Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/8–3150

Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

top secret

[Washington,] August 31, 1950.

United States Courses of Action as to Korea

the problem

1. To determine what United States course of action as to Korea would be best calculated to advance the national interest of the United States.

discussion

2. The present United Nations’ action in Korea is being taken in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950. The Resolution of June 25 called for “the immediate cessation of hostilities,” called upon “the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel,” and called upon all U.N. members “to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.” The Resolution of June 27 noted the failure of the North Korean authorities to comply with the resolution of June 25 and recommended that “the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.”

3. In a third resolution (July 7, 1950), the Security Council requested the United States to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized that these forces fly the U.N. flag. In response to this resolution, General MacArthur has been designated Commander of the U.N. forces in Korea. The Republic of Korea has also placed its forces under General MacArthur’s command.

4. The political objective of the United Nations in Korea is to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949.

5. The United States has strongly supported this political objective. If the present United Nations’ action in Korea can accomplish this political objective without substantial risk of general war with the Soviet Union or Communist China, it would be in our interest to advocate the pressing of the United Nations’ action to this conclusion. It would not be in our national interest, however, nor presumably would other friendly members of the United Nations regard it as being in their interest to take action in Korea which would involve a substantial risk of general war. Furthermore, it would not be in our national interest to take action in Korea which did not have the support of the great majority of the United Nations, even if, in our judgment, such action did not involve a substantial risk of general war.

6. As U.N. forces succeed in stabilizing the front, driving back the North Korean forces, and approaching the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U.N. members which are supporting the Security Council resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities are confined to Korea or spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

7. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will passively accept the emergence of a situation in which all or most of Korea would pass from its control, provided it believes that it can take action which would prevent this and which would not involve a substantial risk of general war. The Soviet Union may decide that it can risk reoccupying Northern Korea before United Nations’ forces have reached the 38th parallel, or the conclusion of an arrangement with the North Korean regime under which Soviet forces would be pledged to the defense of the territory of the People’s Republic of Northern Korea. Alternatively, the Soviet Union might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities are still in progress south of the 38th parallel. In view of the importance of avoiding general war, we should be prepared to negotiate a settlement while refusing terms that would leave the aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of the aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

8. Although it does not appear likely that Chinese Communist forces would be used to occupy North Korea (because the Soviet Union probably regards Korea as being in its own direct sphere of interest), this contingency cannot be excluded. It also seems unlikely that Soviet or Chinese Communist forces will be openly employed in major units in the fighting in the southern part of the peninsula, for it is believed that neither the Soviet Union nor the Chinese Communists are ready to engage in general war at this time for this objective. It is possible that the Soviet Union may endeavor to persuade the Chinese Communists to enter the Korean campaign with the purpose of avoiding the defeat of the North Korean forces and also of fomenting war between the United States and the Chinese Communists should we react strongly.

9. It is possible, but not probable, that no action will be taken by the Soviet Union or by the Chinese Communists to reoccupy Northern Korea or to indicate in any other way an intention to prevent the occupation of Northern Korean by United Nations’ forces before the latter have reached the 38th parallel. In this unlikely contingency it would seem probable that the Soviet Union had decided to follow a hands-off policy, even at the expense of the loss of control of Northern Korea. Only in this contingency could the U.N. forces undertake ground operations north of the 38th parallel without a substantial risk of general war. It is difficult to appraise this risk at this time, and our action in crossing the 38th parallel would create a situation to which the Soviet Union would be almost certain to react in some manner. While the risk of Soviet or Chinese communist intervention might not be lessened if only the ROK forces conducted the operation north of the 38th parallel, the risk of general hostilities as a result of such intervention would be reduced. In no circumstances should other U.N. forces be used in the northeastern province bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.

10. It will be desirable to bear in mind in the contingency stated in paragraph 9 both the importance of securing support of the majority of U.N. members for any action that might be taken north of the 38th parallel and the advantage of establishing a record that will clearly show that every reasonable effort has been made to avoid carrying the military struggle into a new phase by a land offensive beyond the 38th parallel. At some point after the U.N. forces begin to take the initiative and to drive back and destroy the North Korean forces, terms of surrender should be offered. The question of the acceptance of such terms by the North Koreans would of course be determined by the U.S.S.R. in the light of its appraisal of its interests under all the circumstances then existing.

11. The U.N. forces are clearly Committed by the Security Council resolutions to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel and there is a clear legal basis for taking such military actions north of the 38th parallel as are necessary in accomplishing this minion.

12. Military actions north of the 38th parallel which go beyond the accomplishment of this mission as, for example to accomplish the political objective of unifying Korea under the Republic of Korea are not clearly authorized by existing Security Council resolutions. Accordingly, United Nations approval for such further military actions is a prerequisite to their initiation.

13. Soviet domination of North Korea has brought with it the pattern of police and propaganda control well known throughout the Soviet world. Since the existence and stability of a unified Korea must in the long run depend largely upon the Korean people themselves, the tasks of the United Nations will include the reorientation of the North Korean people toward the outlook of free peoples who accept the standards of international behavior set forth in the United Nations Charter.

conclusions and recommendations

14. It is evident from the above discussion that final decisions can not be made at this time concerning the future course of action in Korea, since the course of action which will best advance the national interest of the United States must be determined in light of the action or inaction of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists and in consultation and agreement with friendly members of the United Nations. Pending final decisions, the United Nations’ commander should make plans to cover the contingency that the United Nations’ forces, or at least the R.O.K. forces, will be called upon to occupy Northern Korea, provided a substantial risk of general war is not thereby incurred.

15. The United Nations’ forces have a legal basis for conducting operations north of the 38th parallel for the purpose of compelling the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this line or of defeating these forces. The United Nations’ forces should be developed so that operations to compel the withdrawal, to inflict maximum losses in the process, and, if possible and desirable, to occupy Northern Korea are within their capabilities. Plans for such operations should be perfected but major actions to carry out the occupation of northern Korea should not be undertaken north of the 38th parallel by the United Nations’ commander without prior authorization. Such authorization should be granted only with the explicit approval of the President, and would require consultation with, and the approval of, the U.N. members supporting the Security Council resolutions.

16. The United Nations’ commander should undertake no ground operations north of the 38th parallel in the event of the occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, but should reoccupy Korea up to the 38th parallel. Bombing operations north of the 38th parallel should not be discontinued merely because the presence of Soviet or Chinese Communists troops are detected in a target area. However, if the Soviet Union should announce in advance its intention to reoccupy North Korea, either explicitly or impliedly giving warning that its forces should not be attacked, the matter should be immediately referred to the Security Council. Military action against North Korean troops south of the 38th parallel would continue. Under the general policy considerations applicable to engaging in full-scale hostilities with the Soviet Union in Korea, forces of the Unified Command would seek to minimize conflict with the Russian forces.

17. In the event of the open employment of major Soviet units south of the 38th parallel, the U.N. Commander should break off the action as rapidly as possible consistent with the orderly withdrawal of his forces. U.S. action in this event should conform with that outlined in paragraphs 35 to 36d of NSC 73/4.¹

18. In the event of the open employment of major Chinese communist units south of the 38th parallel, the United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China; but as long as action by U.N. military forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, the U.N. Commander should continue such action and be authorized to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U.S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further U.S. courses of action.

19. In the event of an attempt to employ major Soviet or Chinese Communist units covertly south of the 38th parallel, the United Nations’ Commander should continue the action as long as he believes his forces were capable of successful resistance.

20. Instructions as to the course of action in the event of the overt employment of major Soviet or Chinese Communist units north of the 38th parallel should be issued to the Commander simultaneously with any authorization to undertake major ground actions north of the 38th parallel.

21. Instructions as to the terms of surrender to be offered in the event of a sudden collapse and rout of North Korean forces shall be transmitted to the U.N. Commander as soon as they are formulated under the procedure outlined in paragraph 27. Pending the preparation of such instructions, the Commander should be given interim instructions that in such event he should offer terms requiring at a minimum the cessation of hostilities and the laying down of arms. If the terms offered should not be accepted, the U.N. Commander should continue his efforts to destroy as many of the enemy as possible before they retreat across the 38th parallel. He should request new instructions before continuing operations north of the 38th parallel with major forces for the purposes of occupying North Korea. He should not in any circumstances permit the use of U.N. forces other than R.O.K. contingents in the northeast province or along the Manchurian border.

22. If operations are undertaken to occupy northern Korea, the United Nations’ Commander should, in consultation with the Government of the R.O.K., determine the timing and method of subjecting occupied territory north of the 38th parallel to its jurisdiction. He should forbid, as commander of the U.N. forces, reprisals against the forces, officials, and populace of North Korea except in accordance with international law and take such measures as are within his power to secure compliance with this directive.

23. In the event of Soviet reoccupation of North Korea or announcement of an intention to prevent U.N. occupation of North Korea (or in the unlikely event of such action by the Chinese Communists), the United States should take the matter to the Security Council, with the stated purpose of securing the cooperation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) in U.N. action to achieve the unity and independence of Korea. Since such cooperation would not be forthcoming, an attempt would then be made in the General Assembly to secure the condemnation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) for flouting the will of the U.N. majority. U.N. forces would be maintained at or near the 38th parallel to safeguard the security of the R.O.K.

24. In the event of the open employment of major Soviet units south of the 38th parallel, the matter should be taken to the Security Council with the purpose of explaining the breaking off of action by the United Nations’ forces and of developing a basis for united action by as many members of the U.N. as possible at such time as the United States believed that action against the Soviet Union would be advantageous. U.S. action in this event should conform with that outlined in paragraphs 35 to 36d of NSC 73/4.

25. In the event of the open employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th parallel, the matter should be taken to the Security Council with the purpose of condemning the Chinese Communists as aggressors. Other U.S. action should be as outlined in paragraph 18.

26. In the event of the attempted covert employment of major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces south of the 38th parallel, the United States should anticipate the probable forced withdrawal of United Nations’ forces from Korea and should take the matter to the Security Council with the purpose indicated in paragraphs 24 or 25.

27. In preparation for the possible eventual retreat of North Korean forces, the United States should immediately discuss with certain friendly members of the United Nations the terms to be offered the North Korean forces. This will serve to develop support for action north of the 38th parallel to accomplish the political objective of the United Nations in Korea in the event that the terms are rejected and there is no evidence of a substantial risk of a clash with Soviet or Chinese Communist forces.

28. When organized armed resistance by the North Korean forces has been brought substantially to an end, the United States should attempt to reduce its share of the U.N. responsibilities for Korea, and announce its desire to do so, without, however, implying any unwillingness to fulfill its U.N. commitments. The R.O.K. forces, operating under principles established by the U.N. Commission for Korea, or such body as may be established to take its place, should take the lead in disarming remaining North Korean units and enforcing the terms of surrender. Guerrilla activity should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of Korea with minimum participation by U.N. contingents, unless the Korean forces alone should prove unable to cope with the guerrilla activities.

29. In performing their mission beyond the 38th parallel, the general posture of the United Nations’ forces should be one of liberation rather than retaliation. An effort should be made to encourage the voluntary adherence of ever larger areas of North Korea to the R.O.K. The United Nations’ forces should attempt to exert a stabilizing influence during the transition period. They should endeavor to conduct themselves in such a way as to emphasize the non-aggressive and temporary nature of the U.N. occupation.

30. The United States should recognize that the Government of the R.O.K. will have to take strong measures against Communist efforts to cause trouble in Korea and that it may require support in these measures from the United States. At the same time, the United States should recognize that social and economic reforms will be necessary in order to reduce the Communist menace to manageable proportions.

31. The United States should make an intensive effort, using all information media, to turn the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean people away from the United States and to direct it toward the Korean communists, the Soviet Union, and, depending on the role they play, the Chinese Communists, as the parties responsible for the destructive conflict. These efforts should be increased immediately and special assistance should be given to the field commander and the U.S. Embassy in Korea to augment their present propaganda and information programs. The Government of the R.O.K. should be encouraged to increase its propaganda output and should be given material assistance in this effort.

32. In order to effect the reorientation of the North Korean people, to cause defection of enemy troops in the field, and to train North Korean personnel to participate in activities looking to unification of the country, the following steps should be taken:

(a) Establish the principle that the treatment of POW’s, after their transfer to places of internment, shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and use for psychological warfare purposes, and for the tasks specified above.

(b) Set up immediately on a pilot-plant scale an interrogation, indoctrination and training center for those POW’s now in our hands in Korea. Personnel in charge of this project must be selected with the greatest care, taking into consideration Korean or Far Eastern experience, language qualifications, and temperamental aptitude. Full advantage should be taken of World War II experience in the indoctrination of German and Japanese prisoners of war and of recent experience with Soviet escapees.

33. The United States should advocate in the United Nations the adoption of the following principles to govern the action of the United Nations in Korea in the post-hostilities period:

(a) the unification of Korea should be arranged by representatives of the Korean people chosen in free secret-ballot elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, the elections to be held under the auspices of the United Nations.

(b) the Government of the R.O.K. should be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted on problems arising in connection with the unification of Korea.

(c) An obligation rests upon the members of the United Nations to contribute to the solution of the tremendous economic, social and political problems certain to confront a unified and independent Korea. Asiatic members of the United Nations should be urged to make a substantial contribution to the assistance program in view of their special regional interest in Korea.

34. In consonance with the above principles, the United States should take the following steps:

(a) Take vigorous action through diplomatic channels and in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly to assure and solidify United Nations support of necessary action in Korea.

(b) Be prepared to announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter and the general aims and principles which the United States believes should underlie such a solution.

(c) When such an announcement is made, the United States should recommend or urge others to recommend, the creation of an appropriate United Nations body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with the principles enumerated above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as chairman of such a body.

35. The United States should urge that the U.N. Commission on Korea or such body as may be established to take its place be charged with continuing consideration of Korean problems and instructed to make recommendations as to the size and character of the military and internal security forces needed by the R.O.K. The U.S. should recommend that the U.N. Commission should consider the desirability of permanent neutralization of Korea accompanied by political undertakings by the R.O.K. and by other states separately to refrain from any aggression. The question of U.N. guarantee should be studied but no U.S. commitment on this point should be made at this stage.

36. The United States should urge that U.N. forces be retained in Korea until a stable, unified, and independent state has been firmly established and should be prepared to make available United States forces as a contingent of the U.N. forces for the purpose of deterring renewed aggression or internal strife. The number of our forces should be reduced so far as possible, however, and should serve only in conjunction with other U.N. contingents, preferably including some Asiatic contingents.

1. Text scheduled for publication in volume i. These paragraphs dealt with U.S. response in the event of overt Soviet attack or Soviet-inspired aggression in various quarters of the world.