795B.00/9–250
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the
Secretary of State
confidential
Pusan, September 2,
1950.
[Unnumbered]
Subject: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation of the
Ambassador, President Rhee, and Dr. Noble
The Embassy transmits a memorandum of conversation of the Ambassador,
President Rhee, and Dr. Noble, which took place September 1, 1950.
Although the Ambassador had conveyed substantially the same ideas to the
President and other officials repeatedly since the Government had been
established at Taejon, the immediate purpose of this conversation was to
impress the President with reasonable handling of a conflict with the
National Assembly which had just come to a head by adoption, by overwhelming
vote, by the National Assembly of a Resolution calling upon the President to
discharge the Prime Minister—Defense Minister, Captain Shin Sung Mo, and the
Home Minister, Dr. Chough Pyung Ok. The Ambassador had also sent Mr. Noble
to discuss this question with the Chairman of the National Assembly, Shin Ik
Hi, and the senior Vice-Chairman, Chang Taik San. Mr. Noble had presented
views similar to those described in the conversation and the two National
Assembly officers had agreed that for the time being they would use their
influence to stop any public legislature-executive conflict.
[Page 695]
Following the conversation described above, the President decided to go, and
did go, before the National Assembly and addressed them for about an hour in
a friendly and conciliatory manner, while at the same time explaining why he
found it impossible to accede to their request to discharge the two
ministers. He also announced the appointment of four members of the National
Assembly as part of the Korean Delegation to the Fifth General Assembly of
the UN, which was taken by the Assemblymen as a conciliatory gesture.
Unfortunately, in the question and answer period following his speech the
President lost his temper and made some harsh statements about the Assembly
which partially undid the good effect of his previous speech. Under the
leadership of Shin Ik Hi and Chang Taik San, however, the Assembly proceeded
to pass the budget and suppress the controversy for the present.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in
Korea (Muccio)
confidential
Pusan, September 1,
1950.
| Participants: |
Ambassador |
|
President Rhee |
|
Dr. Noble |
Location: President Rhee’s Office
I told President Rhee how disappointed I was upon arrival at Pusan to
find men—both in and outside the Government—who pride themselves in
being leaders, “knifing” men in responsible positions. I considered
particularly deplorable attempts to inject selfish political bickerings
into the army and police at a time when the very life of the state was
at stake.
I reminded Rhee that this jarred me officially and personally, as twice
in the past two years I had had the opportunity of throwing my weight
against continuance of U.S. aid to Korea. Since the blow of June 25,
there were at least two times before military aid arrived that the U.S.
could have run out plausibly and left the peninsula to its fate. It
would have been easy to have done that at Suwon and, a few days later,
at Taejon. I am delighted that we hung on at that time. I am proud that
President Truman made his bold, forthright decision to send air and sea
support and two days later ground support to stop the aggression. At the
same time, I feel a tremendous responsibility to the American people for
the lives and effort being expended and cannot but expect all Koreans to
work together and do their best expressing confidence they could and
would thereby be justifying the support received.
[Page 696]
I then mentioned that the UN Commission on Korea in its first, two
reports had done well by Korea and by what was being done here. I
understood that the third report had just been signed1
and that it was even more favorable to Korea. I continued that I was
thrilled that 53 member states have endorsed what Korea, supported by
the United States, had done. Many of these states were not only giving
their moral support, but were coming now with material and military. The
reports of the United Nations Commission on Korea had played a vital
role in mobilizing world opinion on the side of Korea. I know that the
delegates also hope that the Korean politicos will not nullify the
confidence they have expressed in Korea.
Naturally, people throughout the world who are sending their loved-ones
to fight here are going to be eager to know why they are here and what
the Koreans are doing. The eyes of the people of the world, friendly and
unfriendly, are on Korea. He, all the members of his cabinet, the
National Assembly, and civic leaders—both in and outside of the
Government—must be aware that they are living in a goldfish bowl. Some
may feel that they can continue their sinister manipulating and get away
with it. They had better be aware that even though they think they can
get away with it, they cannot.
This general outline was used in conversations that I and members of my
Staff have had with Koreans, both in and out of the Government.
