He thought the fellow on the spot would have tremendous political influence. He believed we would be flying in the face of reality to consider that the relief operation could be carried out by an Indian without any politics.

Mr. Kotschnig thought it would be unfortunate to delete the phrase, “war damage”. This was the reason certain countries were ready to participate in the operation. It had to be made clear that this relief agency would be concerned with rebuilding and not with economic development. A suggestion was made that the origin of aggression in Korea could be clarified by the inclusion of appropriate language in the preamble. Mr. Kotschnig still felt that if this were done, a great many other countries would not be willing to participate in the operation. They had insisted on the use of the words, “war damage”.

Mr. Bancroft called attention to the close analogy between this situation and the Palestine relief program. There, we had chosen a non-American administrator, assisted by an Advisory Commission on which the United States was represented. At that time we had not thought the choice of an American necessary. Mr. Ross, however, believed the particular situation of the United States in the Middle Eastern area distinguished the Palestine situation completely from Korea.

Mrs. Roosevelt inquired whether the emphasis should be placed upon war damage or upon rehabilitation. She could not see why both were not covered in Mr. McKeever’s suggested language. Senator Lodge asked whether the Secretary’s speech⁴ had not suggested that the Korean case would be something of a pilot project, or model relief operation, to show what could be done. Mr. Lubin thought the Secretary’s speech more precisely suggested Korea might be an example of what countries could do if they got together and worked cooperatively. Mrs. Roosevelt said her own impression of the purpose of the operation was to bring Korea back to conditions before the war. She did not think there was any intention of the United Nations going in to make a demonstration of how an economy should be run.

Mrs. Roosevelt attempted to sum up the feeling of the Delegation on this subject. As nearly as she could see, the only major suggestion which had been made was that of Mr. McKeever to delete the words, “war damage”. Mr. Kotschnig, on the other hand, felt that it should be included from the standpoint of the position of other members. Mr. Cohen thought that proper language in the preamble would be helpful in this connection. Ambassador Gross agreed. Mr. Kotschnig observed that many countries objected to the use of the words, “relief and rehabilitation”. The name was too much like that of UNRRA which awakened certain unhappy memories. The suggestion was made that possibly the name could be changed to Korean Reconstruction Agency, or to Korean Relief Agency. Mrs. Roosevelt thought that the problem should be met in this way. She assumed the sense of the Delegation was to prefer an American as the Agent General, but to recognize the difficulties raised by the particular Indian candidate. Nevertheless, it was the feeling of the Delegation that for the present we should try to get an American. Such an American should have a remarkable knowledge of the Asiatic situation and be able to take advantage of the particular situation. She summed up the Delegation’s decision as being in favor of an American as Agent General and of deleting the words, “war damage”, in the title of the Agency. These decisions could be reviewed in the light of the developments growing out of our discussions and consultations with other delegations.

Senator Lodge said he was not prepared to agree without a convincing demonstration, that a large-scale, double barreled American effort would not be better than the suggested proposals. The fact that Americans did things in a big way and were not penny pinching was what had enabled us to be successful during the war. Perhaps this did not look wasteful to some, but our way cleaned up situations quickly, and we got better results in the end. Mrs. Roosevelt thought these observations were more applicable to a long-run relief plan. She said she would like to see any American reconstruction plan run in that way.

[Here follows a record of the discussion on the second agenda item: Mexican resolution on land problems in trust territories.]

1. Not printed.
2. See the memorandum by Mr. Acheson to the President, October 11, p. 927.
3. Walter Kotschnig, Director of the Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs and U.S. Deputy Representative in ECOSOC, was an adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.
4. Reference is to Mr. Acheson’s address before the U.N. General Assembly on September 20; text in Department of State Bulletin, October 2, 1950, p. 523.