Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/7–2550

Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff

top secret

[Washington, July 25, 1950.]¹

Problem:

To decide upon U.S. policy regarding the advance beyond the 38th parallel of U.S. forces now engaged in Korea as a part of the U.N. forces.

Analysis:

1. As U.N. forces drive back North Korean forces and approach the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U.N. members which are supporting the Security Council Resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities can be confined to Korea or will spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

2. In its Resolution of June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security Council (a) noted “with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea”; (b) determined “that this action constitutes a breach of the peace”; (c) called for “the immediate cessation of hostilities”; (d) called upon “the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel”; and (e) called upon “all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.”

3. In its Resolution of June 27, 1950, the Security Council (a) noted “from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security”; (b) noted “the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security”; and (c) recommended “that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area”.

4. In a third Resolution of July 7, the Security Council requested the United State to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized these forces to fly the U.N. flag. In response to this Resolution, General MacArthur was designated as Commander of these forces. The Republic of Korea also has placed its forces under General Mac Arthur’s command.

5. In his message to the Congress on July 19, President Truman stated that he thought it important that the nature of our military action in Korea be understood; that it should be made perfectly clear that the action was undertaken as a matter of basic moral principle; that the United States was going to the aid of a nation established and supported by the United Nations and unjustifiably attacked by an aggressor force.

6. The present military action in Korea responds to the Security Council resolutions which come within the scope of provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter dealing with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

7. The General Assembly Resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949 are a part of the U.N. effort which is strongly supported by the United States, to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. This effort is based upon provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter, dealing with pacific settlement of disputes.

8. There are, therefore, two phases of the Korean problem: (a) the long-term effort to bring about unity and independence, and (b) the present enforcement action to repel North Korean aggression. This paper is addressed primarily to the latter phase of the problem.

9. The following contingencies are envisaged as the U.N. enforcement action develops, provided North Korean forces are not reinforced by U.S.S.R. or Communist Chinese troops; (a) voluntary withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel before U.N. forces have begun a counter-offensive; (b) a withdrawal in good order of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel at a time when they are being driven northward to a point approaching the 38th parallel; (c) a major defeat and disintegration of North Korean forces during the period when they are being driven back toward the 38th parallel; (d) continued resistance by North Korean forces after U.N. forces have reached the 38th parallel. Another contingency is the occupation of North Korea to the 38th parallel by Soviet or Communist Chinese forces before the U.N. forces reach the 38th parallel, or active support of the North Korean forces south of the 38th parallel by Chinese Communist or Soviet forces.

10. A need for important decisions will arise with a reversal of the military situation in Korea and the approach of U.N. forces toward the 38th parallel. It is probable that at the time when it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression cannot succeed and that eventually North Korean forces will be driven back north of the 38th parallel the Kremlin will take a decision (if it has not already done so) regarding a course of action in the new situation.

11. There is ample evidence of the strategic importance to Russia of the Korean peninsula. It is unlikely that the Kremlin at present would accept the establishment in North Korea of a regime which it could not dominate and control.

When it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression will be defeated, there might be some agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the North Korean regime which would mean in substance that U.N. military action north of the 38th parallel would result in conflict with the U.S.S.R. or Communist China.

While fighting is in progress south of the 38th parallel the Kremlin might bring about the occupation of North Korea either with its own or with Chinese communist forces.

The Kremlin might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities still are in progress south of the 38th parallel. We should guard against terms that would leave the aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

12. If North Korean forces withdraw or are driven back to the 38th parallel, continued military action by the U.N. forces for the purpose of imposing a settlement with a view to a unified and independent Korea would depend upon majority support in the U.N.

13. There probably would be reluctance and opposition to multilateral use of force as a part of the United Nations effort, initiated under the provisions for pacific settlement, to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. Conversely, there probably would be gratification and acclaim were extraordinary efforts to be made to avoid such use of force. The above would be true particularly in many of the countries of Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia.

14. It will be desirable to bear in mind both the eventual advisability of securing, through intensive diplomatic preparation, support on the part of the majority of United Nations Members for any action that might be taken beyond the 38th parallel, and the possible advantages of assuming a position which will clearly show that every effort has been exhausted to avoid carrying the military struggle into a new phase by a land offensive beyond the 38th parallel.

15. The future of the Korean people is an important consideration. The United States has supported the U.N. effort to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. However, the United States has not had and does not now have any commitment to use military force to bring about that independence and unity.

Having been the victim of armed attack from North Korea, the Republic of Korea naturally will want a settlement that gives a maximum guarantee against the danger of similar future attacks. The Korean people and Government already are insisting that the 38th parallel division must go and that the present opportunity to unify the country must be seized.

16. Likewise, public and Congressional opinion in the United States might be dissatisfied with any conclusion falling short of what it would consider a “final” settlement of the problem. Hence, a sentiment might arise favoring a continuation of military action north of the 38th parallel.

17. The advantages of an effort involving the use of military force to attain the complete independence and unity of Korea after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel must be weighed against the disadvantages of such a course. If the North Korean forces are decisively defeated and if North Korea suffers heavy material damage from air attack, those forces are not likely to attack again soon. The United States and other U.N. members should be in a much stronger position to take effective action as present efforts have time to take effect. It seems likely, also, that a satisfactory permanent solution of the Korean problem can be hoped for only when and if a substantial accommodation is reached between the U.S.S.R. and the non-communist world.

Conclusions:

18. It is U.S. policy to help bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. That policy has a sound basis of right and principle. U.S. action to carry out the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council regarding North Korean aggression are in accord with our policy of strong support of the United Nations; but we have no commitment to use armed force in the effort to bring about Korean independence and unity.

19. The Korean problem must be dealt with in the wider framework of the conflict between the communist and non-communist countries. The necessity to maintain a realistic balance between our military strength on the one hand and commitments and risks on the other hand, together with the need for additional information which depends upon political and military developments in the near future, make it impossible to take decisions now regarding our future course of action in Korea. It seems clear that our national security and interest will be best served at present by maintaining the greatest possible degree of flexibility and freedom of action.

Recommendations:

20. The present vigorous U.S. action in support of the United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding North Korean aggression should be continued.

21. Decisions regarding our course of action when the U.N. forces approach the 38th parallel should be deferred until military and political developments provide the additional information necessary to enable us: (a) to base our decisions on the situation in Korea and in other parts of the world at that time; (b) to consult with other U.N. members who are supporting the Security Council resolutions in regard to measures which might be necessary or desirable once the aggression has been brought to an end; and (c) to keep our military capabilities and commitments in safe balance.

1. The source text bore the notation that it was drafted on July 25 by George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff; it was forwarded to Max W. Bishop, Department of State representative on the NSC staff, by Philip Watts under cover of a memorandum dated July 26, not printed, which indicated that the document was now ready to go to the NSC staff for appropriate processing. Mr. Watts’ memorandum also noted that the document had been prepared by the Policy Planning Staff in consultation with Messrs. Jessup and Bishop along with representatives of the Bureaus of Far Eastern and United Nations Affairs.