795.00/9–1150
Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President
Subject: Considerations Surrounding Proposed Bombing of Rashin (Najin)
It is our understanding that the present policy of the United States, both military and political, is directed toward a localization of the conflict in Korea and the avoidance of any unnecessary extension of hostilities or the outbreak of a general war. If there is any lack of agreement on this point, it should be clarified without delay. It is obviously not the intention of the Department of State in any way to inhibit the progress of military operations, but at the same time it is the duty of the Department to attempt to assess the political risks and possible consequences of proposed military actions as they might affect this policy.
The proposal to again bomb Rashin, a town but seventeen miles from Soviet territory, is an operation which in the opinion of the Department entails serious risks. The directive to General MacArthur, approvided by the President, which authorizes bombing operations, against specified military targets in Korea north of the 38th parallel contains a stipulation that planes engaged in such operations should stay “well clear” of the Soviet and Manchurian frontiers. This injunction to stay “well clear” of the Soviet frontier is by its terms more than an injunction simply to avoid a violation of those frontiers, or it would have been so stated.
The Kremlin has an intensive and almost pathological sensitivity regarding Soviet frontier areas. This has always been true with respect to the Far Eastern area and especially the immediate surroundings of Vladivostok. The latter is an area which Soviet authorities consider of vital importance to the security of the Soviet Union. Military operations of any character in that vicinity cannot but give them deepest concern and keep them in a state of constant alert. A specific risk involved in the proposed operation, by no means lessened by the [Page 722] high speeds and high altitudes at which modern air warfare is conducted, is that either a violation or merely a Soviet conviction that a violation of the frontier was possible would induce the local Soviet commanders to endeavor to intercept our planes. This could well produce an incident with incalculable consequences. To say the least it would have most serious repercussions in both the United States and the Soviet Union given the present inflamed state of opinion. It would enjoy additional impact following so closely on the alleged violation of the Manchurian frontier by our planes and the recent episode involving the shooting down of the Soviet plane in the Yellow Sea.
Yet even in the absence of an incident and given this extreme Soviet sensitivity towards their frontiers, operations of the character proposed might well convince the Kremlin of the need to take protective measures against their possible violations and injury and thus lead to a reoecupation of North Korea by Soviet armed forces. In this connection, one cannot exclude the possibility that they might place Soviet strategic bombing planes at the disposition of North Korean forces for attacks against UN forces in Korea and even our bases in Japan.
In short, the bombing of Rashin or of any other place of equal proximity to the Soviet or Manchurian frontier runs the pressing danger of causing the Soviet Union to react in the very way we wish to avoid. It is therefore the Department’s opinion that before a decision is made, the specific military advantages which might be expected to accrue from the proposed attack on Rashin should be carefully weighed against the risk of the grave political and military consequences outlined above. The Department of Defense has indicated that Rashin is believed to afford storage for about 28% of the petroleum supplies for North Korea, but the significance of this is not clear in view of the distance which separates Rashin from the fighting front and the town’s proximity to Soviet territory which itself must offer extensive facilities for storage and stockpiling.1
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Mr. Acheson saw President Truman on September 11, left this memorandum with him, and subsequently dictated the following memorandum of their conversation:
“I left with the President this memorandum, and briefly discussed it with him. He is inclined strongly toward our point of view and believes that General Bradley is pretty much of that mind. I said that a copy of the memorandum had been sent to the Defense Department so that they could have it in mind in making their report to the President.” (795.00/9–1150)
The Department of Defense has supplied Information to the effect that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already informed MacArthur on September 8 that they wished no further attacks to be made against Rashin for the present. On September 26, the Joint Chiefs of Staff terminated the bombing program entirely by rescinding the basic target directive. (See Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 346.)
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