795.00/8–2450
Memorandum by Mr. Walter P. McConaughy to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)1
Subject: NSC Staff Assistant’s Meeting of August 24 on State and Defense Drafts on Korea Policy and the 38th Parallel.
The Armed Services representatives were strongly of the view that the two State Department drafts on long-term and short-term policies [Page 642] in Korea should be combined into one. They felt that the matter of military action when the 38th Parallel is reached is so closely interwoven with future U.S. policy in Korea that the two cannot logically be separated. It was suggested that one paper be drafted to cover the entire subject with separate conclusions and recommendations for the immediate military question and the long range policy issue. Mr. Butler of S/P saw no objection to this.
The representatives of the other Departments apparently had no objection to the State Department’s short-term draft2 except that it was inconclusive and recommended a postponement of the urgent decision as to whether 38° should be crossed. They felt that the State and Defense drafts3 could readily be reconciled if the State Department were willing to participate in making the essential decision now.
The Armed Services representatives pointed out that postponement would delay the military build-up which would be necessary in case of an affirmative decision. They stressed that it would take a long time to prepare for airborne or amphibious operations north of 38°, and that if there was any likelihood that such operations might be called for, an immediate decision was needed.
Mr. Butler felt that it should be decided whether planning should be based on a narrow interpretation of the UN Resolution on Korea (not specifically authorizing ground operations north of 38°), or a broad interpretation of the resolution, under which any military action required to “restore peace and security in the area” could be taken.
The consensus seemed to be that ground operations north of 38° subsequent to the withdrawal of North Korean forces from South Korea would probably lead to the direct involvement of the Soviet Union and Communist China, or both, in hostilities, which might well become generalized.
The question was raised as to whether there might not be some intermediate line north of 38°, but short of the Manchurian and Siberian borders, to which the UN forces might push without grave danger of provoking the Soviet Union to open hostilities. It was generally conceded that the occupation of North Korean points within easy striking distance of Vladivostok and other strategic centers would be more provocative than a limited occupation which stopped short of such points.
It was agreed to request the Senior Staff to pass on the following [Page 643] question taken from paragraph 28, subsection B, “Military Objectives” of the Defense draft:
- 1.
- “Should the unified command seek to occupy Korea and to defeat North Korean armed forces wherever located north or south of the 38th parallel?”
- 2.
- “Should the unified command be instructed to pursue military operations in Korea without regard to the 38th parallel?”