Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/8–150

Memorandum by Mr. George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff to the Department of State Representative on the NSC Staff (Bishop)

top secret

[Washington,] August 1, 1950.

With reference to your memorandum of July 31, 1950¹ to Mr. Watts regarding future U.S. policy with respect to Korea, there are attached three copies of revisions of some of the paragraphs.²

These revisions are based upon comment made at the Under Secretary’s Meeting of July 28. They also reflect comment made by Mr. Jessup.

Messrs. Allison, Sandifer, and Wells and I agreed that work on this paper should go ahead but that another paper would be necessary to complete the study. This point is covered in the final paragraph of the revision.

George H. Butler

[Annex]

Future U.S. Policy With Respect to Korea

the problem

1. To report upon the policy that the United States should pursue after the Korean communist forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel.

analysis

8. (The last sentence of this paragraph³ should be deleted.)

9. (The last sentence⁴ should read as follows): This paper is addressed primarily to the latter phase of the problem, for the reasons set forth in the following paragraph:

13.⁵ If North Korean forces withdraw or are driven back to the 38th parallel, continued military action by the U.N. forces for the purpose of imposing a settlement with a view to a unified and independent Korea would depend upon majority support in the United Nations. Account would have to be taken of possible reluctance regarding the multilateral use of force as a part of the U.N. effort to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea.

14. (This entire paragraph⁶ should be deleted.)

15. (Renumber as paragraph 14.)

16. (Renumber as paragraph 15.)

17. (Renumber as paragraph 16 and revise as follows):

Likewise present public and Congressional opinion in the United States would be dissatisfied with any conclusion falling short of what it would consider a “final” settlement of the problem. A sentiment favoring a continuation of military action north of the 38th parallel already is arising. On the other hand, there may well develop a contrasting sentiment against using U.S. military forces to help establish an independent Korea.

18. (Renumber as paragraph 17.)

conclusions

19. (Renumber as paragraph 18.)

20. (Renumber as paragraph 19.)

recommendations

21. (Renumber as paragraph 20.)

22. (Renumber as paragraph 21 and revise as follows):

Decisions regarding the course of action when the U.N. forces approach the 38th parallel should be def erred until military and political developments provide the additional information necessary to enable us: (a) to base our decisions on the situation in Korea and in other parts of the world at that time; (b) to consult with other U.N. members; and (c) to keep our military capabilities and commitments in safe balance.

[Add new paragraph 22.]⁷ Measures which might be necessary or desirable once the aggression has been brought to an end, either by defeat of the Korean communist aggressors or as the result of a possible Soviet suggestion for an early voluntary withdrawal by the Korean communists, should be the subject of immediate study and early report by the Department of State in cooperation with the Department of Defense.

1. Not printed.
2. References in the annexed document are to the paragraphs of the draft memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff of July 25, p. 469, as it had gone forward to the NSC Staff, bearing the date July 27 and with no changes in the text but with the paragraphs renumbered.
3. See paragraph 7 of the draft memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff, July 25, p. 470.
4. See paragraph 8, ibid.
5. See paragraph 12, p. 471.
6. See paragraph 13, ibid.
7. Brackets appear in the source text.