795A.5/10–1450: Telegram
The Ambassador in Burma (Key) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 14—10:18 a. m.]
246. Re Depcirtel 9, October 5 and Embtel 231, October 1 [9]. Prime Minister1 informed me October 14 that Burmese Ambassador Peking shared Indian Ambassador’s apprehensions Chinese intentions Korea because:
- 1.
- Suddenness Chou En-lai’s warning which was given late at night,
- 2.
- Feverish activity Peking and unusual security measures adopted preceding and following warning,
- 3.
- Reports indicating half million Chinese Communist troops massed in area adjoining Korean border.
Prime Minister feels Burmese Ambassador’s fear of Chinese intervention while understandable even “inevitable” view political atmosphere Peking was exaggerated. Consequently, Burmese delegate UN had been instructed support eight-power resolution regardless Burmese Ambassador’s forebodings. Prime Minister personally inclined believe opportune moment Chinese intervention has already passed: if China were fully determined save North Korea intervention should have taken place when it became apparent Seoul would be liberated.
Prime Minister expressed regret GOB unable give material support UN in Korea and could extend only moral support. Hoped we appreciated compelling reasons for this. Added he pleased note our unanimity and firmness as well as promptness our reactions in dealing Communist aggression. I assured him we fully appreciated Burma’s vulnerability to her giant Communist neighbor and consequent necessity for caution. I expressed opinion that accordingly in backing eight-power resolution GOB had shown not only courage but readiness to face a fundamental issue of outstanding importance and congratulated him on his far-sighted and firm leadership.
- Thakin Nu.↩