795B.551/8–1150: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
priority
787. Malik’s statements in UN and present Sov propaganda make it clear that one of main Sov objectives is to obscure UN character [Page 560] of Korean action by placing emphasis on fact that burden of fighting is being undertaken by US forces virtually alone. Immed and decisive action is called for to place UN decision in true light of joint effort to meet aggression. While we appreciate support for UN already given by other govts we consider it essential that all those nations whose: mil capabilities are adequate for the purpose shld increase their contribution by the sending of ground troops as a matter of urgency. In addition to political desirability1 this step support of Brit ground iorces would be of real military value.
Brit timetable for sending ground forces to Korea is much too slow tinder circumstances of situation. London’s Weeka of Aug 42 reports plans that UK brigade of about seven thousand will depart UK about end Oct meaning they cannot be engaged until Dec at earliest. US considers it of utmost urgency that some Brit ground troops be available Korea much earlier.
Pls see Attlee urgently and express above views as held most seriously by US and urge immediate reexamination of Brit capabilities as to increasing tempo forwarding Brit troops to Korea at once. Stress US view of extreme urgency of need for prompt and effective action.
Similar approaches being made other countries including France.3
[Page 561]You shld explore with Attlee the possibility of transfer of Brit forces from Malaya or Hongkong for immediate use Korea, replacing them later with troops from UK. It appears to us that Brit themselves shld come to conclusion that situation warrants risk of withdrawing forces from Malaya or possibly Hongkong for immediate use Korea.
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The following message was sent to London and Paris in telegrams 788 and 770, August 11, 8 p. m.:
“Eyes only for Ambassador.
“In addition to reasons set forth Deptel 787, Aug. 10[11] re ground troops for Korea you will appreciate that there is another extremely important factor, namely rapidly increasing public and congressional opinion that in spite of their vocal support our allies are sitting back and allowing us to bear the full brunt of the Korean fighting. This is due to fact that casualties have been born in overwhelming proportion by ground troops and no amount of naval or air support, however welcome, will successfully counter this sentiment.
“You will readily appreciate possible effect of this growing opinion on our current plans for invigorating NATO and voting funds to assist our allies to build ttp their defensive strength.” (795B.551/8–1150)
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Telegram 771, August 11, 8 p. m. to Paris, not printed. Similar messages were sent on August 11 to the Embassies in Ottawa, Paris, The Hague, and Wellington, as well as to the Acting Political Adviser in Tokyo for use during the visit there of Australian Prime Minister Menzies. In addition, the Ambassadors in Bangkok and Manila were requested to expedite the despatch of Thai and Philippine forces to Korea, and the Ambassador in Stockholm to speed the sending of the promised Swedish Medical Unit to the United Nations Command in Korea. The Minister in Jordan was informed of U.S. interest in the idea of a contribution of a ground forces unit by the Government of Jordan, although no formal approach was to be made pending U.S. talks with the U.K. Government, and the Ambassador in Pakistan was instructed, at his discretion, to attempt to obtain an immediate offer of ground forces from the Government of Pakistan for use in Korea (795B.5/8–1150; 795.00/8–1150; 357.AD/8–1150).
Subsequently, Department telegram 1149, August 31, to London informed the Embassy that the Department of State was inclined to believe that States not members of the United Nations should not be pressed to supply troops for Korea, but that, if Jordan decided to offer troops, the offer would be carefully considered by the United Nations Command (795B.5/8–3150).
Neither Pakistan nor Jordan provided ground forces to the U.N. Command in Korea.
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