330/7–2950: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received July 29—4:49 p. m.]
237. Embassy views prospective Soviet return to SC as Soviet tactical retreat dictated by over-all course world developments since inception Korean fighting and believes that Soviets have utilized the coincidental circumstances of their alphabetical succession to SC presidency as convenient face-saving cover for their decision to return. Embassy bases this opinion on its estimate of long-term prospects which have been confronting Kremlin in past few weeks, and perhaps one tangible corroborative piece of evidence is the curiously indirect manner in which Soviet public has been informed of this development (Embtel 232, July 29).1
One prospect facing the Soviets is that the UN is “marching away” from the minority Soviet bloc, taking with it the Charter, the UN flag, and the SYG. The free world, united as it never has been before on any important issue, is achieving a moral and physical cohesion through the UN which bodes ill for the Kremlin’s long term ambitions to remake the world in its image.
As Embassy has stated in previous cables, while Soviets attach considerable importance to advantages which they derive from UN membership, at such time as they felt UN would hamper the attainment of important Soviet objectives, they would not hesitate to leave UN in a fashion calculated to disrupt the organization. The fact that the Soviet boycott of UN during its consideration of Korean issue has not achieved such disruption but, on the contrary, has led to [Page 493] greater free world unity within UN, must have made deep impression on Soviet leaders (Soviet public was never permitted to glimpse factual picture of concerted UN effort re Korea).
Related to first prospect, but of even greater import to Kremlin is the stimulus which their Korean military adventure has given to building up of the military strength of the free world, and in particular that of the US and UK. If Embassy estimate that Soviets not now prepared to invite consequences of global conflict with west (Embdes 514, April 252) is correct even under present circumstances (which at least afford Soviets excellent opportunities for initial military victories in Europe and Asia) with what serious concern must Kremlin view march of events which threatens to give west much stronger relative military position within next year or two.
Impelled by considerations of foregoing nature to make tactical retreat from position so long and stubbornly maintained on Chinese representation issue, Soviets will no doubt exploit to the full the possibilities for maneuver which their new position affords. Their return to the UN opens up following avenues of approach which were at least partially closed to them during their willful boycott:
- (1)
- They regain UN forum for use as world sounding board for all their views and propaganda;
- (2)
- More particularly, they can once again project into UN their phony “peace movement”, including “Stockholm appeal”, and perhaps even a more attractively packaged version of their UNGA “peace pact”.
- (3)
- They will certainly take full advantage of their return to resume familiar disruptionist and obstructive tactics and to encourage maximum dissension among free world governments represented on SC. Use of veto one of several methods open to them this connection.
- (4)
- They may feel that given the tough free world attitude that prompted their return and the serious dangers, military and otherwise, which confront them in that regard, the first three avenues will not suffice and that, making a virtue of necessity, the time has come to make concrete appeasement moves (e.g., on Korea) which would tend to relax marshalling of free world strength which has been under way since onset Korean affair. Their return to SC per se might be conceived as step in this direction.
Having indicated that they will return to SC without prior decision their favor re Chinese Communist representation, question arises as to what action Soviet representative will now take to press that issue. Unless Soviets have made advance deals assuring favorable vote for seating Chinese Communists (which seems unlikely from information available here), precipitating a vote on this matter would place Soviets in awkward position, particularly if Embassy analysis of underlying [Page 494] reason for Soviet return to SC essentially valid. It is believed, therefore, that Soviets may follow path already marked for them in Nehru-Stalin correspondence of linking peaceful settlement in Korea with question proper composition SC, thus opening up general discussion with vote delayed for time being. Fact that spotlight has shifted from Chinese representation matter to Korea may, in fact, have been important reason why Soviets may have deemed it possible to get back in SC without too much loss of prestige.
From Soviet point of view this is propitious time make “peace” moves re Korea. NK regime is now in control most of South Korea, and though NK troops may still make some advances, it would appear that point of temporary military stabilization being reached with only Pusan beachhead and perimeter under control UN/US forces To call for truce and armistice now would certainly meet Soviet requirements, though unlikely Soviets would consider that any such proposal by itself would receive SC support. More probable that Soviets would submit proposals based on idea that Koreans must settle their own political future, “foreign” troops should get out, and elections be held, perhaps under UN observation. If Soviets intend make real appeasement move, they may (refEmbtel 215, July 27) use this opportunity pull back NK troops to 38th Parallel to avoid defeat of latter and make maximum political capital as peacemakers on assumption that their continued participation in SC with veto power would be adequate weapon to forestall movement UN forces into North Korea, and that ROK troops would be too weak to attempt this alone. In appraising possible Soviet moves looking toward “peaceful” political solution Korean problem through cessation of fighting followed by elections (even if NK troops withdrawn), it cannot be overlooked that public opinion in South Korea may be very vulnerable to appeals based on “anti-foreign” aspect of UN intervention (including destruction wrought by UN forces), and outcome elections might be favorable Korean Communists.
Soviets may attempt by various means to make Formosa an issue, seeking to exploit unilateral US commitment and failure to date of SC to support US position. This might be considered by Soviets as good tactics to cover up their failure “stick it out” on Chinese Communist question, for Soviets would appear to be fighting for Chinese Communist interests within UN. If Chinese Communists should attempt invade Formosa and US naval units take defensive action, Soviets would, of course, in addition to any other reaction, exploit this issue for all it is worth in SC.
It is, of course, possible to view Soviet return to SC as presaging further overtly aggressive moves by international Communism (Indochina, Burma, Iran, Yugoslavia) on assumption that Soviets would [Page 495] now be in position to block effective UN counter-action through veto and other obstructionist methods. If, as Embassy strongly believes, Soviets have their eyes on the major issues outlined at outset this message, it is doubtful that Soviet return was motivated by this somewhat legalistic motive. Further aggression in the near future, even though of a local character, would certainly intensify more than ever the strengthening moves now begun in the west and would reveal a Soviet recklessness out of keeping with Embassy observations and estimates of long standing.
Department pass USUN, London, Paris. Repeated information USUN 31, London 75, Paris 64.
-
The text of this telegram read as follows:
“Following complete text of Soviet announcement via New York Tass item dated July 28 their intention participate SC meeting August 1.
“‘Members of SC again assembling July 28 [see U.N. document S/PV. 478], during prolonged period discussion report submitted by Austin. Speakers limited selves to short remarks in which they obligingly approved Austin’s report. After statements representatives of France, England, Cuba, India and Ecuador, President Sunde closed meeting and set new meeting for July 31. This decision of Sunde provides delegates of Anglo-American bloc with opportunity to continue hurried behind-scenes negotiations and hold new meeting before representative of USSR Malik occupies post of presidency of SC on August 1 when turn of representative of Soviet Union to preside in SC begins.’” (330/7–2950)
↩ - See footnote 3 to telegram 1720 from Moscow, received at 9:59 a. m. on June 25, p. 139.↩