398.43 UNESCO/8–150: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 1—10:19 a. m.]
254. When on July 30 Embassy officer delivered to Indian Ambassador message re UNESCO contained Deptel 87 July 28,1 Radhakrishnan took occasion to discuss significance Malik’s projected return SC, saying he thought it was sign Soviets disturbed by repercussions Korean affair and that they had decided to make move to stop rearmament of west. He feared that if Soviet return did not lead to some kind of settlement, UN would break up and Soviets would start war before west becomes stronger. Indian Ambassador was sure that democracies would in that event win military victory, but what would happen to democracies in course hostilities? Would they achieve moral victory?
It was clear that Radhakrishnan seemed to fear impact Malik’s propaganda appeal in SC. He asked why we wouldn’t cut Gordian knot by allowing Peking to take SC seat in return for Soviet undertaking to withdraw NK troops and to agree to UN mediation in Korea? He was sure that Soviets and Peking would agree not to vote against (i.e., they would agree to abstain) constructive Korean resolutions in SC, thus giving future SC action full “moral weight” of “800,000,000 additional people.”
Indian Ambassador does not think Soviets are returning to SC with any assurance, based on secret deals, that Peking would be seated and expressed view that vote would continue be adverse at this stage unless US took positive action. Indian Ambassador Peking certain that Peking not yet solidly tied to Kremlin. Indian effort is to detach China from Moscow. Magnanimous gesture by US might help do the trick. China not yet “communized” except for agrarian reform; it is not as “socialistic” as Britain.
When Embassy officer emphasized “blackmail” aspect any change US position on China this time, Indian Ambassador said he feared that our stand very much “which comes first, chicken or egg” proposition, and that net result our standing on prestige would be war. After Embassy officer sketched course Soviet post-war imperialism in Europe and Asia since 1945 which underlies US disillusionment with possibilities negotiated settlements with Soviets, Indian Ambassador agreed that Soviets had been faithless and asked whether we then consider [Page 513] situation “hopeless.” Embassy officer replied that “solidarity of non-Communist world” was answer to problem whereupon Radhakrishnan said we must take into account cross-currents in Asian part non-Communist world. Not difficult to convince many Asians that Korean affair staged or at least seized upon by west as pretext for re-introduction western military forces into Asia to reconstitute old nineteenth century imperialism. GOI in difficult position if its foreign policy appears consist of support for French in Indochina, British in Malaya, Americans in Formosa, etc.
Indian Ambassador then referred his call on Stalin last January, which appears to have left deep impression, and said he personally counted great deal on fact that Stalin an old man who would not wish do anything which might result in destruction Soviet “house” which he had constructed and that Stalin is proud of difference between himself and Hitler. Whereas latter impetuous and adventurous, Stalin considers that he is cool, detached, cautious and calculating. Radhakrishnan thinks we should take advantage this fact.
In review Stalin–Nehru correspondence, Indian Ambassador clearly implies he was not happy with way matter had been handled by GOI, particularly failure GOI pin Soviets down on details peaceful settlement in Korea. Added that if he had received “green light” instead of “flat no” as result this informal mediatory approach this Embassy, Nehru would have taken different tack.
Indian Ambassador indicated several times during talk that GOI stood by its position re NK aggression and withdrawal NK troops after which mediation should take place. Like many genuine idealists, he was naive enough to suggest that something might come of direct approach to Malik by US or one of its friends to effect, “My dear fellow, what are you chaps up to? You know you can’t blackmail us, so let’s get down to business.” Nurtured in the atmosphere of British power in India, which was flexible and compromising, he fails almost completely to understand the implacable and fanatical persistence of Soviet Communist power.
Department pass New Delhi; repeated information New Delhi 23.
- Not printed; the message related to the calling of a meeting of the Executive Board of UNESCO to discuss UNESCO’s position on Korea (398.43 UNESCO/7–2850).↩