Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/9–2850

The British Embassy to the Department of State

secret

[Washington, undated.]¹

Substance of a Telegram From the Foreign Office to Washington Embassy Dated 28th September

chinese reaction to developments in korea

As in the case of the U.S.S.R., there appear to be three courses open to the Chinese Government:

(a) Military occupation of North Korea (presumably by invitation of the North Korean Government) either openly or by means of “volunteers”.

(b) The maximum political effort to influence United Nations and particularly Asian opinion in favour of a compromise that would leave intact an independent North Korean Communist buffer state.

(c) The strengthening of Chinese military dispositions on the Manchurian/Korean border without military or political intervention in Korea.

2. Action by Chinese forces under course (a) can by no means be excluded since the Chinese might well regard the crossing of the 38th Parallel by United Nations forces and the prospect of the elimination of the North Korean Communist buffer state as constituting a serious threat to China’s own security. Moreover the Russians might well consider the risk of any extension of hostilities (if they do not want general war) considerably reduced if Chinese rather than Russian forces were to move into North Korea. It might also be argued that the U.S.S.R. would be reasonably well content to take the risk of seeing China embroiled (though perhaps not inextricably) with what are predominantly United States forces and in this way staging a bigger war by proxy. A move into Korea by Chinese forces would also be more consistent with Soviet tactics of leaving the leading part in the execution of Communist Asian policies (in appearance at any rate) to China as an Asian power. It should perhaps be noted that in Pannikar’s talks with Chou En-lai, with Chu Teh as well as with the Polish Ambassador, the emphasis is solely on China’s concern at United States aggressive intentions in Korea and all reference to any possible Soviet interest in the matter is carefully omitted. (As realists, the Chinese must of course be aware that the Soviet interest in the Korean issue is in fact as great as their own.)

3. The two following considerations might also be adduced as possible pointers towards Chinese action along the lines of course (a):

(i) Peking’s propaganda both internal and external has put increasing, deliberate and violent emphasis on United States aggressive action both against Korea and China.

(ii) Peking’s notes to the United Nations might seem designed and worded not so much to secure her early admission as to demonstrate that United Nations action in Korea is illegal (and therefore not binding on China or anyone else) and that United Nations action serves to cloak United States plans for aggression.

4. Nevertheless on balance it would still seem unlikely that China would be prepared to take the risk of becoming involved in hostilities with the United States and possibly other Western Powers with no prospect of real benefit to herself and with the fate of Korea as a strong deterrent. Other arguments against China’s intervention are:

(i) Her internal position has not yet been consolidated.

(ii) Her ambitious plans for economic reconstruction and industrialisation might have to be sacrificed. Her towns and communications would be liable to devastation.

(iii) Her military capacity to face major hostilities is doubtful although she may consider on the analogy of the war with Japan that her vast territory and population would ensure ultimate success.

(iv) Her people overwhelmingly want peace not war. To judge by Chinese popular reaction over Formosa, there seems no real difficulty in restraining outraged patriotism. If anything the difficulty particularly in the case of Korea might well be to whip up any indignation at all.

5. Thus, however closely in some respects China’s policy may be coordinated with that of the USSR there is likely to come a point beyond which China would not move unless her own interests were clearly served. In Korea, she would therefore be unlikely to intervene for the sake of the Soviet Union rather than for any tangible Chinese benefits, especially as her intervention would coincide with the destruction of the North Korean Forces. If, on the other hand, the USSR were prepared to launch a general war and themselves come in, then China might feel compelled to move.

6. It would follow that China would almost certainly prefer course (b), i.e. to do everything possible to achieve the survival in some form of North Korea by diplomatic means rather than by open intervention. The threat of open intervention might however profitably be used in this diplomatic context and talks with Pannikar in Peking would provide a convenient starting point for action under course (b).

7. The initial purpose of Chinese diplomatic pressure on the Indians may therefore be designed primarily to break the United Nations front against North Korean aggression, but in view of Chinese propaganda and threats, of possible Soviet pressure on China, of the fact that China has an estimated troop concentration in Manchuria of between 400,000 and 600,000 men, the possibility of a Chinese move into North Korea in the event of diplomatic pressure failing exists as a real danger. Pandit Nehru, in fact, on the 27th September, expressed the extreme and perhaps alarmist view presumably based on the recent reports of the Indian Ambassador at Peking whose own views on Chinese intervention have undergone a complete volte-face in the last few days that “any decision or even suggestion that United Nations forces will move beyond the 38th Parallel is likely to precipitate what might well be world catastrophe, is I fear more than probable”.

8. As regards course (c) the strengthening of Chinese military dispositions in Manchuria has already taken place. If the Chinese conclude that the difficulties and dangers enumerated above of becoming embroiled are such as to outweigh the advantages, and this on balance would seem to be the case, then they would presumably concentrate on further defensive measures and adopt course (c).

9. To sum up, the prospect of control over North Korea by United Nations forces presents the Chinese with extremely difficult decisions. On balance, we consider they are not likely to intervene since they risk hostilities on an issue which would not appear to be vital to China. They would prefer to achieve the survival of a North Korean buffer state, by diplomatic means, but if this fails, the possibility of open Chinese intervention exists as a real danger. If there is intervention in North Korea Chinese forces are more likely to move in than Russian forces.

1. A copy of this document was delivered to Mr. Rusk at 10 a.m. on October 2 by messenger from Mr. Graves of the British Embassy and circulated in the Department of State on the following day. Also received and circulated was a similar note dealing with the question of Soviet reaction to developments in Korea. The latter document, not printed, concluded that, on balance, a crossing of the 38th parallel by U.N. forces would involve increased danger of a head-on clash with the Soviet Union, but stated that the Soviet leaders would probably not risk provoking a general war on this issue. (795.00/9–2850)