795.00/8–1850
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb)
Cabinet Meeting, Friday, August 18, 1950
korea
While General Bradley was briefing the Cabinet with respect to the military situation in Korea, Mr. Harriman stated that he was answering the criticism about the attack by American forces in the Southwestern area by saying that it had a real military objective and was not dictated from Washington. He asked General Bradley if this was true, and General Bradley indicated that it was, that the decision had been left to the commander in the field, as were all other decisions in that area. Secretary Johnson then stated that Ambassador Jessup had telephoned the Pentagon this morning lodging a protest by the British against bombing military targets in North Korea, and left the impression that perhaps some of the targets the British did not wish bombed might even be owned by the British. He stated that these matters had been left to the commander in the field, and that neither he nor the Joint Chiefs expected to change instructions with regard to bombing or interfere with the discretion of the commander in the field. General Bradley then stated that this was generally true, that [Page 600] they had sent out information obtained from Mr. Pauley1 and other sources with respect to military targets in North Korea which might be bombed to prevent their utilization in the military effort. General Bradley also stated that he had had a talk with Air Marshal Tedder this morning and believed that the concern of the British was due to a misunderstanding relayed from Tokyo by the British man there, and that he and Tedder both understood that the targets to be bombed were really military targets, such as marshalling yards, warehouses, industrial plants, etc. At this point I intervened to say that the British had lodged a protest last night based on an assumption that our dropping of evacuation warning leaflets over cities in North Korea indicated that we were preparing to engage in mass bombing of those cities, and that this, if carried out, would produce a feeling in Asia and elsewhere that would be harmful to the West. I stated I was sure this protest was not intended to influence the decision to bomb particular military targets.
The President stated that he understood my point, but then turned to General Bradley and said, in effect, that he was to go after any targets which were being used to furnish supplies to the North Korean troops fighting the UN forces.
- Edwin W. Pauley had been Personal Representative of President Truman on reparations. Concerning his trip to North Korea, May 29–June 3, 1946, see Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 320–322, and Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. viii, p. 706.↩