Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 76/1

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

top secret
NSC 76/1

Washington, July 25, 1950.

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on U.S. Courses of Action in the Event Soviet Forces Enter Korean Hostilities

References:	NSC Action No. 308–c1
	NSC 762

The enclosed comments on NSC 76, prepared by the Department of State and the National Security Resources Board Consultants,³ respectively, are submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of NSC 76 as Item 2 on the Agenda of the Meeting scheduled for Thursday, July 27, 1950.

The National Security Council Consultants recommend that after discussion by the Council, NSC 76 together with the enclosures be referred to the Consultants for preparation of a report on the subject in the light of the discussion by the Council.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

State Department Consultant’s Comments With Respect to NSC 76

1. The State Department agrees completely that full-scale mobilization should be initiated immediately it is determined that major Soviet combat units have entered Korean hostilities or have indicated their intention of engaging. The further decisions set forth in NSC 76 relate to the most basic national policies and should not be taken except at the highest level in the light of all relevant circumstances at the time.

2. The determination whether major Soviet combat units have entered Korean hostilities or have clearly indicated their intention of engaging in hostilities, and the decision to initiate the actions contemplated by NSC 76 should be made only by the President. It is difficult at this time to foresee clearly the various possible ways in which the engagement of Soviet combat units might be indicated or occur. It would be of the utmost importance that a course of action not be touched off by an incorrect evaluation of the actual situation which had arisen.⁴

3. The phrases “prepare to minimize its commitment in Korea” and “prepare to execute war plans” appear to require clarification. The State Department assumes that the phrase “prepare to minimize its commitment” means that the evacuation of Korea would be prepared and undertaken. The State Department is not clear as to what, in addition to the initiation of full-scale mobilization, is contemplated by the phrase “prepare to execute war plans”. In any event, it is the opinion of the State Department that the actual decision should be made by the President in the light of all the circumstances at the time. It is the State Department’s opinion that, prior to the actual execution of war plans, careful consideration should be given to the following points, among others:

a. Appropriate action in the United Nations.

b. The effect on our relations with our principal allies. The Atlantic Pact does not by its terms cover hostilities breaking out in Korea.

c. The advisability of the immediate execution of war plans under the particular state of facts which had occurred. In this connection it would be important to determine:

(1) Whether the nature of the commitment of Soviet forces had been such as to secure the clear support of world opinion for the execution of war plans by us.

(2) What would be the effect upon our allies, in particular our European allies, of an immediate generalization of hostilities.

(3) Whether the country was sufficiently mobilized to carry out its war plans with maximum effectiveness in the light not only of the immediate military situation but also of the total campaign to be waged, or whether additional time for mobilization would improve the prospects of ultimate victory.

d. The type of action to be taken by the Congress before the initiation of war plans. A decision as to what action the Congress should take would have to be made by the President.⁵

1. The text of the record of action, taken at the 58th NSC meeting on June 28, read as follows: “Agreed that the Council should prepare for consideration by the President recommendations as to the courses of action to be followed in the event that Soviet forces enter Korean hostilities.” (NSC files) See also footnote 1 to the note from Acheson to Johnson, June 28, p. 217.
2. See footnote 2 to the memorandum, July 10, from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, p. 346.
3. The comments of the NSRB Consultant are not printed.

4. At its 62nd meeting on July 27, the NSC recorded the following decision taken as Action No. 324 (b):

   “Agreed with the recommendation by the Secretary of State that, in order to establish the fact of support to the North Koreans by the USSR or the Chinese Communists, aerial reconnaissance over all Korean territory, including Korean coastal waters, up to the Yalu River on the west and up to but short of the Korean-Soviet International boundary on the east should be authorized, subject to the understanding that such operations will be conducted from as far south of the frontiers of Manchuria or the Soviet Union as practicable, and that in no case will these frontiers be overflown.

   “Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action.” (NSC files)

   Appropriate instructions were sent out by the JCS to General MacArthur in telegram JCS 88051, August 5, for text, see vol. vi, p. 424.

5. According to Action No. 323 taken at the 62nd meeting of the NSC on July 27, the NSC “noted and discussed the reference reports [NSC 76 and 76/1] and referred them to the NSC Consultants and Staff for the preparation of recommendations for Council action thereon”. (NSC files) Subsequently, this action was cancelled in the light of action taken on NSC 73/4 of August 25, scheduled for publication in volume i, and NSC 81/1, September 9, post, p. 712.