Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

330/7–1750

Memorandum of Conversations, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

secret

[Washington,] July 18, 1950.

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador; and Mr. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State.

Sir Oliver handed me copies of the report Ambassador Kelly had made on his last talk with Gromyko (copies attached).

He then gave me the following message for the Secretary: He said Mr. Bevin had inquired whether or not it would be possible to see the Secretary in Washington during the UN and had appreciated the Secretary’s statement that he would probably be in New York for a considerable period of time and that, therefore, he was quite ready to agree that he should see the Secretary in New York and not in Washington.

Sir Oliver had a news dispatch indicating that London had released their action concerning oil in Hong Kong.¹ He asked that this action be explained to our Congressional leaders as soon as it was made public (This has been done).

Sir Oliver then repeated the question he had asked the Secretary on Sunday² as to whether or not he could have any information as to the President’s message³ to forward to London so that Mr. Attlee might be informed in the event of questions in the House of Commons as soon as the message was released (This was done at 10:00 p. m., July 18).

In response to a question which I put to Sir Oliver as to the Formosa situation, he indicated that he thought that the thing that was most troublesome about the original statement of the President was the implication that we would never agree that Formosa would go to China so long as there was a Communist Government in China.

Later in the evening Sir Oliver telephoned that he had received a message from London saying that they were now considering what reply if any should be made to Gromyko’s statement to Ambassador Kelly and that they would consult with us on the reply before making it.

George W. Perkins

[Enclosure]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

17 July 1950.

Mr. Gromyko asked me to call at 9:30 p. m. Moscow time and informed me of substance of a Russian text which he then handed me. Literal translation follows in my immediately following telegram.⁴

2. He began by briefly summarizing my communication of July 11th and then stated that in opinion of Soviet Government Security Council should be convened with “indispensable” (he emphasized the word) participation of Chinese Peoples Government. “And that” (Russian text has “so that”) representatives of Korean people should be heard, and that Security Council should then solve the Korean question.

3. I said our general attitude to representation of Chinese Peoples Government was known but that this was separate from actual situation which was that forces representing 53 United Nations were being attacked in South Korea. Did he mean this was to be referred to Security Council with Chinese Government in it and that, meanwhile hostilities should continue?

4. Mr. Gromyko at first evaded direct answer but on being strongly pressed finally said that it was for Security Council to “solve the broad Korean question” including the cessation of hostilities.

5. By coincidence I had three journalists dining with me this evening and was therefore obliged to explain to them my reasons for leaving. I authorised them to report on my return that I had seen Gromyko at his request in continuation of earlier conversations on the subject of Korea.

Aide-Mémoire

On July 11th M. l’Ambassadeur, you informed me for communication to the Soviet Government that the British Government being bound by the latest decisions of the Security Council, cannot at the present time put forward definite proposals for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and that the British Government considers the putting forward of such proposals to be running ahead. At the same time, so you stated, M. l’Ambassadeur, the British Government considers it necessary, by way of a preliminary proposal, that the hostilities in Korea should be terminated and the North Korean troops withdrawn behind the 38th parallel. I am authorised to state to you that the Soviet Government considers the best means for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question to be the convening of the Security Council with the indispensable participation of representatives of the Peoples Government of China so that representatives of the Korean people should be heard during the deciding of the Korean question.

With reference to the preliminary proposal of the British Government, the Soviet Government considers that, to avoid running ahead, this, and also any other proposals should be submitted for the consideration of the Security Council.

[Document, although in form of letter, has no superscription or signature.]⁵

17.7.50

1. The British Admiralty had requisitioned all oil stocks in Hong Kong for military requirements. The effect of this measure, since there were no direct deliveries to North Korea, was to prevent shipments from Hong Kong to Communist China, whence the oil might be transshipped to North Korea. For related documentation, see vol. vi, pp. 619 ff.
2. July 16.
3. Reference is to President Truman’s message to Congress on July 19, concerning which, along with his radio address to the nation on the same day, see editorial note, p. 430.
4. Printed in this document under the subheading “Aide-Mémoire”, below.
5. Brackets appear in the source text.