330/8–1850: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received August 18—9:40 p. m.]
325. At Rau’s request he called on me this afternoon to discuss his proposal concerning Korean subcommittee. Rau said he had been giving further thought to his proposal and wished to ascertain whether we “had mental reservations” about his proposal since he felt that our attitude should be largely decisive in determination on his part whether to proceed further with his proposal. He commented that since USG was playing major role in Korea and bearing heaviest burden, he had grave doubts whether he should proceed if we felt that a subcommittee of sort he had suggested would hinder rather than help our effort in Korea. I replied that I could not characterize our attitude in terms of “mental reservations” but that I would repeat to him views expressed by Department of which I had told him two days ago as reported in USUN’s 309, August 18. I then outlined Deptel 147, August 15, stressing opening paragraph and summarizing our main points of concern. I attempted to make clear that we were concerned lest his proposal might, because of inadequate terms of reference, be construed as derogating from force of earlier SC resolutions and that we thought it of decisive importance that any procedure should clearly be designed to bring about earliest possible compliance with those resolutions. I also stressed importance we attached to avoiding an unprofitable and diversionary debate in SC concerning subcommittee, which debate would open up opportunity for dilatory tactics and deflect from important matter of obtaining compliance with SC resolutions. Finally I stressed importance attached by Department to adhering to fact that there was no reason in logic or in sound policy why US pending resolution required subcommittee consideration but that, on contrary, it should be put to a vote as soon as Parliamentary situation in SC permitted.
I said I was sure it would assist Department in considering whole matter if I could transmit text, of draft resolution which Rau earlier said “had been hammered out” in his meeting with other non-permanent members this morning. However, Rau was clearly unwilling [Page 610] to give me copy and I did not wish to embarrass him by pressing him for it. Department will recall substance of draft as transmitted earlier today in USUN 309.
With respect to Rau’s comments concerning special interest of US in matter, I emphatically denied that we had any greater or smaller interest than any other member of UN in obtaining compliance with SC resolutions. I said that while we appreciated Rau’s motive and friendship in requesting our views, we would not wish to assume to ourselves any special role or responsibility in leading him to a decision concerning his future actions. I said that I was sure Department would be interested in reaction of Soviet Union to his proposal and that I hoped Malik would be as forthcoming in expressing his views concerning proposal as we were. In addition, I expressed certainty that Department would also be affected by views of our other colleagues on SC and added that in informal discussions we had derived impression that a substantial number of SC members felt same concerns about his proposal which I expressed to Rau.
Rau then said that shortly after a meeting which he held with other non-permanent members of council earlier today, he had received new instructions from his government. He said that in view of heavy responsibility which would fall upon non-permanent members, particularly India if his subcommittee proposal were adopted, his government felt that it was of great importance to have affirmative support of permanent members of council rather than their mere acquiescence or abstention. He said it was for this reason that he had asked whether we had mental reservations.
I reminded Rau that this introduced a wholly new factor since up to this point he had advised us of his feeling that it would be best for us to abstain on theory that announced support of his proposal by US would compel a Soviet veto. I also reminded him that he had up to this point left us with impression that while our viewpoint was not irrelevant, he would prefer to proceed on basis of his own independent judgment. I attempted to convey foregoing comments in as tactful manner as possible and he readily admitted that a “wholly new factor” had been introduced by his present instructions from his government. I said that I would advise Department of introduction of this new factor.
Rau then adverted to discussion we had held on 11 August, reported in USUN’s 265. He referred to mention I had made of possibility of a UN advisory council. Saying that he had understood that I had mentioned this in a tentative manner and that as he recalled I was referring to a council which might be established after cessation of hostilities, he said he wished to explore our views concerning possibility of SC establishing an advisory committee at present time. He envisaged a committee which would include at least two Asiatic powers mentioning [Page 611] India and Burma as illustrations. He had no views about other members of committee except that its composition would not be limited to SC members. Although he was somewhat vague about terms of reference, he pictures it as an advisory group which “would have no formal functions” and which would make no recommendation to SC. Apparently it would be a group which would be available for consultation to any members of SC desiring to consult with it and its primary purpose would be to assist in formulation of what Rau described as “war aims”. I pressed Rau for an elaboration of his idea, which was clearly amorphous. He mentioned thought that such a committee or group might formulate post-hostilities aims, including a formula for establishment of a UN advisory council, but would not formalize them in any way and would not report to anybody.
I said I would transmit this suggestion to Department but felt I should point out immediately reaction that it would seem preferable to leave to GA task of forming a subcommittee or advisory group. Rau said he had not considered question of GA action on matter but thought that an advisory committee of sort he was now suggesting might in some way be of assistance to SC.
Comment: My impression during whole of our conversation was that Rau had been instructed to go slow pushing his proposal and that he was endeavoring to find an exit through which he could walk gracefully. I do not believe he himself attaches much importance to his advisory committee idea. Inasmuch as our tactics up to this point in not committing a frontal assault upon his subcommittee proposal have preserved his good will and at same time have not led to establishment of a subcommittee, I think that pursuit of same tactics with respect to his new proposal would also be a wise course.
It is not likely that he will obtain much if any support for this new proposal from other members of council, and I doubt that upon further reflection he will adhere to it himself. However, I promised that I would communicate with him Monday1 morning and give him definitive Department reactions both to his request for our point of view concerning his subcomittee proposal and also concerning his newer advisory committee proposal. It will therefore be important to have instructions Monday mid-morning.
In light of foregoing and in view of fact that Department is now crystallizing its views re Korea in GA and contemplates initiating consultations with British and French on this subject next week, we feel it would be advisable and would help maintain good relations with Rau by among other things helping him get off hook, if we could be authorized to discuss in preliminary form our thinking re Korea in GA.
- August 21.↩