795.00/7–2750: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 27—7:03 p. m.]
215. 1. Prospect of protracted UN/US military campaign Korea involving so much concentration on the fluctuations in our military fortunes, suggests importance continuing to clarify and delimit our political objectives in Korea. It would seem particularly important that our policy be currently adjusted so as to keep Korea in proper correlation to those other worldwide problems we face, in containing Soviet expansionism by building up “situations of strength” in the free world. Key political issue insofar as Korea is concerned would seem to be whether we should now, or in near future, commit ourselves to a policy of using armed force under UN auspices to eliminate Soviet influence and power from that part of Korea lying north of 38th Parallel, as essential step forward establishment unified and democratic Korea.
2. As understood here, present position this respect is that UN is by virtue UNGA recommendations still committed to achievement Korean unity by peaceful UNCOK mediation, whereas under recent SC decisions UN is now also committed to expulsion by force of NK troops from ROK territory (unless they withdraw voluntarily). Presumably under article 12 (1) of UN charter facts that SC now seized of Korean issue precludes further UNGA recommendations unless requested by SC. It would appear therefore that if UN is to make any further political recommendations re Korea, SC must itself take action or authorize forthcoming UNGA to do so.
3. To date neither in Soviet press nor in official statements has Politburo foreshadowed reaction to situation which will arise when tide of battle turns against NK troops and latter are retreating, or are about to do so. Cautious avoidance of any formal involvement of Soviet prestige in fortunes NK regime has been noteworthy (Embtel 183, July 21), and has effect leaving Soviets with freedom of action for time being. Embassy believes on basis: (1) its own estimate of Soviet intentions re all out war (Embdesp 514, April 251); (2) reasonable flexibility which Soviets have shown in past in withdrawing after tentative jabs beyond post war Iron Curtain frontiers (Iran, Greece, Berlin) have resulted in burnt fingers; and (3) Soviet attitude since Korean fighting began June 25, that at critical phase for [Page 484] NK regime as above envisaged, Soviets will not throw their own forces into South Korea or any other forces possibly at their disposal (Chinese Communist troops). Rather they are more likely, first, to attempt to arrange some kind of cease fire and truce on basis military status quo, and if this is unsuccessful, then to order NK troops to withdraw to 38th Parallel, announcing to world that KPDR has been persuaded by Soviets to bring to halt their punitive measures to deal with ROK aggressors; that this is evidence Soviet love for peace (thus salvaging some face); and, lastly, possibly proclaiming in one form or another inviolability of 38th Parallel (perhaps by signing treaty of friendship and mutual defense with KPDR at this juncture).
Possibility cannot be excluded that Soviets may make declaration re inviolability 38th Parallel well prior to period of NK military reverses with view deterring UN from adopting any resolution calling for action to unify Korea with assistance UN forces and or to punish NK aggression through military occupation north of 38th Parallel. Soviets would then be counting on intimidating some UN members on basis that to take action in face such warning would precipitate WW III.
4. On other hand, Soviets may feel that for them to commit themselves definitely to defense NK, particularly if UN had earlier indicated its determination take all steps within its power to bring about establishment unified and democratic Korea after restoration peace and security in the area, would involve risk all out war, which Embassy believes Soviets still wish to avoid. We should obviously be prepared to take quick advantage of any such temporary military vacuum, such as political unification moves under UN auspices, using such UN and ROK military units as may be necessary for maintenance internal law and order.
5. Positive advantages which would derive from an early proclamation by UN of its determination to assist the Koreans by all possible means to achievement their freedom in an independent, unified and democratic state, are manifest. Such forthright enunciation would give heart to all non-Communist Koreans in their time of travail and would be particularly useful as a morale stimulant to those Koreans, both civilian and military, who are actively cooperating with US and UN forces. Proclamation by UN that objective UN effort is establishment unified and independent Asian state would also tend help our cause with vacillating non-Communist Asian opinion, which to considerable degree appears view present conflict struggle between two power blocs, without involving any fundamental principles of right or wrong.
6. From several points of view, therefore, it seems desirable UN formulate and declare its purposes regarding political future of Korea. No doubt we are sufficiently in touch with sympathetic fellow UN [Page 485] members to take sounding with view crystallizing the nature and timing of such declaration. This connection Embassy believes that while an affirmation by SC, that UN will persist in its efforts towards Korean unity, might well be made now or in near future, it would be decidedly premature to make any move which would definitely commit us to use our forces north of 38th Parallel regardless of military situation in NK at time NK troops in South Korea near defeat. Our enormous responsibilities in Western Europe, not to mention peripheral sore spots in SEA and NE, preclude any commitments to extend our Korean effort beyond present objectives until we are in better position evaluate degree to which Soviets are willing to risk showdown in Korean peninsula which, it must be recognized, does constitute favorable military terrain for Soviets and their Asian puppets.
7. In essence Soviet inspired NK aggression left us with but one choice: to demonstrate unmistakably before eyes free world that we would not permit extension Soviet power by armed aggression beyond present limits Soviet sphere. Our firm stand and willingness to undertake risks and sacrifices for that end have made a deep impression not only on non-Communist world but, I am sure, on Soviet leaders too. We should seek to achieve a basic solution of the Korean political problem at the same time as we inflict a decisive defeat on the NK aggressors, and it is possible that the latter event will open the path to a solution. At present time, however, it should be recognized that we are not in a position to make a realistic appraisal of the obstacles, military and otherwise, that will face us even after NK troops in South Korea have been defeated; and elementary prudence dictates that we not take on now an obligation, the fulfillment of which may require a US military effort out of proportion to political and strategic importance of Korea.
Department pass London, Paris. Repeated info London 71, Paris 59.