795.00/8–3050
Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State for National Security Council Staff Consideration Only
U.S. Course of Action as to Korea
the problem
1. To determine what United States course of action as to Korea would be best calculated to restore international peace and security.
discussion
2. The present United States responsibility in Korea stems from the UN resolution of June 27, 1950 which noted that North Korean authorities had not complied with the UN resolution of June 25 calling for immediate cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel; that urgent military measures were required; and recommended that UN members furnish assistance not only to repel the armed attack but also to “restore international peace and security in the area”. Earlier General Assembly resolutions on Korea which also have a bearing on U.S. responsibility [Page 661] in Korea are referred to in Appendix I.1 Under the UN resolutions, the United States as a UN member, along with other UN members is obligated to: (1.) continue the present enforcement action to repel the North Korean aggression and (2.) participate in an effort to establish peace and security in Korea and bring about the unity and independence of the country under a representative government chosen by the Korean people in a free election.
3. Assuming that a UN offensive will be launched in South Korea within the fairly near future, both the United States and the USSR will be obliged to take critical decisions as to the course of action they will pursue in Korea. The USSR would not be likely to accept passively a situation where all or most of Korea would be under the control of forces not subject to its influence. Action by the Soviet Union to forestall such an eventuality might begin either before or after the UN forces reached the 38th parallel and might take the form of the entry into the conflict of satellite armed forces from Communist China, or Soviet forces. Such Soviet or Chinese Communist forces might be organized elements of the regular Soviet or Chinese Communist armies fighting under their own banners, or they might masquerade as North Korean forces fighting as an integral part of the North Korean Army. The former contingency would create a more serious issue for the United Nations than the latter. If Soviet or Chinese Communist forces should openly enter the fray, occupation by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces of all that portion of Korea between the battle lines and the Manchurian-Siberian borders could reasonably be anticipated.
4. Should the USSR announce its intention to occupy part or all of the Korean peninsula, or openly take part in hostilities with its organized armed forces, the UN members resisting the aggression in Korea would be placed in a precarious position and the prospects would be reduced that a united front could be maintained against the aggression. Notwithstanding the risks, it is highly desirable that the UN Commander in Korea have the maximum degree of latitude of strategic and tactical decision in order that he may carry out his mission at minimum cost and in minimum time. Military considerations might dictate the desirability of amphibious or airbourne landings or ground operations in North Korea, either after or (more likely) before the main body of UN forces has crossed the 38th parallel. Such operations might cut the supply lines and the avenue of retreat of the North Korean forces and materially hasten the end of the hostilities. The UN Commander should not be denied the authority [Page 662] to carry out such operations in his discretion without conclusive reasons for such denial. It should be decided immediately whether the Commander has authority to carry on operations north of 38 so that in the event of an affirmative decision there will be sufficient time for the considerable advanced planning and preparation required.
5. Clearly any operations which might be undertaken north of 38 should not needlessly risk drawing Soviet or Chinese Communist forces into either general or local conflict with forces supporting the UN. The objective should be to obtain the maximum strategic and political benefits from operations north of 38 with a minimum of provocation to the Soviet Union and Communist China.
6. Distinct from, but related to the issue of landings north of 38 while fighting is still in progress south of 38, is the question whether a straight roll-back of the main North Korean forces should be continued beyond 38 when the principal battleline reaches that parallel. It is unlikely that the North Korean forces can be entirely disarmed and dissolved south of 38. Hence a continuing threat to the UN forces would exist if those forces halted at 38. The important military advantages of momentum and initiative would be lost. There would be an imminent threat of a renewal of the offensive by rearmed and reinforced North Korean troops, regrouped and reconditioned under cover of the immunity afforded by the 38th parallel. The pacification and unification of Korea in accordance with the UN mandate could not be effected.
7. Thus a halt at this point would not make political or military sense unless the risk that it would provoke a major clash with the Soviet Union or Communist China were so great as to override all other considerations. The Korean Government would not be satisfied with a cease fire decision at the 38th parallel. Such action might be plausibly construed as a betrayal of the Korean people and a negation of the UN resolutions on Korea. The moral effect of a victory in South Korea would be largely dissipated by a refusal to press on, while a decision to continue the pursuit beyond the artificial dividing line would have world-wide psychological repercussions favorable to the United Nations and adverse to the Soviet Union.
8. The arguments for endeavoring to wipe out the arbitrary partition of Korea as a part of the UN military operation is bolstered by the fact that the Soviet Union may well have already made a decision to wage its counter campaign only on the political and propaganda fronts without risking general hostilities at this time, unless the strategic areas contiguous to key population and military centers in the Maritime Provinces and Manchuria should be occupied by the forces of a Great Power. Strong endorsement of and participation [Page 663] in a positive UN course in Korea by Asiatic and other more or less “neutral” members of the UN might have a deterrent effect on the Soviet Union. Certainly, bold action could not safely be participated in by United States without strong UN sanction enjoying the support of the great majority of the membership. The action would have to be a cooperative effort not identified solely with the interest of the great western powers. It should be crystal clear that any action taken will not pose a military threat to the Soviet Union and will not be aimed against any legitimate Soviet or Chinese Communist interest.
conclusions
A. Operational
9. The risk of provoking a clash of the Soviet forces with the UN forces will be inversely proportional to the distance between the front line UN forces and the Siberian-Manchurian borders. The UN forces should, therefore, refrain from any ground activity, either combat or occupational, in areas close to the international borders of Korea, or in any more distant areas the occupation of which might reasonably by construed as greatly increasing the military vulnerability of Vladivostok or any other strategic center in Siberia or Manchuria.
10. The UN Commander should be informed: (a) that the foregoing is the sole restriction on his freedom to carry out operations north of 38 degrees as part of the strategy to accomplish the mission assigned to him by the UN; (b) that behind-the-line operations in the narrow neck of the peninsula [near?] the 39th parallel would be less provocative than operations farther north; and (c) that it is desirable that he confine any amphibious or airborne operations to that area unless compelling military considerations dictate otherwise.
11. The UN Commander should also be authorized to conduct continuous roll-back operations against North Korean forces well into the northern part of the peninsula if such operations are necessary to the dissolution of the North Korean armed resistance. In this connection, the UN Commander should be directed: (a) to seek new instructions before pushing on after North Korean organized resistance has been terminated; (b) in no eventuality to approach the international borders of Korea; (c) increasingly, as militarily expedient, to designate South Korean troops, and (secondarily) UN forces other than the United States contingent, to spearhead the advance north of 38 degrees; (d) in consultation with South Korean Government, assign to it a large measure of responsibility for determining the timing and the method of subjecting occupied territory north of 38 degrees to its jurisdiction; (e) to take due precautions against the indulgence of South Korean troops in unwarranted reprisals against the forces, officials, and populace of North Korea.
[Page 664]12. In order to insure that participating forces of other UN members will not be recalled by their governments when the UN forces reach the 38th parallel, the United States should seek an explicit prior understanding on this score through the framework of the UN or through direct negotiation, as desirable.
13. In the event of the overt use of organized Chinese Communist forces in Korea:
- “(1) The United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China.
- “(2) As long as action by UN military forces now committed or planned for commitment in Korea offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, such action should be continued and extended to include authority to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U.S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further US courses of action.” (cf. NSC 73/4, paragraph 40b)
14. If major USSR combat units should at any time during military operations in the Korean area of hostilities engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities against U.S. and/or friendly forces the U.S. “should prepare to minimize its commitment in Korea and prepare to execute war plans. These preparations should include initiation of full scale mobilization.” (cf. NSC 76—July 21, 1950)2
15. If unidentified and unannounced Soviet or Chinese Communist forces should enter the fighting under the North Korean banner, they should not be distinguished from North Korean forces.
16. Notwithstanding the authorizations contained in the preceding paragraphs, if the intelligence available to the UN Commander should indicate that there will be important organized USSR or Chinese Communist resistance, he should not advance farther without specific authorization and should immediately refer the matter to the United Nations.
17. If the Soviet Union should announce an intention to re-occupy North Korea, the United States should take the issue immediately to the Security Council as a matter clearly within the competence of that organization. United Nations forces should not risk open conflict with the Soviet Union while this issue is before the Security Council, but the UN forces should not cease their efforts to destroy North Korean forces south of 38. If the UN should be unable to prevent Soviet reoccupation of North Korea, the United States should seek UN action designed to extract assurances from the Soviet Union that North Korean forces would be disarmed and dispersed when they retreated north of the 38th parallel.
[Page 665]18. The United States should, in so far as possible, reduce the scope of United States participation in UN responsibilities for Korea after the organized armed resistance of the North Koreans has ended, without any intimation that the United States would not fulfill its UN commitments. After North Korean organized armed resistance is substantially liquidated, the forces of the Republic of Korea, assisted by the UN Commission on Korea should take the lead in disarming North Korean troops and enforcing the terms of their capitulation. Guerrilla activity should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of Korea with minimum participation by UN contingents, unless the Korean forces alone should prove unable to cope with the guerrilla activities.
19. After UN forces have crossed the 38th parallel, their general posture should be one of conciliation rather than retaliation. An effort should be made to encourage the gradual voluntary adherence of even larger areas of North Korea to the Republic of Korea through civil procedures. UN forces should constitute a stabilizing influence during the transition period and should endeavor to reassure both of Korea’s neighbors as to the non-aggressive and temporary nature of the UN occupation.
B. Political Objectives
20. The political objective of the United States in Korea is to carry out the UN mandate of establishing under the auspices of the United Nations a unified and independent Korea without provoking a general war with the Soviet Union thereby. The United States should act in Korea only with UN sanction and should consent to the commitment of United States armed forces to the fighting in Korea only so long as employment of these armed forces does not lead to grave risks of a frontal clash with the USSR. The United States should continue to urge support of the United Nations position as to the establishment of a unified and independent Korea but should not unilaterally take action beyond that which is effectively supported by a preponderant majority of the UN membership.
21. The United States should recognize that the USSR and Communist China will make the strongest possible effort to aid the Korean Communists to infiltrate Korea and to seize control of the government by indirect aggression, if their effort to seize all of Korea by civil war is thwarted and that accordingly the legitimate government will be impelled to take strong counter measures for which it may require moral and political support from the United States.
22. The United States should make every effort, utilizing all information media, to turn the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean people away from the United States and direct it toward the Korean Communists, toward the USSR and, [Page 666] depending upon the role they play, toward the Chinese Communists, as the instigators of the destructive conflict. These efforts should be increased immediately and special assistance should be given the field Commander and the U.S. Embassy in Korea to augment their present propaganda and information programs. The Government of the Republic of Korea should be encouraged to carry this message to the Korean people and should also be given material assistance such as portable radios, sound trucks and printing presses and leaflet materials to facilitate their efforts.
23. The United States should press for UN designation of the United Nations Commission on Korea or some other UN body to make recommendations to the General Assembly as to the future of Korea. The United States should urge that this United Nations body be guided by the following principles:
- (1)
- The permanent unification of Korea should come about through the participation of representatives of all the Korean people chosen in free country-wide secret-ballot elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, the elections to be held under the authority and supervision of the United Nations.
- (2)
- The Government of the Republic of Korea should continue to be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem. Its independence and stability conforms with Korean aspirations and the expressed objectives of the United Nations.
- (3)
- An obligation rests upon the members of the United Nations to contribute to the solution of the tremendous economic, social and political problems certain to confront a unified and independent Korea. Asiatic members of the United Nations should make a substantial contribution to the requisite United Nations assistance in view of the special regional interest they have in Korea. Their views regarding a solution of the problems of Korea should be given weighty consideration.
24. The United States should also urge that this United Nations body be charged with continuing consideration of Korean problems and instructed to make recommendations as to the size and character of the military and internal security forces needed by the Republic of Korea and as to steps which might be necessary or desirable to insure that all countries will recognize and respect the neutrality of Korea.
25. If the United Nations should recommend the retention in Korea of a UN military force until a stable, unified, and independent government is firmly established, United States forces should be made available as a component unit in the UN forces for the purpose of assisting in the prevention of renewed aggression or disruptive internal strife. United States forces should however be minimized and should preferably serve only in conjunction with contingents of Asiatic and other UN members.