Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

661.00/8–1550

Minutes of a Meeting Held by Representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in Paris on August 3, 1950¹

Paris, August 3, 1950

[Extract]
top secret

Participants

France:	M. Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
	M. Roland Jacquin de Margerie, Assistant Political Director.
	M. James Baeyens. Director for Asia.
	M. Jacques de Bourbon Busset	}	Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
	M. Bernard de Menthon
	M. Jacques de Folin
	M. Jean Laloy
	M. Sauvagnargues
	M. Pignon, High Commissioner for Indochina (Part of 2nd Session).
U.K.:	Mr. Maberly E. Dening, Assistant Under-Secretary of State.
	Mr. William Hayter, Chargé d’Affaires a.i., Paris.
	Mr. Anthony Montague-Brown, Third Secretary.
U.S.A.:	Ambassador Bruce
	Mr. Bohlen, Minister
	Mr. Woodruff Wallner, First Secretary
	Mr. William A. Crawford, Second Secretary.

M. Parodi opened the talks by referring to the French aide-mémoire of July 18, 1950 noting the dangers of the current world situation resulting from the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. He expressed the hope that the present conversations would offer the opportunity for a profitable study of the political lessons to be derived from the Korean aggression and for a reassessment and coordination of the positions of the three countries with respect to Korea and other danger points throughout the world. He preferred that the talks be kept on an informal basis and that their purpose be that of exchanging information rather than of arriving at specific commitments.

Ambassador Bruce expressed his agreement with M. Parodi’s statement of the character and purpose of the talks and said that Mr. Bohlen, who had just returned from Washington, would make the United States presentation.

Mr. Hayter likewise expressed his agreement with M. Parodi’s summation.

M. Parodi said that he would prefer to place the topics relating to Asia at the head of the agenda because Mr. Dening might not be able to remain for the full duration of the talks. There was general agreement on this suggestion.

Mr. Bohlen presented the United States position on Korea. He said that any attempt to analyze Soviet intentions in initiating the attack on Korea was pure guess-work. Our best guess as to the primary reason is perhaps the most obvious—that the Soviet Union desires to control South Korea because of the strategic importance of that area to the Soviet positions in North Asia, such as Port Arthur, Manchuria and Vladivostok. The fact that the Soviets had concluded no military agreements with North Korea such as they had with all their other satellites (except Albania) would indicate that they regarded North Korea as unfinished business which was to be completed by armed action with which the Soviet Union did not wish to be directly and juridically connected.

Mr. Bohlen stated that our entry into the Korean conflict was a political action based on the premise that aggression cannot be tolerated. From a purely military standpoint such action was undesirable because Korea from a strategic point of view was not vital to the United States defense position in Asia. For this reason there had been no American plan for a military action in Korea. The Soviet Union was doubtless fully aware of United States military thinking, which had been publicly stated, and had acted accordingly. We believe that for these reasons the United States and United Nations reactions to the North Korean attack came as a surprise to the Soviet Union. Further support for this belief lies in the fact that the Soviet propaganda machine was caught off guard and did not react immediately. Since the outbreak of the conflict, the Soviet Union has kept a free hand politically and militarily and has carefully avoided the impression that there is any special connection between itself and the North Koreans.

Mr. Bohlen reaffirmed that the United States action was a political action aimed at resisting aggression. He noted that it is based on the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27. He said that we cannot at this juncture predict the course of action that we should take if and when we reach the 38th parallel. That action will presumably depend on a Security Council decision when the time comes. As for the present military situation, it is critical but with luck we can hold. Of outstanding importance are the long-term results of the aggression as evidenced in our mobilization and rearmament now under way. These actions should place the United States in a much stronger overall military posture within a reasonably short period. The President has already asked Congress for additional military appropriations of 10 billion dollars for ourselves and of 4 billion dollars for foreign military aid of which about 3.5 billion dollars will be for Europe.

Mr. Bohlen emphasized that whereas the purpose of the resolution recently submitted by Mr. Austin to the United Nations is to localize the Korean action, there is a real danger that the present hostilities may be extended. The greatest danger of this arises from the possible entry of Communist China into the conflict. So far no Chinese troops have been identified among the North Koreans. As for the North Koreans themselves, we have been much impressed by their fighting skill and believe that many of them had previous military experience in the Chinese civil war and possibly in Soviet Armies during World War II.

Turning to the possibility of direct Soviet involvement in the Korean conflict, Mr. Bohlen said that we consider such an eventuality unlikely so long as the fighting is confined to South Korea. Should the front be stabilized and the fighting turn again toward the North, we might expect a shift in the Soviet attitude. As the situation is today, we see no possibility that the Soviet Union would be prepared to settle the Korean question in a manner acceptable to the United Nations. There is no reason for the U.S.S.R. to adopt a conciliatory attitude so long as everything is going in its favor. If a real opportunity for an acceptable peaceful settlement (that was not merely a propaganda gesture) presented itself, we would certainly not reject it. However, we must remember that we are fighting for a political principle that aggression cannot be permitted to pay, and that this principle cannot be compromised.

Mr. Dening expressed general agreement with what Mr. Bohlen had to say. In the British view the Soviets were employing the technique of aggression by proxy in a new form. Moreover they were seeking to exploit an initial success before the Republic of Korea could be armed to resist aggression. Unquestionably they had been surprised by the United States and United Nations actions. The United Kingdom–Soviet diplomatic exchanges in Moscow showed that the Soviets had nothing to propose by way of settlement in consonance with the Security Council resolutions. Nevertheless the Soviet replies have not closed the door to negotiations. The United Kingdom shares the United States view that so long as the North Koreans continue to be militarily successful the Soviet Union will be disposed to make no acceptable offer. In short, the North Koreans must be forced by military action back to the 38th parallel. Doubtless the United Nations will then seek to unify all Korea. Unification, however, will be impossible without United Nations forces to support it. Although there is no question that the ultimate solution must be a United Nations solution, it is premature at this time to discuss the methods by which it may be achieved.

With regard to the possibility of Chinese Communist involvement in the Korean conflict, Mr. Dening expressed the view that this was unlikely unless the Peking Government considered that very material advantage would accrue therefrom. Neverthless he did not exclude the possibility that the Peking Government might be compelled by Soviet pressure to take military action against its better judgment. So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, he believed that it desires above all to avoid involvement in total war and that should things go badly in Korea it will have no compunction in sacrificing its North Korean satellite in the hope of taking it over by political means at a later date. Meanwhile it will exploit the situation.

Mr. Bohlen said that United States public opinion has been aroused by the Korean action to a fuller understanding of the extent of the Soviet menace and is facing up admirably to the realities of the situation. He noted that whereas the technique of Soviet aggression by proxy is not new, this is the first occasion of an unconcealed aggression by proxy. This would seem to denote that the Soviet Union is prepared to take greater risks today than a year or so ago and that the Soviet rearmament program has doubtless progressed to a point permitting of greater risks. We are forced to conclude that only by rearming in turn can we deter the Soviets from continuing to take risks of an increasingly graver nature.

M. Parodi expressed general agreement with what had been said. In his view the Soviet Union had eschewed simulated aggression, such as a civil war might have offered, in favor of brutal and open aggression. He assumed that although the Soviet Union had believed there would be no armed aid to South Korea and had counted on United States non-intervention, it had nevertheless prepared for the worst. The lesson of the Korean aggression, he said, is that it is provoking the rearmament of the West. He expressed concern that the Soviet Union might be tempted to seize the opportunity of Western weakness in the months immediately ahead to start a general war. He said that we are now in a more dangerous phase than at the beginning of the Korean conflict and noted that the United States military cover on which Western Europe must depend is dispersed and largely tied down in Asia.

Mr. Bohlen spoke to this point. He said that we are fully aware of the danger of war in the period immediately ahead. We are, as M. Parodi indicated, entering a new phase of large scale rearmament. White this may entail the risk of war, it is a risk we must take because to do nothing would leave us in a weakened state in the event of aggression. In the past, Stalin’s actions have not been based on the military factor alone. By nature he is very prudent, and he is not accustomed to launching wars where the odds are not overwhelmingly in his favor. These are deterrents to aggressive action which we must constantly bear in mind. Moreover, there are other deterrents, the first of which, from a military point of view, is our atomic arm. In the second place, Stalin must keep in mind the lesson of the defection of Soviet troops in 1941. Furthermore, he cannot feel entirely secure in his European satellites. By launching an intensive rearmament program, we may be taking a risk, but because we are living in a dangerous world where self-defense is a paramount necessity, the risk must be taken, and we cannot let our actions be dictated by fear of Soviet reactions.

M. Parodi remarked that it would be logical for Stalin to foresee that within three years the United States would be in a much stronger position than it is now and that this consideration might induce him to take preventive action against us at this juncture. He agreed that we must take the risk and expressed the hope that we can gain time now. He then referred to the inroads which Communist “peace” propaganda has made on public opinion in Europe and commented that the Russians had spoken so much of peace that many had begun to believe them. He concluded that while recognizing that United States intervention in Korea was indispensable and is fully supported by France, we must use every proper means to achieve a peaceful settlement.

Mr. Dening expressed agreement with Mr. Bohlen that while there is danger in rearmament there is even greater danger in not rearming. He said that while the United Kingdom would like to buy time, as M. Parodi had suggested, we must preserve a firm attitude.

Mr. Bohlen recognized that by drawing our forces into Korea our position from the standpoint of offering effective military cover elsewhere has been temporarly weakened. At the same time Stalin must realize that the net result of our present effort will be increased strength for us in the near future. Stalin has often said that what ho particularly respects is productive capacity and that by underestimating the role of production in modern war and the productive capacity of the United States Hitler had made his greatest mistake. There is no question that he continues to maintain a healthy respect for our productive potential. He can only conclude that from our standpoint the adverse effect of our initial reverses in Korea must soon be offset many times by the cumulative results to be derived from mobilizing our industrial capacities for war.

M. Parodi asked Mr. Bohlen if we had envisaged the possibility of a Soviet proposal for elections in Korea.

Mr. Bohlen replied that it would be difficult to envisage such elections without the presence of United Nations troops throughout the country. Moreover, the Soviets are generally afraid of internationally conducted elections. In any case, as long as they hoped to get all Korea by military action, they would have no reason to favor general elections. A United Nations electoral commission in any case would not be enough, and United Nations troops would be required to guarantee security.

Mr. Bohlen said that contrary to the popular conception, the South Koreans have held together politically. There is no important guerrilla activity on the part of the South Koreans behind our lines. Not only have they fought well but after the initial defeat some four South Korean divisions have been regrouped and are continuing to make an effective contribution. It should be noted moreover that 700,000 South Korean refugees have preferred to flee behind our lines rather than to remain in Communist occupied territory.

M. Parodi expressed great interest in these facts and said that it would be desirable if they were more widely known in France.

M. Parodi then turned to the question of Formosa and expressed the view that perhaps the greatest present danger lay in the possibility of the Peking Government entering the conflict over this issue.²

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. The minutes were transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 373 from Paris, August 15, not printed, which indicated that they were an informal record of the conversations prepared by an officer of the American Embassy. Herein are printed the portions of the talks dealing with Korea; the sections dealing with China and Formosa are printed in vol. vi, pp. 407 ff. These tripartite discussions were held in pursuance of the French aide-mémoire of July 18, contained in telegram 332, July 18, from Paris, p. 423, and took place in two sessions on August 3 and 4.
2. At this point, Mr. Bohlen set forth the U.S. position on Formosa; for documentation, see vol. vi, pp. 407 ff. On the question of Chinese Communist entry into the Korean conflict, the minutes of the meeting of August 4 attributed to Mr. Bohlen the observation that “as regards Korea, the Chinese Communists have no special interest in Korea and if left to their own free will, would probably hesitate to take any aggressive action.”