Office of the Historian

Files of the Under Secretary of State: UM M–225

Memorandum for the Files on a Meeting Held in the Office of the Under Secretary of State (Webb)1

top secret
Washington, July 28, 1950—10 a. m.

Advance Beyond the 38th Parallel (UM D–109)2

1.
Mr. Nitze explained that the substance of the recommendations in this paper was that we should wait until the time comes when our troops approach the 38th parallel before deciding whether to cross it or not. Mr. Dulles concurred with these conclusions emphasizing that the important thing was to remain flexible. Mr. McGhee pointed out that this conclusion was necessary in view of the possibility that Russian troops might reoccupy North Korea, in which case a U.S. decision to go beyond the 38th parallel would then involve us in fighting Russian troops.
2.
It was recognized that other States will want to know now what our intentions are. Mr. McGhee also pointed out that it would be desirable for the UN to have a policy on how to punish an aggressor. The North Koreans should not be left in exactly the same position they were in before they started.
3.
Mr. Tate3 stated that the General Assembly actions of 1947, 1948 and 1949 on Korea had been taken under Article 14 of the Charter rather than under Chapter 6 as indicated in the paper. Mr. Tate also suggested that we should speak of the North Korean “attack” rather than of their “aggression”, because the later word might imply the existence of a North Korean State.
4.
Mr. Nitze will see that the section dealing with UN support for an advance beyond the 38th parallel is rewritten to take account of the views expressed by Messrs. McGhee, Miller, and Sandifer.4 These agreed that it might be possible to get UN support for such a move and, as Mr. Rusk stated, that the important factor would be the position taken by those countries whose troops were doing the fighting.
5.
It was recognized that the conclusions of this paper would make it difficult to conduct an effective public information campaign. It was felt, however, that P could emphasize the UN actions and continuing efforts for Korean independence and unity. Mr. Dulles stressed the importance to the Koreans of national unity. He said he believed the kind of government under which they would be united was of secondary importance to most Koreans. He recognized therefore, that our propaganda may have to go further than the political position we are willing to take at the moment. The danger was also pointed out that if we should be pushed out of Korea, other States, particularly India, might be inclined to approve the fait accompli which had united Korea. This would be especially likely if the U.S. had not promised unity.
6.
Mr. Rusk will take the initiative to have a section added dealing with our attitude toward a possible Soviet suggestion for an early voluntary withdrawal by the North Koreans.
7.
Paragraph 16 will be modified to indicate that U.S. public and Congressional opinion would not now be satisfied with a restoration of the status quo ante, but on the other hand that they would probably not desire to make elimination of the 38th parallel a U.S. war objective.

  1. The meeting, one of a regular series, was chaired by Mr. Webb and attended by 25 Department of State officials.↩
  2. See the draft memorandum prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, July 25, p. 469.↩
  3. Jack B. Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State.↩
  4. Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.↩