795.00/8–1250
Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)
After talking with General Norstad about another matter this morning, I told him that we in the State Department were disturbed at reports that American B–29s had bombed the port of Rashin. I said that, as he knew, the Russians were very touchy about any military activity in the neighborhood of their frontiers. I reminded him that the directive which had been sent to CINCFE had specified that our Air Force in its bombing missions north of the 38th parallel was to stay “well clear” of the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers. I said that 17 miles from the frontier did not seem to us to come within this definition. I asked him what was the importance of bombing Rashin. He replied that the Air Force had given the strictest instructions that B–29s were not to bomb Rashin except under the most favorable weather conditions when there could be no possibility of bombing Soviet or Manchurian territory through error.1 He said he was sure that in this case the mission had not flown over or bombed Soviet or Manchurian territory. As to the importance of the mission, he said Rashin was very important for fuel supplies and as a rail and shipping center.
To make our views known through appropriate channels, I telephoned General Burns this afternoon. Being unable to reach him or Captain Murdaugh,2 I delivered the following message to Mr. Kenneth Young:3
The State Department was deeply concerned over the bombing of Rashin and did not feel that this was consistent with the general directive approved by the President that all American bombing missions should stay “well clear” of the Soviet and Manchurian frontiers. I said I was communicating this as the official State Department view and asked that he communicate it to the proper quarters. I emphasized the sensitivity of Soviet authorities to any military activity in the neighborhood of their territory and the dangers involved, particularly in view of their presumed state of tenseness and irritation. Mr. Young [Page 567] expressed the personal view that he shared our anxiety on this score and said he would immediately communicate this message to any available members of the Joint Staff and that he would pass it on to General Burns and Secretary Johnson on Monday.4
- At 7:56 a. m. on August 12, the Department of the Army held a teletype conference with officials of the Far East Command in Tokyo, headed by General Willoughby, G–2, who made the following report: “FEAF Bomber Comd B–29’s today dropped 550 tons of bombs on the important seaport and rail center of Rashin, 17 mi SW of Korea’s NE boundary. Bad weather necessitated radar bombing against the target area; results unobserved.…” (DA TT–3650; Korean Conflict)↩
- Capt. Albert C. Murdaugh, U.S.N., Acting Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense.↩
- Mr. Young was Captain Murdaugh’s Assistant.↩
- August 14.↩