Office of the Historian

795.00/7–1950: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority
Moscow, July 19, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received July 19—8:45 a. m.]

165. Russian text Stalin’s reply to Nehru as published Soviet press confirms accuracy English translation transmitted GOI by Radhakrishnan. Key word is “tselesoobrazno” which can be translated “expedient” or “suitable”. Bajpai’s assumption Soviet Embassy Delhi meddled with text therefore appears correct.

Reur thought Indian Embassy here may have deliberately toned down Stalin’s message in order make it appear more palatable, I feel [Page 425] you may possibly have gained impression from Bajpai that divergencies between GOI and Radhakrishnan (urtels 3, July 131 and 8 July 142) on Korean issue reflect tendency of latter take “softer” line with Soviets than desired by GOI. We do not have complete picture here of course but as stated mytel 10, July 133 Radhakrishnan seemed to be genuinely proud of role he played in influencing GOI to support SC resolution of June 27 and his informal mediatory approach to me on July 9 smacked less of appeasement than Nehru’s present mediation efforts.

In fact from recent conversation with Indian Embassy officer it seems Indian Embassy has received message from GOI rapping it over knuckles for way it handled informal mediation effort with this Embassy and implying arguments used by Indian Embassy that connection (which appear to have become known to MEA) raise question Radhakrishnan’s good faith and impartiality and possibly compromise his position vis-à-vis Soviets. It appears therefore that whatever indiscretions Indian Embassy may have committed (and Indian Embassy source continues maintain that his Ambassador’s approach to me was based on GOI instructions) stem from its allegedly unneutral, i.e., pro-US attitude on certain vital aspects Korean issue.

Incompleteness of our information here on what Radhakrishnan told Soviet DepFonMins Zorin and Gromyko in his conversations with them on July 1 and 13 respectively precludes my reaching 100% firm conclusions re Radhakrishnan’s position in this affair but for reasons given foregoing paragraphs I am inclined to believe his approach to me although unrealistic was conceived in friendly pro-US spirit.

Dept. pass Delhi, sent Delhi priority 16.

Kirk
  1. See telegram 79 from New Delhi, received on July 13 at 12:39 p. m., p. 371.↩
  2. See telegram 86 from New Delhi, received on July 14 at 1:25 p. m., p. 385.↩
  3. See telegram 111 from Moscow, received on July 13 at 11:32 a. m., p. 370.↩