795A.5/10–650: Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

531. Re Depcirtel 9, October 5, 11 a. m. As Belgians maintain consular representation in China, and also have advantage of banking [Page 901] and business representatives as well as many Belgian Catholic missionaries, Foreign Office obtains certain amount information from China. There, in absence Van Zeeland1 who is in Paris on ECA matters, I asked De Gruben2 whether he had any indications of possible Chinese reaction in face UN military action in North Korea (c.f. Embtel 490 September 283). He replied in negative adding he thought Chou En Lai’s statements should be closely analyzed before jumping conclusions because Chinese evidently had to say number of things of an equivocal nature to please Russians but without definite commitment. Nothing he had seen would lead to conclusion that Chinese had any intention of direct military intervention in Korea and he believed present Chinese obligation so great and Chinese supply and economic situation so adverse that they would not risk such intervention. Chou En Lai might use various expressions to effect that “he would view with grave concern” and/or “would have to consider eventual Chinese course of action”, etc. Belgium took all this with heavy grain of salt. Belgian Foreign Office has no information thus far of disturbing nature re Chinese intentions vis-à-vis Korea.

Subsequent check with desk officers in Foreign Office has revealed no telegraphic or other report from Belgian diplomatic missions indicating impending Chinese or Soviet hostilities.

Murphy
  1. Paul van Zeeland, Belgian Foreign Minister.
  2. Baron Hervé de Gruben, Secretary General of the Belgian Foreign Ministry.
  3. Not printed. In this telegram, Ambassador Murphy reported de Gruben’s view that U.N. forces should proceed past the 38th parallel and unify all Korea. De Gruben said that he had received a report from the Belgian Consul in Peking stating that the Chinese Communist Government had been taken by surprise by North Korea’s attack on the Republic of Korea. De Gruben went on to say that he did not feel that Communist China wished to become involved in Korea, but that after the settlement of the Korean question the matter of Communist China’s admission to the United Nations would have to be solved. (795B.00/9–2850)